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ABSTRACT 
Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including vulnerability, 
powerlessness and dependence on others for help. The nursing literature is saturated with 
debate about a 'therapeutic' nurse-patient relationship. However, despite the current 
agenda regarding patient-centred care, literature concerning the development of good 
interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on 
persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the 
traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I 
critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics 
and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based 
moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. Instead, the moral 
virtues and virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I 
develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to 
nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such 
as compassion and courage, (2) using judgment and (3) using moral wisdom - moral 
perception, sensitivity and imagination. Merits and problems of this approach are 
examined. Following Macintyre, I conceive nursing as a practice; nurses who exercise the 
virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus 
prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong (action-guiding) practice based 
version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist and relational. Several 
areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to 
develop this account yet further. 
II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis is my own work. However, I would like to offer my gratitude to several people. 
I would like to thank Dr. Shaun Parsons for his encouragement and friendship. 
I would like to thank Dr. Parsons and Professor Phil Barker for providing me with the 
opportunity to register for the Ph.D. 
I would like to thank Dr. Christine Stevenson who took the time to review some of the early 
drafts of this thesis. 
I would like to thank Lars Madsen, a fellow Ph.D. student in the Department of Psychiatry. 
Lars and I discussed several themes in this thesis and this was most helpful. 
I was awarded a Bursary from the Department of Psychiatry, University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne. Once again I thank Dr Parsons. I am also most grateful to the Robinson Library, 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne for awarding me the Catherine Cookson Bequest 
Bursary, 1998-2001. Without the funds from these two bursaries, this thesis would not 
have been completed. 
I would like to thank Susan Yates, Lecturer in the Department of Nursing at the University 
of Central Lancashire in Preston. Susan critically reviewed several Chapters, but she was 
also a friend who listened to my woes. 
iii 
My immediate family has been very special over the past few years. lowe a great debt -
emotional and financial - to my kind sister, Dawn, and my generous brother-in-law, 
Steven. I thank both of you from the bottom of my heart; you know that without your help 
over the past dozen or so years, I would not have succeeded. 
How do I begin to thank my wonderful parents, Kenneth and Mary? Your kindness, 
generosity, patience and love have helped me enormously through my whole life. I thank 
both of you very much for your help and support. This thesis is dedicated to my 
grandparents, Henry Bruce Armstrong (my father's father) and Florence Keeney (my 
mother's mother). 
My life changed out of all recognition on April 16th 1999 when I first met Carol who is now 
my fiancee. Carol's youngest daughter, Stephanie, is a joy (most of the time!). The past 
five years with Carol have been the best years of my life so far. Carol, you love me and do 
not judge me. Without your kindness, patience, understanding and love, I could not have 
completed this thesis. I therefore also dedicate this thesis to you, Carol - thank you. 
IV 
CONTENTS 
TITLE OF CHAPTER/SECTION 
Title 
Abstract 
Acknowledgements 
Contents 
List of Figures 
Preface 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Aim of the thesis 
Background to the thesis 
My background 
Oelphi studies 
Motivations for this thesis 
Type of thesis 
Philosophical ethics 
Plan of the thesis 
Chapter 2 - Illness, narratives and the value of the nurse-patient 
relationship 
Chapter 3 - The virtues in general ethics 
Chapter 4 - A critique of obligation-based moral theories in general 
ethics 
Chapter 5 - The origins, development and tenets of virtue ethics 
Chapter 6 - A critical account of obligation-based moral theories in 
nursing practice 
Chapter 7 - Virtue-based moral decision-making in nursing practice 
Chapter 8 - Macintyre's account of the virtues 
Chapter 9 - Macintyre's account of the virtues and the virtue-based 
approach to moral decision-making in nursing practice 
Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
v 
PAGE No. 
1/ 
iii -iv 
v - xiii 
XIV 
XV 
1 -10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Conclusions 
References and endnotes 
CHAPTER 2 -ILLNESS, NARRATIVES AND THE VALUE OF 
THE NURSE-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
Introduction 
Illness and narratives 
Hospitalization and patients' emotions 
Anxiety 
Fear 
Powerlessness 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability and trust 
Dependence on others 
A brief history of the nurse-patient relationship 
The nurse-patient relationship in contemporary nursing and the 
notion of empowerment 
The medical model and disempowerment 
The Tidal Model and empowerment 
Therapeutic nurse-patient relationships 
Helping relationships 
The nurse-patient relationship: empirical research findings 
The role of the nurse 
The role of the nurse - some empirical research findings 
9 
10 
11 - 48 
11 
11 
14 
14 
14 
16 
18 
18 
20 
20 
22 
24 
25 
26 
28 
28 
30 
31 
Barker, Jackson and Stevenson on the essential feature of mental 33 
health nursing 
Depth of knowing 34 
Power 35 
Time 36 
Translation 37 
Defining a 'good' nurse 38 
Conclusions 40 
References and endnotes 42 
CHAPTER 3 - THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL ETHICS 49 -73 
Introduction 49 
On the idea of one's life faring well 49 
The virtues in the history of philosophy 50 
vi 
What is a virtue? 51 
Aristotle on virtue 51 
Are the virtues types of knowledge? 52 
The contemporary meaning of the term 'virtue' 54 
Assumptions about virtues and goodness 55 
Morality, ethics and the moral life 56 
Virtues or vices? 57 
Is it possible to list the virtues? 58 
What might determine important virtues? 59 
Virtues and roles 59 
Is a single set of virtues desirable for all persons? 60 
Do the virtues differ within different societies? 61 
What is a virtue? Revisited 61 
Why are the virtues valuable? 62 
The example of honesty 62 
The example of kindness 63 
Communities and the virtues 64 
The 'virtues' of charity and temperance: more difficult examples 65 
Lacking virtue and showing the vices 65 
Advantages of the virtue-based approach to morality 66 
Action-guidance from the virtue and vice terms 66 
Problems with the virtues 67 
Identifying the virtues 68 
The moral status of the virtues 69 
Conclusions 71 
References and endnotes 72 
CHAPTER 4 - A CRITIQUE OF OBLIGATION-BASED MORAL 74 -132 
THEORIES IN GENERAL ETHICS 
Introduction 74 
Characterizing obligation-based moral theories 74 
Consequentialism 75 
Act-consequentialism 75 
Objections to act-consequentialism 78 
The neglect of moral character 78 
Anti-theory and the assumption that moral dilemmas are resolvable 79 
The neglect of moral remainder 80 
vii 
Problems with utilitarianism 84 
Ignoring other peoples' rights 84 
No action-guidance until the second premise 85 
Utilitarian isms' single rule and misrepresenting morality 86 
Misrepresenting morality: Stocker on modern moral theories' account 88 
of moral motivation 
Act-consequentialism and the problem of intuitions 89 
Utilitarianism: impartialism and conflicts between intuitions 90 
Which intuitions are deeper than others? 92 
Intuitions - the need for supporting argumentation 94 
Merits of consequentialism 95 
It avoids the charge of moral relativism 95 
Consequentialism is codifiable 96 
Rule-consequentialism 96 
Hare's indirect consequentialism 98 
Criticism of Hare's theory 104 
Consequentialism - conclusions 105 
Deontology 106 
Contemporary deontology 107 
Deontological constraints 111 
Deontological constraints - negative formulations 111 
Deontological constraints - narrowly framed and bounded 112 
Deontological constraints - narrowly directed 112 
Intention and foresight in deontology 112 
Deontology and the doctrine of double effect 114 
Problems with deontology 117 
No action-guidance until its second premise 117 
Wrongful harming or the permissible causing of harm? 118 
Appealing to the notion of respect 118 
Criticisms of the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between 120 
intended and foreseen harm 
Criticisms of deontology's rules 121 
Moral and legal rights: a critique 122 
Deontology and intuitions: a response 124 
Deontology: conclusions 126 
Conclusions 126 
References and endnotes 127 
viii 
CHAPTER 5 - THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND TENETS 133 - 187 
OF VIRTUE ETHICS 
Introduction 133 
The characterization of moral theories 133 
The origins and development of virtue ethics 134 
What do other moral theories say about the virtues? 135 
The central tenets of virtue ethics 135 
Virtue ethics: nomenclature 137 
Supplementary virtue ethics 137 
Supplementary virtue ethics: weak and moderate versions 137 
Supplementary virtue ethics in medicine: Pellegrino and Thomasma 138 
Supplementary virtue ethics in nursing 139 
Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva's virtue ethics 139 
Criticism of Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva's version 140 
Strong virtue ethics 141 
Aristotle's virtue ethics 142 
Eudaimonia 143 
What does flourishing comprise? 145 
Goodness and function 146 
The use of 'good' 146 
Hitting the right mark: the doctrine of the mean 147 
Achieving the mean 148 
"Real" virtue 148 
Virtues and desires 149 
Moral education 149 
Moral and non-moral virtues 150 
Objections to Aristotle's ethics 151 
Does man have a function? 151 
Is man's function unique? 151 
Why choose 'reason' as the function of man? 152 
Elitism and injustice 152 
Why lead the good life? 153 
Responses to criticisms 154 
Contemporary virtue ethics and moral character 155 
Virtue ethics: the focus on the moral character of persons 157 
Virtue ethics and impartialism 159 
Hursthouse on action-guidance and the v-rules 160 
Virtue ethics and moral education 163 
ix 
Objections to virtue ethics 
What is virtue ethics? 
Strong virtue ethics - a viable view? 
Moral rules and deontic language versus aretaic terms 
Benn on virtue ethics' exclusivity 
The problem of completeness 
What do the virtues entail? 
Virtue ethics and the charge of moral relativism 
The problem of completeness revisited 
Virtue ethics: conflicts between virtues 
Conflicts between virtues: a response 
Conflicts of moral obligations and rules 
Can one display a virtue in performing a bad or evil deed? 
Virtue ethics: supplementary or strong? 
Conclusions 
References and endnotes 
CHAPTER 6 - A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF OBLIGATION-
BASED MORAL THEORIES IN NURSING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Why are obligation-based moral theories popular in nursing? 
Examples of the deontic approach in the nursing literature 
Examples of moral decision-making tools or models 
The four principles approach to biomedical ethics 
The principle of non-maleficence 
The principle of justice 
The principle of respect for autonomy 
Autonomy 
Kant on autonomy 
Respect for autonomy 
The principle of beneficence 
Disadvantages of obligation-based moral theories in nursing 
Conclusions 
References and endnotes 
CHAPTER 7 - VIRTUE-BASED MORAL DECISION-MAKING 
IN NURSING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Judgment and moral wisdom 
Judgment 
Moral wisdom 
x 
164 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
175 
176 
180 
180 
182 
188 - 218 
188 
188 
190 
195 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
204 
205 
206 
208 
210 
214 
219 - 272 
219 
220 
220 
225 
Moral perception 225 
Moral sensitivity 229 
Moral imagination 231 
The virtue-based helping relationship 232 
The virtue of compassion 233 
Compassion and caring 238 
Courage and advocacy 240 
Respectfulness and empowerment 241 
Virtue-based moral decision-making 242 
The virtue of compassion 242 
The use of judgment and moral wisdom in nursing practice 244 
Merits of the virtue-based approach 246 
The language of the virtues 246 
Adequate action-guidance 247 
The virtue-based approach, consequences and other morally relevant 248 
features 
The virtue-based approach and the role of emotions in morality 248 
The virtue-based approach and resolving moral dilemmas 249 
The virtue-based approach and moral education 250 
The virtue-based approach, narrative accounts of illness and patient- 250 
centred care 
The virtue-based approach and the use of judgment and moral wisdom 251 
in moral decision-making 
The virtue-based approach and 'reasons for action' 251 
Problems of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice 253 
Assumptions about virtues and goodness 253 
Assumptions about the meaning of 'virtuous' 254 
Identifying the virtues 255 
Why should nurses be virtuous when nursing patients who have 257 
committed deplorable acts? 
The problem of exercising a virtue to an excessive degree 259 
Conflicts between virtues 262 
Conclusions 265 
References and endnotes 268 
CHAPTER 8 - MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE VIRTUES 273 - 305 
Introduction 273 
Summary of the argument so far 273 
Macintyre's account of the virtues 273 
Macintyre on modern moral philosophy 274 
Macintyre's argument 276 
T1 - The role and importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of 277 
the self in morality 
T2 - Macintyre on practices, goods and the virtues 279 
T3 - The role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in morality 283 
xi 
Further discussion of and objections to Macintyre's thesis 
T1 - The role and importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of 
the self in morality 
On the epistemological and normative dimensions of the self 
On choosing and deciding 
On the good life 
Denying a telos for man? 
Man as a story telling animal 
T2 - Macintyre on practices, goods and the virtues 
The flourishing of the virtues in modernity 
On practices 
Miller on Macintyre's notion of a practice 
T3 - The role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in morality 
The threat of moral relativism 
On liberalism ignoring social and historical contexts in moral 
philosophy 
Conclusions 
References and endnotes 
CHAPTER 9 - MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE VIRTUES 
AND THE VIRTUE-BASED APPROACH TO MORAL 
DECISION-MAKING IN NURSING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Nursing practice, narratives and morality 
Nursing as a practice, its internal goods and the virtues 
The virtue-based approach as a tradition of enquiry 
Conclusions 
References and endnotes 
CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The argument summarized 
Problems with the virtue-based approach 
What about clinical skills? 
Conflicts between virtues 
Areas for further research and enquiry 
Research on identifying the virtues and conflicts between virtues 
Research on the intellectual virtues, judgment and moral wisdom 
Virtue ethics and blame 
Patients with chronic illness and the virtues 
xii 
286 
286 
286 
288 
289 
290 
291 
292 
292 
295 
296 
300 
300 
300 
302 
304 
306 - 319 
306 
306 
309 
315 
315 
319 
320 - 340 
320 
320 
326 
328 
329 
331 
331 
331 
331 
332 
Merits of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice 
The virtue-based approach and Hursthouse on dilemmas and moral 
remainder 
Hursthouse on 'morally right decision/right moral decision' 
Teaching the virtues 
Can the virtues be taught? 
How can the virtues be taught? 
Conclusions 
References and endnotes 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
xiii 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
337 
338 
340 
341 - 355 
FIGURE 
Description of Figure Page 
No. 
Figure 1: A representation of the virtue-based approach, the practice 318 
of nursing and the virtues of justice, kindness, courage and patience. 
XIV 
PREFACE 
This thesis proposes a philosophical argument about the virtues and applies it to adult and 
mental health nursing. There are four stylistic issues to note. 
First, I write this thesis in the first person as is customary in the arts including applied 
philosophy. Second, I use a modified form of the Vancouver referencing system. 
References and endnotes are compiled at the end of each chapter. I have attempted to 
keep endnotes to a minimum. In the 'Bibliography', there is an alphabetical list of literature 
that I have reviewed since March 2000. Third, in the chapters that focus on nursing, I have 
used the term 'patients' rather than 'clients'; I have done so because this is typical in 
philosophical ethics. And, fourth, for brevity I use 'nursing' to mean both adult and mental 
health nursing and I use 'nurses' to mean both adult and mental health nurses. If I need to 
make a distinction, then I make this clear. 
xv 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
I n this Chapter, I set the scene for the argument to follow. I describe the aim of the thesis 
and provide some background information about my clinical experience. I describe my 
participation in 2 Delphi questionnaire studies and I explain the reasons behind this 
particular thesis. I clarify that this is a theoretical, not empirical, thesis. I close by outlining 
the content of each Chapter. 
Aim of the thesis 
In this thesis, I argue that a strong virtue ethics and a virtue-based approach provide a 
defensible and plausible nursing ethics. 
Background to the thesis 
I shall first describe my background both in terms of my nursing experience and interest in 
health care ethics. I then describe my involvement in two Delphi questionnaire studies. 
Finally, I consider my reasons for writing this thesis. 
My background 
I commenced my registered general nurse (RGN) training in June 1986 at the County 
Durham School of Nursing based in Darlington, County Durham, England. I enjoyed many 
aspects of the training, especially the clinical placements where one could see the reality 
of nursing practice. 
The subject of ethics was not taught in my nurse-training program. I did not question this 
omission. Furthermore, I did not think that the development of the nurse-patient 
relationship involved a moral dimension. 
I became fascinated and perplexed by the wide range of moral dilemmas, problems and 
issues in nursing practice. With hindsight, my conceptual framework was a combination of 
patients' rights and nurses' obligations. I also began to critically reflect about a broad 
range of nursing issues. 
My interest in nursing ethics and critical reasoning intensified when I qualified as a RGN in 
1989. I specialized in two clinical areas: hematological and spinal injuries nursing. Moral 
dilemmas and problems seemed to pervade all nursing activities in both these specialist 
areas. 
Between 1989 and 1992, I relished clinical nursing. But I also had a deep fascination and 
curiosity towards moral concerns in nursing. For example, (a) what are the moral issues 
involved when patients refuse life-prolonging chemotherapy?, (b) how ought I tell a patient 
that he is paralyzed and probably will never walk again? and (c) what does it mean to act 
in a patient's 'best interests'? 
Because of this interest in nursing ethics, I left full-time clinical nursing to study for a 
degree in philosophy. I enrolled at the University of Sunderland for a BA (Hons) in 
Philosophy with History in September 1992. I continued to work part-time as a nurse, 
especially during the vacations. Continuing to work as a nurse meant that my interest and 
understanding of moral problems in clinical nursing could develop. Concurrently, I began 
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to study some of the major figures in western philosophy, for example, Plato, Aristotle, 
Kant and Mill. 
After graduating in 1995, I registered part-time for a MA in health care ethics at the 
University of Leeds, England. Several highly respected moral philosophers taught on this 
course and I thoroughly enjoyed the intellectual challenge that it provided. 
I had known Dr. Shaun Parsons since my nurse training in Darlington. He was employed 
as a lecturer in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Through Dr Parsons, I was introduced to Professor Phil Barker. Soon after, I began 
teaching ethics to mental health nurses (1996-2001). During this period, I taught several 
experienced mental health nurses. Through sharing ideas and arguments, my 
understanding of ethical issues in mental health nursing developed. 
I registered for the PhD on a part-time basis in September 1997. My initial idea was to 
examine 'The value and sanctity of human life in patients with mental illness'. I spent the 
first year of my candidature reading literature and writing a draft chapter. 
Delphi studies 
I was awarded a departmental bursary to organize and manage two Delphi1 questionnaire 
studies, with a view to writing up the studies for publication. Professor Barker also asked 
me to review the literature in mental health nursing ethics. I reviewed approximately 30 
articles. I was already aware that obligation-based moral theories were popular in both 
nursing ethics and nursing practice. But this belief was further supported from the findings 
of the literature review. In short, the focus was on 'ethical decision making' and the 
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'resolution' of moral dilemmas in nursing practice. In order for nurses to be 'ethical' the 
message was clear: nurses must 'abide' by moral obligations, rules and principles. 
I began work on the Delphi studies in August 1998. By the end of February 2000, both 
studies were completed and written up. Both papers were later accepted for publication in 
peer-reviewed journals. 
The firsf Delphi study aimed to investigate the views of mental health nurses in relation to 
ethical decision-making. The central question was: 'how do you make ethical decisions?' 
Delphi studies utilize a questionnaire design. Three 'rounds' of postal questionnaires were 
sent to the participants. Written responses were organized into themes and categories. 
The second3 Delphi study operated in the same manner as the first. However, the 
participants were nurse lecturers working in university departments of nursing in the UK. 
The general aim of this Delphi study was to gather information on the organization, 
teaching methods and content of ethics modules taught to pre-registration students of 
nursing. 
Motivations for the thesis 
Some of the findings from the two Delphi studies interested me. First, in the 'clinical nurse' 
Delphi study, the majority of participants were familiar with the phrase 'moral virtues'. This 
familiarity was superficial, which I expected; after all, these were clinical nurses, not 
ethicists. The responses suggested that nurses utilized the language of the virtues and 
vices in clinical practice. For example, terms such as 'well', 'honest' and 'fair' were used by 
the participants many times in their responses to the questions. It was also clear that the 
participants viewed themselves as participating in a 'caring' discipline. However, their 
ethical decision-making appeared to be reducible to three key notions: moral duties (or 
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obligations), patients' rights and legal duties (or obligations). The latter notion received the 
second highest number of responses (after moral duties). While I was aware of the 
importance of the Mental Health Act, this finding intrigued and concerned me. 
In the 'teaching' Delphi, it was revealed that obligation-based moral theories, including 
consequentialism, deontology and the 'four principles,4 approach to bioethics were taught 
by ten out of eleven lecturers. Information about the depth and breadth of teaching was 
not forthcoming. It was also revealed that only four out of 11 lecturers taught the virtues 
and virtue ethics. Furthermore, it was revealed that specialist lecturers in ethics were not 
employed to teach ethics to students of nursing. 
These findings prompted me to think carefully about ethics, the virtues and the role of a 
nurse. Several questions came to mind. For example, do nurses need to have an 
awareness of the virtues to be morally good nurses? Why are the virtues and virtue ethics 
not taught to the same degree as obligation-based ethics in nurse education? I suppose 
the pivotal question was: 'why are nurses - who care for ill patients - taught to abide by 
moral (and legal) obligations rather than cultivate and exercise the virtues? One of the 
premises upon which this thesis is based is that for a nursing ethics to be adequate, it 
needs to begin with the ill person instead of emphasizing the nature and consequences of 
actions and omissions. 
In the first submitted thesis (September 2002), I examined the virtues in relation to mental 
health nursing. I did this for three reasons. First, because of my existing interest in mental 
health nursing ethics. Second, because of the interest in this field shared by Dr. Parsons 
and Prof. Barker. And third, because I believed that the nature of the virtues and the 
merits of virtue ethics were most suitable for nurses who care for patients with mental 
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health problems and mental distress. However, in response to the comments made by my 
two examiners, in this resubmission I provide examples drawn from both adult and mental 
health nursing. I believe that this approach helps to illustrate the value of the virtues 
across different nursing specialties. 
Type of thesis 
Philosophical ethics 
In the 'Preface' I mentioned that this thesis proposes a philosophical argument. This thesis 
is an example of applied philosophical ethics. Moral philosophy (or general ethics, as I 
refer to it in this thesis) examines the question of how persons ought to live. It examines 
human conduct by investigating the nature and justification of moral obligations, rules, 
principles and virtues. Philosophy is concerned with rigorous thinking including the 
development of plausible and defensible arguments. 5 This thesis is theoretical. I advance 
a moral argument that I hope others will find plausible. This thesis is therefore not the 
product of an empirical research study. However, some qualitative empirical research 
findings are cited to support or reject a claim. 
Plan of the thesis 
This thesis consists of an 'Introduction', eight Chapters, 'Conclusions' and a 'Bibliography'. 
I shall now provide an outline of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 - Illness, narratives and the value of the nurse-patient relationship 
I begin by examining several relevant and important themes in contemporary nursing 
practice. These are: illness and narratives; hospitalization and patients' emotions; the 
history of the nurse-patient relationship; contemporary views of the nurse-patient 
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relationship and empowerment; therapeutic nurse-patient relationships including helping 
relationships; the role of the nurse; and defining a 'good' nurse. 
Chapter 3 - The virtues in general ethics 
I turn to general ethics and examine: the history of the virtues, conceptions of virtues and 
the value of virtues in peoples' lives. One advantage and disadvantage of the virtue-based 
approach to morality is then described. 
Chapter 4 - A critique of obligation-based moral theories in general ethics 
I critically examine the role of moral obligations, rules and principles and obligation-based 
moral theories within general ethics. I examine the merits and disadvantages of 
consequentialism and deontology. 
Chapter 5 - The origins, development and tenets of virtue ethics 
I describe the origins and development of virtue ethics, the moral theory that places the 
virtues at the core of morality. Three tenets of virtue ethics are identified. Both 
supplementary and strong versions of virtue ethics are examined. I explore Aristotle's 
virtue ethics. The notions of moral character and moral education are examined. I consider 
the work of Hursthouse6 on virtue ethics' account of action-guidance. Objections towards 
virtue ethics are identified. 
Chapter 6 - A critical account of obligation-based moral theories in nursing practice 
I provide a critical account of obligation-based moral theories in nursing practice. 
consider the popularity of these theories in contemporary nursing. I examine examples of 
the deontic (duty-based) approach in the literature, including 3 tools to assist moral 
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decision-making. The 'four principles'? approach to bioethics IS described and several 
flaws of obligation-based theories are identified and examined. 
Chapter 7 - Virtue-based moral decision making in nursing practice 
I develop an account of the virtue-based approach to moral decision making in nursing 
practice. This approach has 3 features: (1) exercising virtues (2) using judgement and (3) 
using moral wisdom. The latter consists of 3 phenomena: moral perception, moral 
sensitivity and moral imagination. 
Chapter 8 - Macintyre's account of the virtues 
I describe and examine Macintyre's account of the virtues as set forth in After Virtue. 8 I 
interpret his claims and organize these to form 3 theses. These are: T1 - the role and 
importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of the self in morality; T2 - Macintyre on 
practices, goods and the virtues; T3 - the role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in 
morality. Objections towards Macintyre's account are examined. 
Chapter 9 - Macintyre's account of the virtues and the virtue-based approach to moral 
decision-making in contemporary nursing practice 
Some of Macintyre's claims are applied to the account of the virtue-based approach to 
nursing proposed in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
I end the thesis by summarizing the argument. Some of the problems of the virtue-based 
approach in nursing are re-examined. I note some pOints for further enquiry and research. 
Finally, some of the merits of the virtue-based approach are examined. 
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Conclusions 
I have explained the broad aim of the thesis and provided some background information to 
help the reader understand my perspective. I have provided an outline of each Chapter. 
The scene is now set for me to begin to argue for a strong virtue ethics in nursing practice. 
9 
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CHAPTER 2 - ILLNESS, NARRATIVES AND THE VALUE OF THE 
NURSE-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
Introduction 
In order to develop an adequate and plausible nursing ethics, it is insufficient to centre the 
theory on the nature and consequences of actions and omissions. It is necessary to 
examine the person who is ill and ask questions about the characteristics of nurses; the 
latter are in a position to care for the ill person. Obligations, rules and principles cannot in 
themselves care for ill persons; all of these deontic (duty-based) concepts require 
application. Therefore, it is crucial that one examines the sort of nurse one is. 1 
I begin by describing and examining several topics that are relevant and important in 
contemporary nursing practice. A" of these topics are in some way crucial to my account 
of the virtues and the virtue-based approach to moral decision-making in nursing practice. 
These topics are: illness and narratives; hospitalization and patients' emotions; the history 
of the nurse-patient relationship; contemporary views of the nurse-patient relationship and 
empowerment; therapeutic nurse-patient relationships, including helping relationships; the 
role of the nurse; and defining a 'good' nurse. 
Illness and narratives 
Illness can affect humans at any point in the life span. 'Illness' is a broad term and by 
using it one is to some degree making a value judgment. For instance, distinguishing 
between illness that is life threatening, serious, but not life threatening, and other illness 
that might be referred to as 'minor'. This language is reductionist; it reduces the language 
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used by the patient, which often will express emotions, to scientific jargon. Therefore one 
does not always get a sense of how a particular illness might make one feel. Examples of 
life threatening illness include some malignant cancers and acute myocardial infarction. 
Serious illness includes diabetes and viral meningitis, although one can die as a result of 
the former if hypoglycaemia or diabetic coma results. The common cold is one example of 
minor illness. However, viral infections such as the common cold and notably influenza 
cause a lot of misery for the sufferer; illness like this can interfere with and cause 
problems in one's daily living. 
During infancy and childhood, children are dependent on others - usually parents and 
guardians - to take care of them and help them to fare well in life. Later in old age the 
reverse might occur: children may be involved in helping and caring for their parents. 
During one's life, help and support is sometimes required from other people including 
one's spouse, friends, and family members. This need is intensified during periods of both 
physical and mental illness; here, humans need other humans to help them survive, 
recover and fare well. 
Illness is one of the features that can characterize one's life; this is especially true if one 
suffers from prolonged and chronic illness, either physical or mental. The extent to which 
illness becomes part of, or takes over, one's life depends on several factors including the 
causation, symptamatology, and prognosis of the illness and individual personality traits 
and coping mechanisms.2 Irrespective of these factors, illness becomes part of one's life 
story. Illness helps to define one's life and the sorts of lives people can live. An important 
point about illness is that it is a feature of human life that can be shared with others, 
through, for example, conversation. By sharing these experiences, people can construct a 
narrative account of their illness. This can help some people to find meaning in, and make 
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some sense of, their lives. 3 
When I reflect upon my life, memories of childhood and adult illness come flooding back. If 
I am representative of other people, then others might also reflect about their past and 
present illnesses. Upon reflection, I believe that during illness I felt bad because of the 
various symptoms of the actual illness. For example, during a bout of influenza I felt hot, 
clammy, cold, shivery, my entire body ached, and I was so tired that I literally could not 
manage to climb out of bed. I knew that I needed regular fluids and paracetamol. Or at 
least I wanted fluids and paracetamol, because I thought that these would help me feel 
better. My partner provided these for me. And when I wanted to moan, there was 
someone around willing to listen to me. Reactions to illness are varied and personal. My 
experiences have told me that I feel more upset during illness if there is no one around, no 
one asking me what I want and no one to listen when I give my response. I doubt that I am 
alone in feeling this way. Indeed reflecting on my previous nursing experiences and caring 
for relatives, I believe that other people feel similar to me regarding personal responses to 
illness and the need for help and support. 
Physical and mental illness, life threatening and otherwise, and the consequent need for 
help and care from other people can strike at any stage in one's life. One of the few 
certainties of human life is that one lives each day without knowing when illness will afflict 
one. Illness becomes part of one's life and it can be constructed through a narrative. 
13 
Hospitalization and patients' emotions 
What are some of the many emotions that people might experience during hospitalization? 
Anxiety 
Feeling anxious and worried is natural during illness. One might be anxious about the 
actual cause and prognosis of the illness. Being hospitalized exacerbates these feelings, 
because not only is one anxious about one's well-being, but there are also practical issues 
to worry about. For instance, the new physical environment of an Accident and Emergency 
(A&E) department or hospital ward and the many unfamiliar new faces and names of 
health care professionals to get used to. Depending upon the severity of symptoms, one 
might be worried and anxious about the possible disabling affects that the illness might 
cause. Separation from one's spouse, loved ones and family members might also intensify 
feelings of anxiety. These are just some of the many reasons why patients might feel 
anxious during hospitalization. 
Fear 
Fear is an emotion that often accompanies anxiety; the two can be related in that if a 
patient is anxious she might also be frightened. Generally a lot of people appear 
frightened of illness, or at least the idea of being ill and the images that this can conjure 
up. For example, being less able to look after oneself, needing help, and suffering physical 
and emotional pain. Thinking about hospitals and the idea of being hospitalized also 
makes some people feel uneasy and fearful. This is, in part, because of the public 
perception of hospitals and the association between these institutions and ill people, 
disease, and dying. One generally realizes that being hospitalized means one is ill and 
one typically wishes to remain healthy (whatever that means for the individual). 
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Fear of illness, its effects on one's life and fear of hospitals can be contrasted with another 
sense of fear: fear of dying. For example, if one is admitted into A&E with severe, crushing 
central chest pain, dyspnoea (shortness of breath), palpitations, and nausea then it is 
plausible to think that one might be extremely frightened about dying. Let us imagine that 
this is the first time such symptoms have occurred. There is nothing to compare this 
situation to. It is difficult to imagine precisely how such a critical situation might make one 
feel. This person might feel frightened of dying because the symptoms, especially the 
chest pain, are so severe and cause so much physical pain. This person might not be able 
to make the link between chest pain and a serious heart problem. My knowledge of the 
heart and the fact that this is probably a heart attack WOUld, I think, make me feel very 
frightened of dying; more so perhaps than if I had no idea of what was happening and 
what could occur, for example, a cardiac arrest. 
A second example sees a person with leukaemia about to enter hospital for a third course 
of chemotherapy. This person is frightened because she reflects back on some previous 
distressing experiences of having chemotherapy; she remembers her hair falling out and 
how this made her feel when she looked in the mirror each morning, she cannot forget 
how painful her mouth was and how tired she became, so tired she never left her bed for 3 
long weeks. This person is well aware of what might occur with the third course of 
chemotherapy (one of the reasons why some people might refuse more than one course 
of chemotherapy). This person is frightened of how she might be feeling in a week or two; 
she might also be frightened of dying as many people with cancer naturally are. But in this 
example, the person is dwelling on the nature of the treatment and especially its side 
effects and how miserable and distressed, both physically and emotionally, these made 
her feel. Despite individual psychological differences, I believe that many people wish to 
lead healthy, independent and valuable lives. The point I wish to make is that for these 
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people above, fear of dying from a heart attack and fear of unpleasant and distressing side 
effects from chemotherapy, are understandable and rational emotions to experience. 
One point about the manifestation and experience of emotions is that these processes are 
complex; furthermore, they are subjective and as such one should refrain from making 
generalizations. For example, waiting six months for a septoplasty - a relatively 'minor' 
surgical operation in which the septum is reshaped to reduce nasal decongestion - gave 
me a great deal of time to think about the operation and general anaesthetic and more 
than enough time to think about possible mistakes, side effects and all manner of nasty 
medical calamities. Compare this example of elective surgery to an acute surgical 
emergency where a person with severe abdominal pain and signs of peritonitis requires 
emergency surgery to save his life. There is clearly less time to think about possible 
errors. But the acute nature of the situation, the speed and intensity in which the patient is 
prepared for theatre, and the serious - painful - nature of the illness will mean that this 
person will be anxious and frightened. It is reasonable to suggest that feelings of anxiety 
and fear will be experienced by many patients in varying degrees and manifested in 
different ways, depending upon the specific circumstances of the illness and one's 
experiences of hospitalization. 
Powerlessness 
Imagine lying in a hospital bed, alone, feeling anxious and frightened. Perhaps one has 
recently undergone abdominal surgery. Various physical symptoms might afflict one 
including pain around the wound site, nausea, vomiting, and extreme lethargy. Or perhaps 
one has informally admitted oneself to the local mental health unit feeling very depressed. 
One wants to talk to the nurses, but they all appear too busy. One is in a state of 
emotional distress. These feelings created by illness and all of the features imposed upon 
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one by the dehumanizing process of hospitalization4 promote feelings of powerlessness; 
indeed patients might feel robbed of all power and control. If patients cannot exert any 
control over their illness, environment and care, or if this is possible but only to a minimal 
extent, then feelings of powerlessness might naturally develop. Feelings of powerlessness 
and loss of control can be a particular feature of chronic Illness, including chronic mental 
illness. In the words of Pellegrino and Thomasma 
sick persons must bare their weaknesses, compromise their 
dignity, and reveal intimacies of body and mind. 5 
Allowing nurses and other health care professionals access to one's body and mind might 
be necessary in order to survive and recover, but it helps to make people feel devoid of 
power and control; in other words, it can disempower people. 
People tend to feel more comfortable and in control when they are at home or in other 
familiar surroundings. Feelings of powerlessness are common with admission or contact 
with mental health services. People with mental illness might, depending upon several 
factors including the nature of the illness, symptamatology and degree of insight, feel 
devoid of all power and control. Or one might believe that one has little input into what is 
happening to one (rather than with one; the former connotes a sense of non-collaborative 
care). In such cases, the emotions of powerlessness and loss of control can be deeply 
upsetting feelings. 
Thus far I have looked at why patients might feel anxious, frightened, powerless and lack 
control and how these feelings can affect one. Crudely, these negative emotions can be 
triggered by the illness itself and then intensified due to the dehumanizing process that 
hospitalization can be. 
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Vulnerability 
Patients in hospital are often described as being vulnerable. 6 One might feel vulnerable 
because one is aware that there is potential to be hurt - meaning, physical pain and 
emotional distress. One's survival might literally be in others' hands. Feelings of fear and 
powerlessness will perhaps contribute to a general sense of feeling vulnerable: being wide 
open to harm. After all, what could a patient do to prevent others from physically or 
emotionally causing him harm? Preventing physical harm might appear to be easier. For 
example, one can usually see that an action is about to happen, such as, a nurse 
approaching with an injection. Here, one can refuse the injection and prevent the physical 
harm caused by the needle puncturing the skin and penetrating the muscle. At other 
times, the physical harm occurs as a consequence or side effect of interventions such as 
medications. This sort of example is more difficult to prevent. What is quite clear, however, 
is that a patient has no control or power over the language that a nurse might use. In other 
words, what a nurse says and how this is phrased is under the control of the nurse. 
Patients have no control over nurses' language and phraseology. 
Vulnerability and trust 
One of the effects that vulnerability has upon patients is that it forces one to trust others. 
Trust is sometimes spoken about as if it could be voluntary. But in reality patients have 
little choice in the matter; as Pellegrino and Thomasma7 claim patients are forced into 
trusting clinicians. Even though nurses and health care professionals are qualified and 
usually well trained, they are strangers to the patient especially during the initial 
assessment phase. This begs the question 'why should I trust someone whom I don't 
know at all?' In a social setting, few of us would trust a total stranger. But if there were no 
choices open to one and the only alternative was death, then one would probably be 
forced to trust another person. Suppose I meet someone at an office party. But after 
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spending a little time with this person, I decide that I dislike him. But then a fire breaks out. 
Everyone panics; no one appears to know what to do. However, the person I have just 
met (and dislike) does not panic. In fact he calms me down and ensures that we both get 
out without injury. I had decided that I did not like him, but I needed to trust him because 
everyone else was panicking and he seemed to know what he was doing. I was scared 
and panicking because I had no idea how I was going to descend the 12 flights of stairs. 
Patients in hospital can be forced to trust nurses. Nurses are trained to a certain standard 
that helps to ensure competence to practice. Frequently, patients believe that nurses 
possess certain 'caring' personal qualities such as kindness, patience, and gentleness. It 
is hoped that patients will trust nurses because of the characteristics and personal 
qualities that nurses demonstrate. However, ultimately, because one is ill and needs help 
to survive and recover, patients are forced to trust nurses. There is really no alternative 
unless one decides to discharge oneself. However, for most patients self-discharge is not 
a viable option. This is because patients tend to want to survive and recover and thus self-
discharge would be an irrational act; if by rationality one means doing that which promotes 
one's interests. 8 
Trust, as an aspect of the nurse-patient relationship, is a complex notion that has been 
examined by several nursing scholars. 9 In feminist moral theory Baier10 has written widely 
on the notion of trust. She claims that for a moral theory to be adequate and sufficient for 
both men and women it needs to include the notions of love and obligation; crudely the 
former will satisfy what most women want in a moral theory while the latter satisfies what 
most men want in a moral theory.11 Baier argues that trust could be the notion that 
satisfactorily encapsulates both love and obligation. On her view trusting nurses concerns 
relying on their competence; nurses ought to be willing to care for patients who are 
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entrusted to their care. In loving relationships, one trusts another not to harm one, while in 
relationships founded upon obligation - as nursing is frequently conceived - patients trust 
nurses to be competent and fulfill their obligations. 
Dependence on others 
Depending upon one's condition, one might need to allow nurses direct contact with one's 
body, often involving intimate touch. If one is ill and hospitalized, then help is needed from 
nurses to meet one's needs. Of course one need not be hospitalized to require help: a 
patient with multiple sclerosis 12 living at home needs twice daily visits by community 
nurses and support workers to help with most of her needs. For example, sometimes she 
cannot manage to get out of bed without help, she often needs help with cooking and 
cleaning, and she always needs help to get bathed and dressed. Patients are dependent 
on nurses to help them meet their physical and non-physical (for example, emotional) 
needs. Patients are reliant on nurses to relieve distressing symptoms, promote 
independence and enable recovery (I focus in more detail on the role of the nurse later in 
this chapter). Whilst one might not want other people to carry out intimate interventions, 
one recognizes that without such necessary actions the illness might persist or worsen; 
thus one generally realizes that these interventions are medically necessary. 
Nevertheless, it might be that beneath the appearance of voluntariness, lies the fact that 
patients feel forced to trust that nurses are clinically competent and motivated by morally 
good desires. 
A brief history of the nurse-patient relationship13 
Since the middle part of the 20th century the nurse-patient relationship - seen in terms of 
human interactions, excellent communication skills, and mutual cooperation - has 
emerged as central to nursing practice. But at the beginning of the 20th century, patients 
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were viewed and understood as objects of medical and thus nursing interest. According to 
Dingwell et at4, nurses were involved in servant-master relationships with medical 
professionals and nurses had an important role in medical surveillance of the body.15 
There was no real concern with nurse-patient interactions or with personal knowing. 
Indeed evidence16 suggests that institutional practices sought to regulate and constrain 
nurses' interactions with patients. All nurses with the same position and training were 
considered as equals 17; all patients were regarded as equal too. Nursing was seen as a 
'collective accomplishment,18 and individual relationships were subsumed within this belief. 
Personal and professional aspects of nurses were deemed as mutually exclusive. The 
personhood of the nurse lay outside her professional role; the personhood of the patient 
was also deemed to be outside the nurse-patient relationship. 
From the 1960's, Armstrong 19 argues that a fundamental change occurred in the 
development of the nurse-patient relationship. The broadening knowledge base in human 
psychology and communication theory led to the patient being viewed as a bio-
psychosocial being. The idea of a person with physical, psychological and social needs 
crossed over into emerging nursing theories, education, and practice. The patient was 
now seen as a complex subject (rather than just an object) of nursing care who needed to 
be understood; as a result the nurse-patient relationship in this humanistic sense became 
a central theme in nursing theory.20 Surveillance became not just a matter of physical 
identity but now focused on the patient's bio-psychosocial identity too. Instead of nursing 
theory and practice being seen solely in physical or medical terms, it developed a holistic 
person-centred21 meaning and identity. The organization of nursing work changed from 
task allocation to individual patient-focused care. As a result, closer more intimate 
relationships between nurse and patient could develop. 
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The nurse-patient relationship in contemporary nursing and the notion of 
empowerment 
Feelings of powerlessness, helplessness, vulnerability and dependence on others for help 
ensure that the nurse-patient relationship is an unequal one; it is a form of inequality 
"paralleled by few other situations in democratic societies". 22 It is, for many thinkers, the 
core of nursing and medical practice. For example, according to Pellegrino and 
Thomasma this relationship is 
the moral fulcrum, the Archimedean point at which the balance 
between self-interest and self-effacement must be struck. 23 
All nursing activities and interventions are enabled through the development, delivery and 
sustenance of the nurse-patient relationship. However, it has already been noted how the 
inequality that lies at the heart of this relationship contributes towards feelings of 
powerlessness in patients. Therefore, one of the main issues that needs to be addressed 
in the nurse-patient relationship is the notion of empowerment. 
The notion of empowenng patients is a prominent feature of the current nursing 
Iiterature.24 At least three points emerge from thinking about the notion of empowerment. 
First, like most notions that become popular in health care it is much more complex than it 
at first might seem; this notion requires one to think from several different perspectives 
such as medicine, psychology, sociology, economics and ethics. Second, despite this 
complexity one can identify two general points: (a) the idea that nurses can only empower 
patients if nurses themselves have sufficient power and authority and (b) the idea that 
nurses should aim to provide a physical and emotional environment that is conducive to 
patients being able, if they so wish, to make their own decisions. The third and final point 
is that the identification and examination of moral virtues needed to be morally good 
nurses, and specifically virtues required to empower patients, is neglected in the literature. 
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Mental illness (or mental ill health25) is disempowering because one's ability to function 
day to day is adversely affected by what Barker calls 'problems of Iiving,26 or the medical 
model might call 'symptoms of mental disorder'. If these features of mental ill health 
persist or reoccur then the term 'disabling' is given and the phrase 'chronic mental illness' 
is often applied too. Clearly, physical illness can also adversely affect one's quality of life. 
For example, chronic rheumatoid arthritis (CRA) causes pain, deformity and spasticity in 
the sinovial jOints.27 Living with such an illness must be difficult. People with CRA tend to 
require medical help in the form of anti-inflammatory medications to reduce swelling and 
promote mobility. The primary focus is on helping the person to meet his needs and retain 
a sense of independence. But no matter how much these aims are achieved, there 
remains an element of feeling really dependent on other people; one must rely on other 
people, for example, GPs, nurses, and carers, for one's needs to be met. Thus one might 
feel vulnerable and powerless: one is unable to change the fact that one has arthritis nor 
can one do much about the course of the illness as it is progressive. However, it is not 
only the nature or effects of the ill health that contributes towards feelings of 
disempowerment. The actual organization and structure of the National Health Service 
(NHS), including primary and secondary care, and specific care and treatment processes 
such as hospital ward policies and those imposed involuntarily through the Mental Health 
Aces add to the feelings of being disempowered. 
Latvala, Janhonen and Wahlberg29 described 3 different forms of helping used by mental 
health nurses, which point to different power dynamics in the nurse-patient relationship. 
'Catalytic' helping is described as involving participatory dialogue, mutual collaboration is 
developed in part because the patient is deemed to have responsible agency. 
'Educational' helping is different. Here precedence is given to nurses' knowledge and 
professionalism, an assumption being that the patient is a responsible recipient, the 
23 
relationship in this form of helping is driven by the professionalism of the nurse. The third 
type of helping is termed 'confirmatory'. These methods are based on the assumption that 
mental ill health arises from a physical cause, the patient is a passive recipient of 
information and thus the nurse-patient relationship and cooperation is limited by this belief 
and the hierarchical structure of care services. It is clear from this discussion that 
empowering patients involves a series of actions and choices that involves nurses making 
moral judgments. Several factors need to be taken into account including one's values, 
beliefs, clinical experience, and knowledge. For instance, regarding the first and second 
factors, a nurse needs to identify and examine her values and beliefs about the cause of a 
patient's illness and the role that that patient can and should play in their care. I discuss 
virtue-based moral decision-making and the role of moral wisdom in Chapter 7. 
Each patient has an individual and unique story to tell. This is the patient's lived 
experience of the illness. Given the importance of and value attached to the nurse-patient 
relationship and the benefits of patient-focused care30 , I suggest that nurses should allow 
patients to tell their stories and in so doing a narrative account of their illness can be 
provided. Disempowerment can arise because the person is not allowed to tell such 
stories. Or perhaps the appropriate questions are posed, but no one is listening to the 
patient's conversation. Therefore, no one can learn how the ill health is causing specific 
problems of living or how the illness is generally affecting the patient's life. It is not difficult 
to begin to understand how patients might feel if they are not given the opportunity to tell 
their story. 
The medical model and disempowerment 
Tilley31 notes the importance of getting people and their loved ones actively involved in 
their care, if this happened then perhaps people would feel more able to tell their stories. 
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The Department of Health32 too want to alter the power balance of the practitioner-patient 
relationship and generally the theme of collaborative care is high on the health care 
agenda. But, for some, contemporary mental health nursing practice remains subordinate 
to the medical model and psychiatry. This view holds that nurses are still the foot soldiers 
to the generals,33 (the doctors') plans against mental illness. It is true to say that the 
medical model is primarily concerned with clinicians making diagnoses, delivering 
treatments, and identifying and evaluating the outcomes of disease processes. 
Epistemologically, the medical model is empirical and reductionist in nature. One of the 
limitations of the medical model is that a patient's lived experience can be neglected. 
Perhaps the necessary questions are not asked or no one listens when the patient 
attempts to describe and make sense of his illness. The language of medicine is 
reductionist and this can mean that individual accounts given by patients might not be fully 
heard. The emphasis is on the disease process and patients' feelings and emotions can 
be lost in the benevolent rush to diagnose and treat the disease. I am not saying that all or 
even the majority of clinicians ignore or neglect patients' feelings, that would be far too 
crude and inaccurate. However the use of medical language does not promote the 
identification and examination of patients' feelings and emotions, which are usually seen 
as subjective and personal notions. Ideas and initiatives in vogue such as patient-centred 
care and the concept of holistic nursing are in large part a reaction against the reductionist 
approach of empirical medicine. If the medical model is utilized and applied in a singularly 
scientific manner, then it can hinder the process of patients telling their narratives. 
The Tidal Model and empowerment 
Nursing models34 35 have attempted to adapt general nursing theories to mental health 
nursing. However, The Tidal Model36 emerged from a previous study that posed the 
question: 'what do people need mental health nurses for?' From this a SUbstantial model 
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of nursing practice in mental health care was generated. Included within this model is the 
notion from Peplau37 about the importance of interpersonal interactions. Furthermore, 
there is recognition that an effective and complete model requires an emphasis on the 
process of empowerment within the nurse-patient relationship.38 The Tidal Model 
proposes that the construction of the patient's lived experience occurs through narrative, 
which is allowed to develop through the nurse-patient relationship. The Tidal Model is one 
attempt to put the person's lived experience and narrative centre stage and in so doing the 
person can be empowered. The Tidal Model aims to refocus nursing practice on the 
human needs of people in mental health care. It investigates such notions as personhood, 
mental distress, and the assumption that recovery for many people is possible. Both 
intrapersonal and interpersonal resources can be used to promote the process of 
recovery. 
Therapeutic nurse-patient relationships 
There is an abundance of literature on the nurse-patient relationship. 39 This relationship is 
usually termed 'therapeutic' as in a therapeutic nurse-patient relationship or a therapeutic 
alliance. This literature discusses several ideas including (a) phases of the nurse-patient 
relationship, for example, the initial or assessment phase, the working phase and the 
termination phase, (b) distinctions between social and therapeutic relationships, the latter 
have distinct aims characterized by the notion of helping another person, and (c) 
examples of communication skills such as empathy and compassion, which it is argued 
nurses need to develop therapeutic relationships with patients. 
How can a therapeutic relationship be defined? Ironbar and Hooper provide one 
conception, 
The goal, which will take skills and time to achieve, is a therapeutic 
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nurse-client relationship, i.e., one in which the client is enabled to 
work through his problems, maintain his individuality and to learn 
from his experiences. 4o 
Several texts (see endnote 39) comment further and list skills that nurses should acquire 
to develop and sustain therapeutic nurse-patient relationships. Among these skills are 
responsiveness, promoting self-esteem, acknowledging the uniqueness of the patient, 
maintaining confidentiality, making non-judgmental responses, developing trust and 
empathy, and providing support for patients.41 Yet more thinkers focus on describing 
processes involved in communication and explain why it is important for nurses to have 
theoretical knowledge of communication theory. One example, among many, of this 
approach distinguishes between verbal and non-verbal communication theory.42 For 
example, regarding verbal communication, nurses need to think about several aspects of 
communication including the clarity of one's voice, the brevity of the language, the 
vocabulary used, and meaning, pacing and intonation. Non-verbal communication 
includes issues such as personal appearance, facial expression, posture, gait, gestures, 
and the use of touch. Skidmore43, for one, believes that all of these points are important to 
facilitate therapeutic relationships. Moreover, he thinks that the notions of reception and 
understanding are especially vital. For example, 'reception' refers to full commitment on 
the part of the nurse to listen in full to what the patient is saying, while 'understanding' 
refers to hearing what patients say and then making sense of this information. 
The objectives or ends of therapeutic relationships are varied and contextual. These can 
include helping a patient into recovery and promoting self-esteem and independent 
living.44 Possible ends in, for example, cancer nursing might include relieving physical 
pain, helping a patient to cope with the distress caused by the illness and the treatments 
including radiotherapy and chemotherapy and helping a patient towards a good death.45 
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Helping relationships 
Literature notes that a 'helping' relationship is an example of a therapeutic relationship and 
the 'dimensions' of a helping relationship are sometimes outlined. 46 For example, nurses 
need to be trustworthy and honest to form helping relationships. However it is interesting 
to note that there is no acknowledgment that these dimensions are examples of moral 
virtues. Furthermore, there is no insight into how so-called 'communication skills' and 
'dimensions' of communication can be seen from other perspectives including those of 
morality. It is common for the conception of a helping relationship to be articulated in terms 
of pure communication theory. Human interactions, human responses and the role of 
moral virtues in developing a helping relationship between nurse and patient are not 
mentioned. There is a general failure to relate communication, both its theoretical and 
practice elements, with the moral lives of patients and nurses. 
The nurse-patient relationship: empirical research findings 
There is a wealth of qualitative literature that examines the nurse-patient relationship. For 
example, a recent Delphi questionnaire studl7 posed the question: "Describe what you 
do, think, and feel when you build a relationship with a patient?" Seven themes emerged 
from the 89 points made. In ranking order, these themes were: 
1. Getting to know each other; 
2. Being open and honest about roles and boundaries; 
3. Be friendly towards client; 
4. Recognizing how this person [this client] makes me feel and making sense of this; 
5. Showing respect for a person's experience, choices, lifestyle; 
6. Develop trust; 
7. Give empathy and sympathy. 
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These themes all involve or concern either intrapersonal or interpersonal skills or the 
inculcation of moral virtues. In the same study participants based their practice, in part, on 
moral virtues such as compassion, honesty and justice. 48 However, the precise technical 
term 'moral virtue' meant little to the nurses. But what is in a name? In other words, why 
does it matter if compassion, honesty, and justice are not understood explicitly as moral 
virtues? From a clinical nursing perspective, I want to see nurses demonstrating moral 
virtues, for instance, kindness, justice, and patience. It matters much less if a particular 
nurse is unable to articulate a theoretical knowledge base regarding the meaning of a 
moral virtue. There is no correlation between someone's depth and breadth of knowledge 
concerning, in this case, the virtues and the reality of how one does act, think and feel. 
However, if these virtues are known by thinkers as dimensions, then one effect is to gloss 
over the actual complexity of the virtues; how difficult it can be for people, including 
nurses, to inculcate these, why it is important that the virtues are inculcated, and how 
nurses can use the virtues to make morally good decisions. 
Part B of this question asked: "What factors might (a) support and (b) restrict this process 
[building a therapeutic relationship with clients]?" Reponses for (a) included "taking an 
interest in people", "being available to listen to the patient", "good communication skills", 
and "being honest". All of these responses were behaviours, actions and choices that 
nurses had control over. Other responses were given which the respondents believed 
patients had control over, for example, "a willingness for the client to engage in the 
relationship" and the "communication skills of the client". Responses for (b) included "lack 
of respect (or trust) of the client", "poor communication, e.g., listen too little", and "poor 
explanation of the role of the nurse". These points were recognized as behaviours or 
qualities within the control of and influenced by the nurse. Some of the factors that might 
restrict the building of a therapeutic relationship and under the control of the patient were 
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"severe illness", "[clients who are] resistive to involvement", and "[clients] having a bad 
experience with others". Human responsiveness and the role of the virtues are again seen 
to be valuable aspects in forming a therapeutic nurse-patient relationship. 
The role of the nurse 
Describing and clarifying the role of the nurse is complex and is not conducive to 
generalization. It is quite clear that a contemporary nurse will need to take on several 
sometimes different or even incompatible roles (one simply has to read a typical list of 
roles that is attached to a nurse's contract of employment to see the variety). But being 
precise about nurses' roles does not necessarily mean that only one or two roles should 
be explicated. What would be the advantage of dOing this? It seems to me unnecessary 
and futile to both individual nurses and the profession to strive for such an objective. 
Specifying the role of the nurse might provide nursing with a specific identity. For some 
nurses, depending on the role identified, this might promote the notion of nursing as an 
independent profession, able to break from the shackles of medicine. But by confining 
nurses to a discrete role - for example, helping patients recover from illness - it could be 
argued that both nurses' professional and personal autonomy could be threatened. 
However such a vague role as 'helping patients recover from illness' could be 
conceptualized and delivered in such a wide variety of ways that the role would be almost 
meaningless. I doubt that it would constrict personal qualities and abilities such as the 
capacity for independent thought, one's ability to make judgments, and the promotion of 
clinical innovation; all of these qualities are thought important to being an effective 
professional nurse.49 
I have led teaching and learning sessions with both student and qualified nurses, both 
mental health and adult branches, and as anticipated, there is some degree of divergence 
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regarding the role of a nurse. 50 Specific roles will depend on one's working environment; 
for example, the roles expected of a theatre nurse will differ from those of a community 
nurse or mental health nurse working on a forensic unit. However, it might be possible to 
find some convergence of opinion about generic roles that the majority of nurses are 
expected to meet. From some teaching that I have led, examples of these include 'nurses 
care for patients' and 'nurses should educate patients about their illness'. As noted, 
several nursing thinkers claim that one role of the nurse is to utilize intrapersonal and 
interpersonal skills to facilitate a therapeutic nurse-patient relationship. Another common 
role articulated in the literature concerns the nurse as someone who is aware of and 
meets the various physical, psychological, spiritual and social needs of the patient. 51 
The role of the nurse: some empirical findings 
Several empirical studies have investigated the role of the nurse or looked closely at the 
aims of being a nurse. A recent Delphi questionnaire study52 revealed some findings about 
the aims of mental health nurses and beliefs about the formation of therapeutic nurse-
patient relationships. For example, one question was "what do you think are the main aims 
and goals of being a mental health nurse?" This question was posed in round two (there 
were three rounds in total) when 22 mental health nurses participated; 15 females (68%) 
and seven males (32%). Eighty-three points were given in response to this question. From 
these, nine different themes were identified. The most popular themes were: 
1. To educate, support and treat people with mental health problems using a 
range of therapeutic interventions; 
2. Utilize skills and knowledge gained through training and life experience to help 
people who suffer from mental illness; 
3. To work with other professionals and outside agencies and the general public 
to destigmatize mental illness; 
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4. To see the client as a person, encouraging them to identify their strengths; 
5. Developing a rapport and relationship with people. 
In this study the notions of being therapeutic and helpful are expressed in 1. and 2. 
respectively, 4. points to the idea of providing holistic nursing care, while 5. indicates the 
importance of an effective nurse-patient relationship. 
Another Delphi study supports some of the findings from the one above. This study sought 
to investigate the required role of the psychiatric-mental health nurse in primary health 
care. 53 Thirty professionals participated in the study including community psychiatric 
nurses, general practitioners, social workers, purchasers and service managers; six 
participants from each profession were recruited to the study. Following the first and 
second questionnaires, interviews were held with the professionals. Users of mental 
health services were then also enlisted and questioned so that the emergent findings 
could be verified. The main theme or core category was 'relationships'. It was believed 
that to provide effective mental health care nurses needed to develop strong relationships 
with patients and other professionals. The importance of the nurse-patient relationship, as 
espoused by thinkers such as Peplau54 and Altschul55 was enforced by this Delphi study; 
in the authors' words 
There was a view that the value of the nurse-patient relation-
ship was as great, if not greater, than the value of any 
clinical interventions. 56 
Another recent small-scale study gained qualitative data from users of mental health 
services. The research question was "What do mental health nurses need to be, do, or 
know?" One of the groups interviewed (n=8) responded with comments that included 
"show respect and a genuine interest", demonstrate certain traits such as "kindness, 
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gentleness and sensitivity" and "take time to talk and explore difficulties".57 
The above three qualitative studies investigated the views of clinical nurses and patients in 
an effort perhaps to describe the reality, not the rhetoric, of nursing for these nurses and to 
ask these patients' what they wanted from nurses. The emerging themes are not reliable. 
For example, if other researchers followed the same methodology for each study then the 
findings, in different parts of the UK with different participants, might well be different. So I 
am not claiming that other nurses and patients from different wards or different 
geographical locations would concur with the views from these three studies. Although 
given the literature and the findings from these (and other) studies, it is reasonable to think 
that there would be some degree of convergence. The themes from these three stUdies 
include (in no particular order): 
• responding to patients as individuals; 
• demonstrating respect towards patients; 
• the importance and value of 'relationships', held by some patients to be as great if 
not greater than the value of other clinical interventions; 
• the need to make oneself available to patients and spend time with them to ask 
questions, listen to their responses, and really hear what they are saying; 
• the need for nurses to demonstrate certain traits of character - moral virtues - for 
example, kindness, patience, and honesty. 
Barker, Jackson and Stevenson58 on the essential feature of mental health nursing 
Barker et al recently conducted a modified grounded theory59 study that broadly 
investigated the need for, and the role of, psychiatric nurses. Ninety two participants 
including users, family members, friends, and mental health professionals took part in a 
series of focus groups held in two sites in England, two sites in the Republic of Ireland, 
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and two sites in Northern Ireland. Theory was generated from participants' statements. 
Some consensus was provided from both participants and professionals that the "essential 
feature of nursing,,60 - the core category - was a complex series of relationships termed 
'Knowing you, Knowing me'. Barker prefers to use the terms 'person' or 'people' instead of 
'patients' or 'clients'. Three domains of relating were elucidated from this study that "serve 
as context-dependent bases for the adoption of differing roles designed to meet the 
person's needs" .61 These domains were 'Ordinary Me (OM), 'Pseudo-Ordinary [or 
Engineered Me] (POEM), and 'Professional Me (PM). OM "relied on a natural 
ordinariness" from the nurse, POEM "involved a more discretely conscious presentation of 
the nurses' 'self', while PM "is the domain where the nurse did what (s)he considered 
'best' for the person: the evidence-based domain".62 Distinguishing between these 
domains of relating were 4 internal dimensions: depth of knowing, power, time, and 
translation. 
Depth of knowing 
All of the participants stated that nurses know people best because of their greater contact 
time. However an extensively broad range of knowledge concerning a person might also 
be superficial in terms of depth of knowledge. The people in this study challenged the 
belief that too much emotional involvement could be unproductive.63 Within the OM 
domain, people wanted nurses to be more intimate and share information about 
themselves. Often this relationship was one way; as a consequence people lacked 
motivation to disclose information to nurses considered to be 'blank screens'. While some 
nurses were comfortable sharing information about themselves within the OM domain, 
others were not; this was viewed as a burden and emotionally draining. 64 
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Power 
Regarding the dimension of 'power', differences emerged between the domains of 
relating. The OM domain involved a sense of caring 'for' someone, while caring 'about' lay 
within the POEM domain. Barker and Whitehill65, while recognizing that caring can include 
domination by carers, believe that caring 'with' involves active person and nurse 
collaboration. However, caring 'for' someone "in such a way as to help them take 
reasonable risks ... was seen as empowerment".66 Within the POEM domain, nurses might 
hold considerable power but by exercising friendly dispositions, they can win a person's 
confidence and thus might be able to work on specific therapeutic issues.67 The nurses in 
this study did not form friendships but acknowledged being 'friendly' 
I think that you can be friendly without building a friendship 
., .. our role isn't to socialise. There is a goal and we must 
look for it. I don't see a problem with being friendly to 
achieve some other goal. (Nurse, group F).68 
The last part of the above sentence is interesting and indicates to an extent a means to an 
end approach from the nurse. In some situations, this could involve an element of 
deception or dishonesty, but this might be - as above - justified from the nurse's point of 
view if a certain goal or outcome is achieved. This relates to the more general theme of 
needing to be a different nurse to suit individual patients depending upon their needs and 
expectations. A contemporary conception of the nurse-patient relationship includes the 
notion of nurses being authentic and genuine69 and intimate and empathetic. 70 Arnold71 
among others believes that an absence of authenticity leads to a sterile application of 
communication techniques. However, Aranda and Streef2 claim that problems are created 
from the view of nurses as authentic. Conflicts arise in nurses who desire to be authentic 
and a sense of emotional discomfort and distress afflicts some who feel that in certain 
complex emotional situations they need to become the sort of person that the patient 
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requires or in their words they need to be 'a chameleon'. These are clearly emotionally 
turbulent situations and these reflect one of the difficulties for contemporary nurses in 
balancing their many, sometimes conflicting, roles. 
Time 
The third dimension was time. Within the OM domain the use of time was valued as an 
essential aspect of this domain. It was believed that if nurses spent less time with people 
then they removed themselves from intimate knowing. Reference was made several times 
to nurses being unavailable on wards 
They [the nurses] sit in the office and patients are outside 
and whether going through distress or whatever, you 
knock on the door and say can I see somebody. 'You can 
just wait. You'll be all right. Just go and have a cup of tea. 
(Person, group A).73 
The situation was different within the community setting. Even though the nurses might not 
spend a lot of time with the person, there were fewer distractions. Community nurses were 
perceived as having a wider appreciation of families and engaged in more informal and 
friendly relationships.74 From the perspective of patients' relatives, the quality of nursing 
care is affected by several factors and qualities including taking time to get to know the 
client.75 According to the latter small-scale ethnographic study that interviewed 12 
relatives, other issues recognized as important to high quality care were working with the 
client and nurses having positive attitudes - even love - for clients. 
Some observational literature makes interesting if perhaps surprising reading regarding 
the amount of time nurses spend in contact with patients. For example, Altschul76 found 
that only 8% of psychiatric nurses' time was spent in one to one interaction with in-
patients. According to Sanson-Fischer, Poole and Thompson77 only 15.9% of nurses' time 
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was spent on one to one therapy, while Martin's78 study revealed that in patients spent 
only 6-12% of their time interacting with staff. In a more recent qualitative study by 
Jackson and Stevenson79, patients stated that they needed time to talk through their 
problems with nurses. In this study, patients said they valued time more than other 
interventions utilized in hospital; this supports the finding from the Walker et al study 
where patients believed that the value of the nurse-patient relationship was as great, if not 
greater, than other clinical interventions. According to Hurst and Howard80 nurses spend 
more time on administration duties than they do interacting with patients. In the Jackson 
and Stevenson study, patients stated that they were unlikely to ask nurses for their time 
and were reluctant to disturb nurses if they were busy. In a recent observational study of 
20 staff nurses on 3 admission wards in a psychiatric hospital, Whittington and 
McLaughlin81 found that less than half of the working day (42.7%) was spent in direct 
patient contact. The study also demonstrated that 
Translation 
the proportion of work time which was devoted to potentially 
psychotherapeutic interactions with patients was very small 
(6.75%).82 
Translation was the fourth dimension in the Barker et al study. Within the OM domain, 
people and their families wanted nurses to be honest. Truth telling, for example, 
describing honestly the side effects of medications to people, was valued greatly within 
these relationships. Nurses were expected to be able to interpret technical jargon and be 
multilingual, for instance, conversing without difficulty with professional colleagues and 
also able to converse well with people and their families. 
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Defining a 'good' nurse 
The contemporary definition of a 'good' nurse includes the cultivation of certain personal 
qualities such as self-awareness, the ability to reflect about practices, including self-
reflection, and the demonstration of highly developed interpersonal skills.83 In a recent 
Delphi study,84 one question was: "What is it to be a 'good' mental health nurse?" Eighteen 
respondents (81.8%) stated that this was concerned with (a) practical skills, (b) clinical 
experience and (c) moral qualities. No one suggested that the development of competent 
practical skills was related to how long one had been a nurse. Two of the responses were 
"moral qualities and moral experience affects how a nurse delivers these practical skills, 
as it is about who she [the nurse] is as a person" and "It is a mixture of both but mainly it is 
the moral qualities and experience. To be honest and respectful of the client". The latter 
respondent made the point that knowledge and experience gained in practice and used to 
benefit the patient was therefore a moral 'thing'; I would prefer the term 'enterprise', but 
the point is well made and understood. 
Three respondents stated that practical skills and moral qualities were both important to 
being a good nurse, however a third factor "general life experiences" was necessary too. 
For example 
Skills, experience and general life experiences would be my main 
positive aspect, feeling you could offer people help from known 
experiences. Though moral qualities would still be an important 
issue which would help me examine, [and] improve my standards 
of care. 
In the above quote, the respondent appears to believe that moral qualities include 
intrapersonal skills such as self-reflection and reflection of one's practice, and that these 
can be utilized to promote one's own caring abilities or competence. Finally one 
respondent stated that being a good mental health nurse concerned only the importance 
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of moral qualities. She seemed to indicate the value of making a connection with a patient 
and generally the value of holistic nursing care, in her words "A good nurse is someone 
who can identify with patients and regard them as people in their own right". 
Empirical research findings suggest that patients have their own views regarding what 
constitutes 'good' or 'high' quality nursing care. One small-scale studl5 involved 
interviewing 24 patients with mental health problems from 2 admission wards of a 
psychiatric hospital. Qualitative analysis revealed 239 indicators of high and low quality 
nursing care, which the authors categorized into 6 main themes. One theme was 
'communicating caring' and this comprised 3 sub-themes, 'being available', 'listening' and 
'actions explained'. Under the first sub-theme 'being available', the responses indicated 
that the patients valued the nurses as caring if they made themselves available to the 
patients. Nurses' actions that were particularly appreciated by the patients included setting 
time aside to be with patients and nurses' attempts to understand patients' problems. 
Another major sub-theme of 'communicating caring' was 'listening'. Several patients said 
that it was more important to them that nurses listened to their conversations than what 
the nurses actually said in response. Some negative experiences of not being listened to 
were described in the interviews. One patient remarked 
There's one nurse, if she sits and talks to you she is always 
looking around to see if anything is happening .... she's not 
really bothered with what I'm saying and will come up with 
any answer just to shut me Up.86 
Theme 6 was termed 'nurses' attributes'. In this theme, the patients described the 
personal qualities, which they believed contributed to high quality nursing care. Examples 
of these traits were 'being caring', 'friendliness', 'kindness', 'patience' and 'tolerance'. In 
this study, patients with mental health problems were able to sense and perceive virtuous 
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care, that IS, care motivated and exercised from moral virtues such as kindness and 
patience. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has described and examined several areas of nursing practice, which help to 
lay the foundations for the remainder of this thesis. Several conclusions can be drawn 
from the preceding discussion. First, illness can affect one at any point in the lifespan. 
Illness becomes part of the person, it is therefore a personal phenomenon. Second, 
illness, whether it is life threatening or not, causes a range of emotional responses in the 
person. These responses include feelings of anxiety, fear, helplessness, powerlessness, 
and vulnerability. These feelings can be intensified with admission to hospital. Ultimately, 
when one is hospitalized one is dependent upon help from others, including nurses, to 
survive, recover, and fare well. Third, there seems to be a relationship between human 
vulnerability caused by illness and human dependence on others for help. And as 
Maclntyre87 points out this relationship has been ignored in moral philosophy. I would also 
suggest that this relationship lacks sufficient discussion in much of the nursing ethics 
literature. 
Literature reviewed, including both theoretical and empirical, agrees on certain 
characteristics of a therapeutic nurse-patient relationship. These include the idea that this 
relationship should be patient-centred and one of mutual collaboration. The role of the 
nurse is a complex topic and if one wishes to be accurate about this area of practice, then 
it is not particularly helpful to make assumptions or generalizations. From a review of 
literature, including both theoretical literature and qualitative studies investigating the role 
of the nurse and anecdotal evidence from my own clinical practice and recent teaching , 
sessions there are however several areas of convergence. Broadly these include the idea , 
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that nurses should help the patient to survive, recover and promote the patient's 
independence. Being a 'good' nurse and providing 'high' quality care from the 
perspectives of nurses', patients' and patients relatives' tends to centre on several 
personal attributes, qualities or skills. These include: the need for nurses to develop and 
demonstrate good communication skills, both verbal and non-verbal, the need for nurses 
to demonstrate certain personal qualities or 'dimensions' such as trustworthiness, honesty, 
patience, and kindness, being friendly towards patients, treating patients with respect, and 
meeting patients' individual physical and non-physical needs (holistic nursing care). 
The nurse-patient relationship as conceived above is held by patients to be extremely 
valuable, as valuable, if not more valuable, than other clinical interventions. It seems to me 
that this kind of helping relationship is only achievable if nurses make themselves 
available to patients, spend sufficient time with patients, allow patients to tell their stories, 
listen to patients' stories and try to hear what they are saying. However, the literature 
examined suggests that nurses are spending most of their time doing administrative tasks 
and only a small proportion of their time is spent in direct contact with patients. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to general ethics and examine the virtues. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL ETHICS 
Introduction 
The importance of interpersonal responses in nursing practice has been established. It 
is also clear that one needs to reflect about the role of a nurse and the traits that 
nurses ought to demonstrate if 'high' quality nursing care is to be delivered. 
In the previous Chapter, I began to discuss 'the virtues'. In this Chapter, I turn to 
general ethics and take this discussion further. I confine discussion of the virtues to 
general ethics so that some of the theoretical foundations for the remainder of this 
thesis can be laid. I focus on the place of the virtues in the history of philosophy, ask 
what a virtue and vice are, examine why the virtues are valuable in peoples' lives, and 
discuss an advantage and disadvantage of the virtue-based approach to morality. 
On the idea of one's life faring well 
Is it plausible to suggest that autonomous persons with decision-making capacity 
usually wish that their needs are met and interests promoted? Based solely on 
personal experience, I believe that this is true. Physical needs must be met or illness 
would occur. People want their emotional and social needs to be met so that their lives 
possess a certain level of quality that that person is content with; generally lives are 
enriched and fare well if needs are met. Need more be said about the notion of a life 
faring well? In this thesis, one's life goes well if needs are met and interests promoted; 
judgments concerning this state of affairs are to be made by the person concerned. For 
instance, if I wanted to form good long lasting friendships with other people and for one 
reason or another this did not happen, then my life - in terms of this one aim - has not 
gone or fared well; at least it has fared less well than I hoped it would. Or suppose that 
I really wanted to become financially wealthy and despite my best efforts this did not 
occur. Then I might judge that my life has not fared well, again at least in terms of this 
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one (important) aim. Other aims (or life plans) that people set for themselves include 
wanting to achieve certain, perhaps high, career goals, wanting to travel the world, 
wanting to develop personal qualities such as self-confidence, and wanting to be 
healthy. Whenever these objectives are not successfully met and thus there is a gulf 
between reality and desires, then one might judge that one's life has not fared as well 
as one had hoped. 
The virtues in the history of philosophy 
Ancient Greek philosophy provides an early account of the role of the virtues in human 
lives, understood in terms of human nature, the good life for humans, and the notion of 
human flourishing. 1 
However, when examining Plato and Aristotle's ethics it should be remembered that 
ethics, for the ancient Greeks, was bound up with politics. The primary focus was on 
forming and maintaining a just state. Thus the idea of virtue was understood in terms of 
how it could help men to protect their states. 
The central question posed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics is 'what is the good 
life for man?' Crudely, his response was living the life of virtue according to reason and 
desires (I discuss Aristotle's ethics in more detail in Chapter 5). This account changed 
with the monotheism of Christianity; the virtues were now neglected and God was seen 
as a lawgiver. According to God, righteous living meant being obedient to the divine 
commandments. The Christian thinker, St. Augustine, distrusted reason. Instead he 
held that to be morally good one needed to subordinate oneself to the will of God. Thus 
the theological virtues - faith, hope, charity, and obedience - held a central place in 
Divine Law. In the medieval period, Aquinas devoted a large part of Summa 
Theologiae2 to the virtues. The Enlightenment saw the rise of Reason, and a return to 
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secular ethics. In the 1;th century, Hobbes3 believed that glory and profit were the only 
human motives.4 However, in Hume the virtues of sympathy and benevolence were at 
the core of his moral theory. And although Kant is held to be one of the founders of 
deontology, he actually argued in The Doctrine of VirtueS that persons had strict 
(perfect) duties to cultivate the virtues. 6 Kant's Moral Law replaced Divine Law. The 
question posed by moral philosophers became 'what is the right thing to do?' The aim 
of the Moral Law was to produce a system of rules so that individuals, who were 
obliged to follow these rules, could know which actions were right and wrong. Thus, 
modern moral philosophers, as a result of going in a different direction from the 
Greeks, developed theories of obligation, for example, Kantianism and utilitarianism, 
instead of theories of virtue. While this account is brief and incomplete - it treats over 
3000 years of human history in less than a page - it is nevertheless accurate and 
representative of the development of obligation-based moral theories. 7 
What is a virtue? 
Aristotle on virtue 
In Book Two of The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle stated that the soul consists of three 
kinds of things: passions, faculties, and states of character. Aristotle believed virtue is 
neither passions nor faculties; "all that remains is that they [the virtues] should be 
states of character'. 8 He distinguished between moral and intellectual virtue. The latter 
were taught through instruction and were split into scientific knowledge (episteme), 
intelligence (nous), technical skill (techne) , wisdom (sophia), and practical wisdom 
(phronesis). Conversely, moral virtue was acquired through exercising the virtue, 
"moral virtue comes about as a result of habit". 9 The emphasis is on the word 
'habitual'. Taking honesty as an example, someone who is honest on certain occasions 
- perhaps when it is convenient to be so - does not posses the virtue of honesty. On 
the Aristotelian view, the honest person is a/ways honest. For Aristotle, the actions of a 
virtuous person spring from a steady unchangeable character. 
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The use of 'virtue' rather than 'the virtues' reflects Aristotle's interpretation of 'virtue' as 
a 'state of character'. However, Aristotle is inconsistent because he also uses the 
plural, that is, states of character. Thus clarity is lacking. It seems to me that the 
ancient Greeks understood virtue and the virtues as two different but related things. 
First, 'virtue' as a complex mental state and second, 'the virtues' as morally excellent 
character traits or dispositions needed to live good lives. 
I discuss Aristotle's ethics in more depth in Chapter 5. For now, I shall just say that 
Aristotle believed that the virtuous person would fare better in life than the non-virtuous 
person. 
Are the virtues types of knowledge? 
Plato in the Meno10 discusses the idea that virtue is knowledge. In ancient Greece, to 
possess knowledge was to be virtuous; in other words, knowledge of the good life 
made a man good. But, like Aristotle, Plato held that only certain people - in fact, only 
Athenian gentlemen, women were excluded - could achieve the status of virtue. 
I shall discuss the idea that virtue is knowledge in more detail. Whilst I have not yet 
examined the nature of specific virtues, I cite examples to make this debate more 
fruitful. 
One dictionary definition of the word 'knowledge' is "awareness or familiarity gained by 
experience (of a person, fact, or thing)".11 Are virtues such as courage and justice 
ultimately types of knowledge? In what sense could a virtue such as compassion be 
knowledge? It is clear that contradictions spring from the claim that virtue is 
knowledge. For instance, Sam displays courage when she rescues the toddler from the 
path of the oncoming car. During the rescue, Sam's leg is injured. In the light of her 
injury, it might be thought that Sam lacked wisdom. On one level, this appears 
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plausible. If this is accepted, then Sam possessed and lacked virtue. However, in trying 
to save the child Sam was aware that she might get hurt. Action in the face of possible 
danger partly characterizes courage. It is not easy to save a child's life when serious 
harm to self might occur. Realizing the potential for harm makes the deed even more 
admirable. Afterwards Sam might act with great humility, responding to others' 
compliments with 'Oh, I didn't have time to think .... anyone would have done the 
same ... I'm not courageous'. But underestimating the measure of her act and reflecting 
about the deed with modesty are themselves admirable personal qualities. 
Consider justice as a virtue. To act justly one needs to know what it means to be just. 
In this sense, the notion of having knowledge is a necessary condition of being a 
virtuous, in this example, just, person. Is there a connection between having 
knowledge of a specific virtue and being virtuous, that is, exercising that virtue? Does 
such a knowledge base encourage and promote self-reflection and a deeper level of 
thinking? It is possible for someone to have a broad and deep knowledge of, for 
example, justice as a virtue and yet not be a just person; this can apply to any of the 
virtues. The reverse is true too: someone might have an idea of what it means to be a 
just person and live according to such an idea, yet this person has never once read 
any literature on justice as a virtue. These questions remind me of some students' 
assumptions and preconceptions. During teaching and learning sessions, it has 
transpired that some students assume that having knowledge of ethics means that I 
must be a moral person. Possessing knowledge of any discipline is something that can 
be admired. However, it is not true to suggest that having a considerable theoretical 
knowledge base in ethics somehow results in moral behaviour; it is no easier for me to 
be moral than it is for others, including students of nursing who are beginning to learn 
about the complexities of ethics. 
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Perhaps the claim that virtue is knowledge should be understood in terms of having 
wisdom or being a wise person. It is commonly supposed that people become wise 
through experience. But experiences are personal. Furthermore, subjective 
interpretation lies at the core of understanding and learning from experiences. It is 
possible for two people to undergo the same experience, but (even if this is actually 
possible) they will perceive elements of the situation differently and interpret the 
situation in different ways. As a result these two people will focus on different things 
and their learning will be dissimilar. So merely having many experiences does not 
necessarily make someone wise. Moreover, the claim 'the wise agent just knows what 
to do' sounds to me as though it is grounded in intuition. I reject the claim that intuition 
can tell people what to do. Like Hursthouse,12 I hold that intuition is a deeply 
unsatisfactory notion, because it lacks any firm grounding. I reject the use of the 
singular 'virtue', because I am referring to character traits. Therefore, I cannot accept 
the idea that 'virtue' is knowledge in the formal sense of the word. I accept however, 
that acting virtuously requires people to possess forms of knowledge gained through 
having familiarity and comprehension of previous experiences. 
The contemporary meaning of the term 'virtue' 
Two uses of the word 'virtue' can be readily distinguished. First, when it is used as a 
noun, virtue can mean 'advantages' or 'strengths' as in 'this system has the following 
virtues .. ' Second, 'virtuous' may be used as an adjective in relation to persons, for 
example, 'Carol is a virtuous girl'. Both usages provide positive and complimentary 
descriptions, which imply praiseworthiness; 'virtue' is not used in a negative sense. 
Even at this relatively early stage, it can be seen that the Greek idea of virtue does 
differ somewhat from contemporary accounts. 
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Assumptions about virtues and goodness 
At this point, I need to focus on one of the criticisms of the virtues and the virtue-based 
approach to morality. In short, this is that there is an assumption that the virtues are 
good. This assumption about the goodness of the virtues leads to a circular argument. 
For example, that by being virtuous - exercising virtues such as honesty - one will be 
a good person and lead a good life, but to be 'good' one needs to be virtuous. 
However, where does the belief that the virtues are good character traits originate? 
What are some of the reasons for this assumption? Whose authority grounds this 
belief? This assumption needs acknowledgement and investigation. 
The term 'virtue' derives from the ancient Greek word 'arete' meaning excellences of 
character. 13 Aristotle focused on certain virtues, for example, wisdom, justice, courage, 
and temperance. Since ancient Greece, the use of the term 'virtue' has been used to 
mean excellences of character or good traits of character. It appears that this usage 
has been widely accepted and not attracted criticism. The moral philosophies of 
Socrates, Plato and most influentially perhaps, Aristotle, provide some degree of 
authority in which to ground this belief. 
There appears to be a relationship between the idea that knowledge and virtue are 
synonymous and the view that many people hold today concerning the value of 
knowledge per se. For many people, the idea of 'knowledge', of being 'knowledgeable' 
and of 'knowing' something is seen as valuable; it is often thought that having 
knowledge is a good thing and that it is unfortunate if one lacks knowledge. The 
relationship between possessing knowledge and being autonomous, self-determining, 
and taking control of one's life is well established, especially in health care ethics. For 
example, the notion of making informed decisions after professionals have provided 
sufficient knowledge of the aims, risks, and benefits of treatments. Of course, it is 
important to think about the purpose and uses of knowledge and therefore whether 
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knowledge is intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. For instance, is knowledge 
valuable for its own sake or for what it might be used for and the effects it might have 
on human life? It seems to me that many people admire those with knowledge and it 
appears that some people envy those who possess a rich knowledge of a certain 
subject. I shall accept the claim that most people believe knowledge is a good thing 
and therefore has value. If this is true, then this might lead to the belief that the virtues, 
seen in terms of character traits, are also a good and should therefore be cultivated 
and exercised, so that the possessor can show his or her goodness. 
Morality, ethics and the moral life 
Morality is concerned with the origins, development, and application of one's values, 
beliefs, and customs. Ethics or moral philosophy is the philosophical discipline that 
examines morality. There are two major questions that moral philosophers pose: what 
is the right thing to do? And what is it to be a good person? In response to the first 
question, the nature and role of moral principles, rights, responsibilities, and obligations 
are critically examined. The second question concerns moral character. In a specific 
attempt to respond to this area of human life, the virtues have been understood 
throughout the history of virtue ethics and including its contemporary conception, in 
terms of traits of character that display moral excellence, deserve admiration and 
praise from others, and help both the possessor and others to lead morally good lives. 
Ethics is concerned with examining good lives from a moral point of view by, in part, 
considering the question of how persons can be good and to a large degree, thinking 
about how humans can live together harmoniously. But, of course, it is possible for a 
person to have a good life, based on a conception of personal well-being, that is 
markedly different from moral goodness. For example, choosing to lead an egoistical 
life, one of self-interest, which might be achievable through being a cheat, liar and 
thoroughly dishonest. These vices conjure up images of a person whom I believe most 
of us would wish to avoid; I would not wish to form a friendship with someone who 
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behaved in these ways. Conversely, if one overheard a colleague talking about 
someone they had just met, using words like 'honest', 'fair', 'sensitive' and 'patient', I 
believe that many people would think that this person sounds 'nice' and is perhaps 
someone worth getting to know. Judgments about people whom one has not yet met 
concern several factors including one's moral values, moral education, and the action 
guidance one gets from thinking about specific virtue and vice terms; some of these 
issues will be examined in the course of this thesis. It does, however, appear plausible 
to connect an understanding of individual character traits called virtues, other example 
are kindness, tolerance, and respectfulness, with the sorts of lives many people 
believe humans ought to live. Thus, on the one hand, it is important to acknowledge 
the assumption about the meaning of 'good' and the circularity of argument. However, 
on the other hand, this assumption is based upon plausible moral reasons that aim to 
provide a convincing account of how humans can lead morally good lives, flourish as 
individuals, and live well together. It seems to me that this explanation of the goodness 
of the virtues in terms of living a moral life relates well to the views expressed through 
'common sense' morality, that is, the view that many ordinary people (I mean, non-
philosophers) have about the sorts of personal qualities people ought to display to lead 
a morally good life. 
Virtues or vices? 
However, Aristotle's conception fails to distinguish virtues from vices because the latter 
are also character traits manifested in habitual action. Pincoffs provides one account of 
how to resolve this problem. He claims that the virtues and vices should be thought of 
as qualities that persons think about in deciding whether someone should be avoided 
or sought. He writes 
Some sorts of person we prefer; others we avoid ... The properties on our 
'd 14 list can serve as reasons for preference or avol ance. 
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Regarding the vices, most people would probably wish to avoid meeting other people 
who are, for instance, cruel, callous, mean, or dishonest. These kinds of negative 
character traits are not admirable either in us or in others. People who cultivate and 
exercise the vices should not be worthy of praise or admiration. 
Is it possible to list the virtues? 
There are numerous moral virtues. It is difficult to be accurate about the exact number. 
If one were to imagine a positive adjective that can be used to describe someone's 
character, then it is probably a virtue, for example, an honest person, a kind person, a 
patient person, and a tolerant person. The literature that I have reviewed does not 
speculate on the number of virtues imaginable. It is the same for alternative moral 
theories and approaches; for example, there is no preoccupation with the 'total' 
number of moral principles of use in health care ethics. Particulars of situations and 
context are important in fostering the cultivation and exercise of the virtues. Therefore, 
even if one wished to, it would be extremely difficult and time consuming to identify 
every conceivable positive personal quality that might be considered a virtue; the lives 
that contemporary humans live are so complicated and multi-faceted to render this aim 
futile. 
The virtues are sometimes sub-divided in an attempt, I think, to make these traits 
easier to remember, understand and apply in concrete situations. For example, 
compassion, honesty, benevolence, and patience are among the so-called other-
regarding virtues. Justice and fairness are classed as social or civic virtues. Other, less 
widely acknowledged, virtues include assertiveness, tolerance, and temperance. The 
latter do not appear to be categorised. 
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Rachels provides a list of common virtues. 15 However, one needs to note that a list 
merely functions to provide examples of virtues, and as a result such lists will be 
incomplete. If someone delivered a list of 25 moral virtues and argued that it was the 
complete definitive list, how might I respond? I might reply 'oh, this list is quite 
comprehensive, but what about respectfulness ....... or trustworthiness?' An amended 
list of 27 (the 25 on the list, plus respectfulness and trustworthiness) moral virtues 
might then result. But later on someone else gazes at the list and says 'Oh, it's a good 
list but what about courage?' And this process would continue. It is difficult to argue 
that a list of moral virtues is complete; amendments to the list will result from other 
people thinking hard about the moral character of persons, situations faced in life, and 
how to lead good moral lives. Specific virtues are required in different situations 
depending upon several factors (to be described soon) and upon reflection of these 
factors, 'new' virtues will spring to mind. I would disagree with those who might allege 
that this inability to produce a complete list of virtues is objectionable. Instead it serves 
to remind us just how complex human lives can be. Furthermore, it ensures that 
rigorous thinking about different kinds of lives and deep reflection regarding possible 
candidates for the status of virtues is not only possible, but remains an exercise in 
human intellect that should be encouraged and admired. It seems to me that believing 
that a list of virtues is complete amounts to wasted opportunities for philosophizing 
about the moral character and moral lives of persons. 
What might determine important virtues? 
Virtues and roles 
Peoples' lives consist of many diverse roles and ends. It appears sensible to think that 
different virtues will be necessary and relevant depending upon the nature of these 
roles and ends. Rachels'16 examples are an auto mechanic and a teacher. He believes 
that an auto mechanic should be honest, conscientious, and skilful, while a teacher 
should be articulate, patient, and knowledgeable. Another example might help. Imagine 
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a lawyer whom I wish to act on my behalf. I would like her to be intelligent, articulate, 
and courageous. By exercising these traits she could act well as my advocate and 
promote and safeguard my legal rights. The inculcation of the virtues depends upon 
one's roles. 
Is a single set of virtues desirable for all persons? 
Given the above it would seem that the answer here is in the negative. Because 
people differ and there are so many contrasting roles and responsibilities, many 
different virtues are important to live morally good lives. But is it useful to think in terms 
of 'the good person'? This might imply that everyone evolves from the same mould. 
Nietzsche for one challenged this claim. In rejecting the assumption that only one form 
of human goodness exists, he said 
How na'ive it is altogether to say: "Man ought to be such-and-such!" Reality 
shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play 
change of forms - and some wretched loafer of a moralist comments: "No! 
Man ought to be different". He even knows what man should be like, this 
wretched bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and exclaims, "Ecce 
Homo!,,17 
Nietzsche is not readily recognized as a philosopher interested in the virtues. However, 
the above quotation illustrates that he believed that many forms of human goodness 
exist. On his view, the virtues would differ from person to person depending on one's 
personality and professional and social roles. But historical eras need to be taken into 
account too, as norms of behavior are interpreted within the context of history. For 
example, qualities in two women, in different periods of history, may both in different 
ways be virtuous and admirable. According to Rachels, 
A Victorian woman who would never expose a knee in public and a modern 
woman on a bathing-beach have different standards of modesty. And yet 
all may be admirable in their own ways.18 
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Do the virtues differ within different societies? 
The short response is affirmative. But a lot depends on the kinds of practices 19, 
institutions, and values sustained (and deemed permissible) in particular societies. In 
other words, the sort of human life one is able to live. Since the character traits 
required to successfully fulfil professional and social roles differ, the virtues required to 
live successfully will differ too. Different societies play an important part in grounding 
and influencing the cultivation of virtues. Therefore one question worth asking is, 'do all 
people need some virtues irrespective of the era?' On this, Aristotle remarked 
One may observe in one's travels to distant countries the feelings of recog-
nition and affiliation that link every human being to every other human 
being.20 
Aristotle is here suggesting the universality of at least some virtues. Certain essential 
human needs, for example, physiological needs such as respiration, eating, and 
drinking remain the same irrespective of one's culture; human physiology does not 
depend on culture. Are moral virtues important in satisfying human needs? With regard 
to physiological needs, one response is to suggest that, directly at least, moral virtues 
prove of limited use. However, in satisfying non-physical needs, such as, the need to 
form friendships and the need for self-preservation, it is plausible to believe that some 
moral virtues, for example, honesty, loyalty, and courage, are, irrespective of cultural 
background, important in meeting these needs. 
What is a virtue? Revisited. 
I now return to the question, what is a virtue? According to contemporary moral 
philosophers21 , moral virtues are character traits that dispose one, its possessor, to 
habitually act, think, and feel in certain ways. For example, Rachels believes that a 
virtue is "a trait of character, manifested in habitual action that it is good for a person to 
have,,22. The moral virtues are those that it is good for everyone to have. 
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The virtues form part of one's character; they are an internal part of one's identify. 
Moral obligations and principles can be viewed as being external to the person, as 
these social constructs are imposed on people from the outside world; for example, 
professional obligations from the Nursing and Midwifery Council23 and legal obligations 
derived from statutory and common law. These externally motivated obligations are 
therefore not necessarily compatible with the kind of person one is. I mentioned above 
that the virtues dispose people to act, think, and feel in certain ways. To be more 
specific, following Aristotle, the virtues are excellences of character. The moral virtues 
are morally excellent character traits or dispositions. Cultivating and exercising the 
moral virtues is instrumental in being able to lead morally good lives. Exercising the 
moral virtues tends to help people fare well in life and this helps others fare well too. 
But I repeat that I am talking about faring well in moral terms. Being dishonest might 
help one to lead a good life, but not a morally good life. Inculcating the moral virtues 
will help one to act, think, and feel in morally excellent ways. 
I would add, however, that the virtues should be regarded as morally admirable traits of 
character deserving of one's admiration.24 People who exercise moral virtues deserve 
to be praised and admired because of the moral excellence of their deeds, thoughts, 
and feelings. This conception of a moral virtue is adopted throughout the remainder of 
this thesis. Then, in chapter 8, I amend this conception in the light of Macintyre's thesis 
about practices and the internal goods. 
Why are the virtues valuable? 
The example of honesty 
Why should the virtues be valued? I have stated that the virtues are morally excellent 
character traits, which help people to lead morally good lives and deserve praise and 
admiration from others; it seems to me that the question should be 'what reasons are 
there for not valuing these traits?' Of course another response is to claim that valuing a 
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virtue will depend upon the particular virtue in question. What is so good about, for 
example, honesty? If I am an honest person, if I exercise the virtue of honesty - that is, 
do honest deeds and think and feel in honest ways - then this will help me form and 
maintain good mutually beneficial friendships. Of course, the assumption here is that 
the honest person would not be selfish and disloyal. In other words, if I inculcated one 
virtue - in this case honesty - I would probably inculcate other virtues or at least refrain 
from inculcating the vices. However, this is far from straightforward. This view is based 
on the idea that the person who inculcates the virtue of honesty does so not on a 
whim, but only after deep prolonged introspection and deliberation. This person desires 
to become virtuous, because she is aware of how exercising the virtues can positively 
affect the flourishing of other people and oneself. Therefore it would be counter-
productive and self-defeating to inculcate one or more virtues only then to inculcate 
one or more vices. 
The example of kindness 
Regarding the value of the virtues, another example may help. Robert is a charity 
worker in Africa helping to care for people who are sick and dying. He is kind towards 
others. He believes that being kind is crucial to his role because he can see that those 
whom he cares about are helped through his acts and feelings of kindness; perhaps 
there is also a quality or feature of his kindness that others can feel. Robert works 
consistently hard to be kind towards other people. By acting, thinking, and feeling 
kindly Robert does well in his chosen role and others are helped, in part, through his 
kindness. He derives a great deal of satisfaction from his work and his kindness does 
not go unnoticed. Indeed so many people tell Robert's leader about his kindness that 
he is soon offered promotion. Thus, even though Robert may not have striven for 
promotion, this is offered to him; of course he may turn a new post down because he 
does not wish to leave his charity work in Africa, but that is a separate matter. This 
example is limited to one other-regarding virtue, namely, kindness and it could be 
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accused of being a trite oversimplification of the truth. However, it serves to show how 
the virtues are important to humans; how in this scenario Robert's kindness helped 
others to fare better in life and how it helped him to do well too. Exercising the moral 
virtues, especially other-regarding virtues such as kindness, is particularly important 
when working with people who are helpless and vulnerable (this is one of the reasons 
why I examined these feelings in the previous Chapter). 
Communities and the virtues 
Thinking generally about whj5 it is good to cultivate the virtues, it is true to say that 
humans are typically (though not always) rational and social creatures, who live in 
communities. Humans interact with one another and communicate in different ways. 
Communities are composed of individuals who might live alone or form families. To 
interact with each other successfully, the virtues of honesty, justice, and loyalty - to 
name only 3 - are important. This is plausible as long as humans wish to get on well 
together. What might happen if people instead exercised the vices of dishonesty, 
injustice, and disloyalty? Using dishonesty as an example, dishonesty would adversely 
affect one's ability to trust another person. Dishonesty and a lack of trust might mean 
that more people lived in isolation or in smaller groups. Eventually more communities 
would fragment and disintegrate. Close relationships, including marriage, would be 
unsustainable. Imagine the effects on communities if dishonesty was joined by injustice 
and disloyalty? As noted earlier, it is clear that people have different needs and 
interests; one's roles and responsibilities differ too. Many different virtues will be 
necessary to successfully achieve these ends. The virtues are therefore valuable 
because in meeting these ends they help humans lead morally good lives. 
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The 'virtues' of chastity and temperance: more difficult examples 
However, the virtues of honesty and kindness are clear-cut examples. These traits are 
usually seen by people as positive qualities and as such, prove non-problematic when 
examining the notion of ascribing value. If one asked 'name two traits of character or 
personal qualities that are associated with being a good person?' I imagine that both 
honesty and kindness would appear high up on the list of responses. But when the 
virtue in question relates to behaviour not widely valued, then the virtue itself will 
require further scrutinizing. According to Benn, chastity is such a 'virtue'. He asks, 
"What is so admirable about chastity?,,26 Without further examination, Benn is sceptical 
that appealing to this virtue can provide plausible reasons for sexual restraint. Another 
example is temperance, which was a trait highly valued by Aristotle. Some people see 
little or no reason to moderate their behaviour, for example, refusing to curtail their 
alcohol consumption or being unwilling to reduce their dietary intake. This sort of 
discussion easily leads to more general disagreement regarding the question, which 
traits of character are virtues and which are not?' A character trait is a moral virtue in 
my view if it meets the conception described earlier in this Chapter. This is an 
important question, however, because the charge of moral relativism looms large if this 
question is not satisfactorily resolved. 
Lacking virtue and showing the vices 
It is interesting to consider the nature of virtues by thinking about what might happen if 
one lacked the virtue in question. For example, would Robert fare as well if he lacked 
kindness? Would those people he cared for have benefited in quite the same way? 
Would his work have been noticed? Or similarly would a primary school teacher 
succeed in her role - fare well - if she lacked patience with the children she taught? 
How does exercising the vices - for instance, dishonesty, cruelty, and unfairness -
affect the ability of other people to lead a morally good life? The inculcation of the 
virtues will not be deemed important or valuable if a person has no intention of leading 
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a morally good life. But for those people who do set themselves this challenge, the 
virtues ought to be taken seriously and take centre stage. 
Advantages of the virtue-based approach to morality 
In Chapter 5, I examine the rich and plausible account of moral motivation and moral 
character that virtue ethics (the moral theory that make the virtues central to morality) 
provides. I develop an account of the virtue-based approach to moral decision-making 
in nursing practice in Chapter 7. I limit this section to examining the moral force of 
virtue and vice terms. 
Action guidance from virtue and vice terms 
Moral theories usually aim to provide action-guidance for persons. In moral dilemmas 
and situations that are morally tense, a moral theory will help a person to know what to 
do. With regard to action-guidance, Hursthouse27 believes that it is important to 
consider the broad range of vice terms to be found within the vocabulary of the virtues 
and vices. Indeed, the list of virtues in comparison is relatively short. Not only is the list 
of vices long, these terms are also remarkably useful to one's conduct. Virtue terms, 
such as 'honest', 'fair', 'kind', and 'patient' and the opposite vice terms, for example, 
'dishonest', unfair, 'unkind' (or 'cruel'), and impatience, according to Hursthouse, 
provide greater explanatory force for people compared with obligations and deontic 
(duty-based) terms (I discuss this in more depth in relation to nurses in Chapter 7). 
Anscombe heavily influences Hursthouse's view on this. According to Anscombe, 
instead of using deontic terms, she believes that "It would be a great improvement if, 
instead of "morally wrong" one always named a genus such as "untruthful", "unchaste", 
"unjust" ... the answer would sometimes be clear at once". 28 Hursthouse believes that 
people can gain a lot of "invaluable action guidance .. from avoiding courses of action 
that are irresponsible, feckless .. harsh .. feeble .. self-indulgent." 29 In other words, one 
can discover a lot of action guidance and gain an insight into what to do by thinking 
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hard about the virtue and vice terms and the sorts of deeds expected of someone who 
exercises specific virtues or vices. 
Suppose I wonder whether I can justify lying to Adam. I can get a clearer idea of how I 
ought to act by considering whether the range of behaviours open to me are honest, 
fair, or hurtful, rather than by asking whether the behaviours are right, wrong, ethical or 
unethical. How much action guidance is forthcoming from the prescription, 'do what is 
ethical'? How can the latter phrase help me especially when I find myself in a really 
difficult situation, saturated with moral tensions, and I simply do not know what to do? 
Benn suggests that virtue and vice terms such as kind and dishonest respectively carry 
'rhetorical resonance', which can positively affect one's behaviour. In other words, 
upon hearing 'you should do what the kind agent would do' I begin to get a sense of 
the range of acts, thoughts, and feelings that kind persons are known for. Then upon 
deeper thinking I become increasingly aware of the meaning of 'being kind'. Benn 
believes that "words like dishonest playa more central role in everyday moral talk than 
words like wrong".30 I agree with this claim. As a child one hears these sorts of virtue 
and vice terms from parents and other adults on a regular basis. I believe that as one 
develops into adulthood, words such as 'fair' and 'kind' are replaced with the language 
of obligations, especially the central concepts of 'right' and 'wrong' action. Benn holds 
that the idea of right and wrong action should not be dispensed with. However, the use 
of virtue and vice terms can prove to be really helpful in an attempt to gain action 
guidance and also when people wish to evaluate the actions of others. 
Problems with the virtues 
Regarding the virtue-based approach, one serious problem is conflicts between virtues 
and how these can be resolved. In a given situation, it will usually be difficult to know 
how to respond to someone. How should I behave in this situation? Should I tell my 
friend the truth, be honest to her, and risk hurting her feelings? Or should I be kind to 
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her, aim to protect her feelings, but deceive and perhaps lie to her in the process? This 
example involves making a stark choice between being kind or being honest, when it is 
thought that one cannot be both. I discuss conflicts between the virtues in Chapters 5, 
7 and 10. In this section, I briefly note the problem of identifying the virtues. 
Identifying the virtues31 
Disagreement exists on which character traits are virtues. For example, one person 
compiling a list of virtues might believe that honesty, patience, and tolerance are 
virtues. Another person may disagree, instead favouring compassion and integrity. 
However, I am sceptical that a person who advocates the virtuous approach would, on 
the one hand, defend honesty and on the other hand reject compassion. A virtue on 
my view is a character trait, habitually performed, which disposes one to act, think, and 
feel in morally excellent ways. Those who exercise the virtues deserve praise and 
admiration. The fact that there are so many plausible virtues is not sufficient reason to 
claim that these traits are not all virtues. 
Instead of the above claim, perhaps the claim is that there are only several virtues. 
This view opposes the claim that I made earlier in this Chapter that numerous different 
virtues exist. For instance, in the above, the claim is that only honesty, patience, and 
tolerance are virtues, but not compassion and integrity. I reject this claim, however. It 
should be clear by now that the moral life cannot be exhausted by reference to three 
character traits. One who suggests that there are only three real virtues (or indeed just 
one or two) needs to respond to several questions, which centre on context and 
particulars of different situations. For example, how can humans live morally good lives 
without being just? In other words, without the virtue of justice is it possible to be 
morally good and if so, how? Surely if the response to this question is affirmative, then 
one must be committed to a view of moral goodness that excludes the virtue of being a 
just and fair person. 
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The moral status of the virtues 
In this final section, I discuss in general terms the question, "what status should the 
moral virtues be accorded?" It is an important question and one that is sometimes 
posed by the critics of the virtue-based approach. 
Are persons obliged to cultivate the virtues in a maximising, utilitarian sense? Do 
persons have a strict positive duty to cultivate the virtues as Kant argued? 32 Or 
instead, is it merely nice for people to cultivate the virtues? 
Benn gives one response to the question of ascribing moral status to the virtues. He 
asks 'could the virtues be human needs?' Benn writes 
We all need the virtues - that is, we need to possess them ourselves, 
rather than merely profit from the possession of them by others.33 
He holds that the virtues "are needed for the satisfactory fulfilment of the activities 
in which we characteristically engage. 34 
What does it mean to say that one thing is needed for something else? Benn35 replies 
that there might be a simple means-end relation. Consider Black, a lecturer. He wants 
to be well known and respected among his peers. He realizes that he needs to work 
hard to realize his aim. But while Black does work hard, he sees no intrinsic value in 
working hard, in being industrious. Indeed as Benn remarks, "he may prefer, other 
things being equal, to do as little as possible".36 Black might not work as hard if he was 
certain that he would still become respected and well known. 
Aristotle did not talk in terms of virtues as needs. But this is to be expected since in 
ancient Greece, the notion of human needs - physical, spiritual, and psychological -
had yet to be intellectualized. It remains true however to claim that one needs the 
virtues on Aristotle's view in order to fare well and flourish. If people fail to cultivate the 
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virtues, then in moral terms people would tend not to fare as well as the virtuous. 
Clearly, however, if one was simply not interested in being a moral person or leading a 
morally good life, then exercising the vices can result in a good life, not in terms of 
moral goodness, but perhaps in terms of financial wealth, power, and status. I discuss 
Aristotle's ethics in more detail in Chapter 5. 
But the virtues are not needs in the same sense that, for example, breathing, eating, 
and drinking, are. However, if one rejects (a) one is obliged to cultivate the virtues and 
(b) the virtues are human needs, what other candidates remain in which to ground the 
virtues? It seems too trivial to claim that Robert, the kind charity worker, ought to 
cultivate kindness because this would be nice for him and nice for others. This claim is 
weak. Importantly, it is too weak and insubstantial to motivate people to inculcate the 
moral virtues in the first place; especially given the fact that inculcating the virtues is a 
very demanding and challenging process. Indeed this is surely one good reason why 
so many people do not bother. 
In relation to Benn's 'virtues as needs' thesis, Robert might believe that to fare well he 
needs to cultivate kindness. Or the scholar might think he needs to cultivate courage to 
fare well. For example, Robert might say 'I need to be kind to fare well and benefit 
those whom I care about, because if I don't then my life will not go as well and those in 
my care will not benefit to the same degree'. Likewise, the scholar can say 'I need to 
be courageous and fight for those ideas I believe in, if not I will fare less well and 
others will benefit less from my work'. Regarding some essential physical needs, if one 
is deprived of nutrition and hydration then one will not fare well; one will suffer from 
malnutrition and dehydration. I believe that the virtues can plausibly be regarded as 
moral needs, which are crucial to enabling people to lead morally good lives. 
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Conclusions 
My conception of a virtue has been outlined. It is plausible to claim that persons need 
to inculcate the virtues if they wish to fare well in life in terms of moral goodness. 
Advantages of the virtue-based approach to morality include the rich and highly 
textured degree of action guidance derivable from the virtue and vice terms. Problems 
with this approach, however, include conflicts between the virtues (which shall be 
discussed in detail later in Chapters 5, 7 and 10) and the supposed difficulty in 
identifying which traits are virtues. 
In the next chapter, I critically examine the role of moral obligations in morality and 
identify some of the merits and disadvantages of consequentialism and deontology. 
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CHAPTER 4 - A CRITIQUE OF OBLIGATION-BASED MORAL 
THEORIES IN GENERAL ETHICS 
Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to a critical examination of the role of moral obligations, rules, 
and principles and their underpinning moral theories in general ethics. I first outline the 
moral theory known as consequentialism. I focus to a large degree on act-
consequentialism, but I also look at rule and indirect forms of consequentialism. Then, 
deontology is put under the critical spotlight. The broad aim of this chapter is to 
explicate these obligation-based moral theories and highlight some of their merits. 
However, I aim to show that the standard objections to these theories outweigh their 
supposed merits. 
Characterizing obligation-based moral theories. 
Obligation-based1 moral (or ethical2) theories can be characterized, fairly accurately, 
as theories that emphasize the role of moral obligations, moral rules or moral 
principles3 in morality. Crudely, obligation-based theorists hold that the role of 
obligations is crucial in morality; they believe that moral obligations are central to ethics 
and that moral acts and conduct cannot be achieved without instruction from, at least 
some, moral obligations. These types of theory claim that persons are obliged to do 
certain things or behave in certain ways towards others; that one person owes 
obligations towards another person. 4 
Anscombe believed that modern moral philosophy (she meant, utilitarianism and 
Kantianism5) is bound up with obligation and duty simply because of moral 
philosophy's historical traditions. In the literature, both moral philosophy and applied 
ethics, the two predominant types of obligation-based moral theories are 
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consequentialism (including utilitarianism) and deontology. Both these types of theory 
focus upon the moral nature of the act itself. Important questions asked by proponents 
of these theories include, 'what ought I to do?', 'what is the right course of action?', and 
'of these two (or more) choices, which one is the best?' 
Consequential ism 
Consequentialists can be described as 'forward looking' theorists because they believe 
that the events after an act are what characterize the morality of the act. 
Consequentialists argue that what makes right acts right (and wrong acts wrong) are 
the act's consequences, outcomes, or results.6 Typically consequentialist theories take 
the form: "Act x is right if x produces good consequences". Many consequentialists go 
further and insist that 'good' is insufficient. The consequences of an act have to be the 
best among a range of possibilities; in other words, what consequentialists call utility, 
has to be maximized. 
Act-consequentialism 
One example of a consequentialist moral theory is act-consequentialism7, which 
according to Frey holds "that an act is right if its consequences are at least as good as 
those of any alternative".B This theory is consequentialist because it views the 
rightness and wrongness of acts in terms of their actual consequences. It is worth 
noting two criticisms, even at this early point. First, this formulation ignores many other 
morally important features, for example, intentions and motivations. And second, doubt 
is raised on the question of how one can know the actual consequences of an act. 
However, in response to the charge that it is difficult to know what the consequences of 
an act will be, two things can be said. It is clearly true to claim that people cannot see 
into the future and predict the consequences of an act. But experience and wisdom, 
consequentialists allege, can provide some general guidelines, the sorts of things that 
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might happen after certain types of acts, for example, if someone is thrown into a lake 
and cannot swim, then a likely consequence is that that person will get into difficulties 
and without help might drown. The second point is that all of us, irrespective of our 
allegiance to a particular moral theory, need to take consequences into account, as 
Glover claims, 
most of us, whether utilitarians or not, take some account of the 
likely effects of our actions on people's happiness, and we 
should all be in a mess if there was no correspondence between 
trying to make someone happier and succeeding. 9 
I need to stress at this point that I do not object to the term 'consequences' per se. 
Glover is correct in holding that, irrespective of our moral allegiance, one needs to take 
the consequences of acts into account. However, when this notion is restrictive, 
excessive and to the detriment of other morally important issues, such as, moral 
character and moral education, then this is objectionable. Furthermore, when people, 
including nurses, have a poor, superficial comprehension of 'consequences' and a 
crude understanding of the meaning and scope of consequentialism, not to mention its 
problems, then this again is objectionable. 
On the relationship between rightness and goodness, Frey believes that act-
consequentialism is an example of a welfarist theory because 
rightness is made a function of goodness, and goodness is understood 
as referring to human welfare. 10 
This suggests that a good act is always a right act. While this is reasonably 
straightforward, just how is rightness determined? In response to this question, Frey 
claims that act-consequentialism is 
impersonal and aggregative, in that rightness is determined by 
considering, impersonally, the increases and diminutions in 
well-being of all those affected by the act and summing 
those increases and diminutions across persons. 11 
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At least three questions arise regarding the above, which are far from simple to settle. 
First, how can one go about evaluating or measuring the various 'increases and 
diminutions in well-being'? 'Well-being,12 is defined and conceived in different ways, 
including objective and subjective accounts, thus convergence is problematic. Some 
might argue that depending on which subjective account is provided, well-being cannot 
be measured. Second, is it possible to evaluate well-being for 'all those affected by the 
act'? This is clearly problematic; just how can one know which people have been or will 
be affected by each and every act? Third, act-consequentialism focuses on the 
impartial nature of morality; indeed impartiality is one of its central tenets. Act-
consequentialism considers that the interests of strangers should count equally with 
those of one's loved ones, but here again problems arise, for example, what does it 
actually mean to treat someone impersonally and how can one go about this? This 
charge is commonly described as 'the nearest and dearest objection'. These objections 
pose serious problems for act-consequentialism as a plausible moral theory. 
In addition to act-consequentialism being an example of a welfarist theory, Frey claims 
that act-consequentialism is also a maximizing theory, 
one concrete formulation of the principle of utility, framed in the light 
of welfarist considerations, is 'Always maximize net desire-
satisfactions. 13 
Desire satisfactions 14 are those kinds of interests, which individuals desire to include 
as part of their lives. Examples here include good health, relationships with others, 
wealth, and pastimes. According to the above quote, one should maximize these items 
on each and every occasion. However, again this is no simple matter and critics point 
to the difficulty in always maximizing goods and benefits. As a way of avoiding such 
objections, some theorists have developed 'satisficing' versions of consequentialism, 
which claim that rather than aiming to maximize interests, people should aim to satisfy 
their needs and interests; the moral requirement is less stringent, people must aim to 
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do a considerable amount of good in and for the world. 15 These theorists argue that 
this version of consequentialism resolves one or more of the standard objections 
levelled at maximizing forms of consequentialism. 
According to maximizing consequentialism, the goal is to maximize human welfare. 
This begs the question, how should one best go about achieving this? Since Hare's 
Moral Thinking16 , it has been acknowledged that perhaps the best way of maxmizing 
human welfare overall is to forego aiming to maximize it on each and every occasion. 
This view, however, contrasts sharply with utiltiarians, such as, Bentham and J. S. Mill. 
Bentham developed utilitarianism, an extreme form of consequentialism, as a political 
theory. Mill then adapted it. Utilitarianism, at least in its classical form, holds that 
maximizing utility for the majority of individuals is the only criterion for determining the 
morality of acts and omissions. It therefore places all of the moral emphasis upon the 
consequences of an act or omission. Mill states, 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' 
or 'the greatest happiness principle' holds that acts are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; 
wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness. 
By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of 
pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.17 
Objections to act-consequentialism 
Some critical comments regarding act-consequentialism have already been made. 
shall now examine in more depth possible objections to act-consequentialism or act-
utilitarianism. 
The neglect of moral character 
This criticism targets an omission of act-consequentialism and other obligation based 
moral theories, including deontology. Therefore it needs to be borne in mind 
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throughout this chapter as it applies to these theories in general. I make this point early 
in this thesis, as it is crucial to my claims in the remainder of the thesis. 
The notion of adequacy in relation to moral theories helps determine one's preferences 
and views about the plausibility of particular moral theories. For example, it partly 
explains why some thinkers prefer obligation based moral theories to character based 
ethics. Rachels' believes that an adequate moral theory 
must provide an understanding of moral character; and 
second, that modern moral philosophy has failed to do this. 18 
I accept this claim without reservation; indeed this claim motivates much of this thesis. 
The reason why I believe moral theories must provide a satisfactory account of moral 
character is because I view ethics as a discipline that has at its core a concern for how 
people respond to the needs and interests of others and how people get on in life. For 
example, do they fare well or badly? Without a plausible account of one's moral 
character - the kind of person one is, demonstrable by the inculcation of character 
traits, both virtues and vices, and one's motives for action - this particular debate 
regarding morality, the virtues, and human responsiveness will be stifled. I qiscuss 
moral character in relation to general ethics in more detail in Chapter 5 and in relation 
to nursing practice in Chapters 7 and 9. 
Anti-theory and the assumption that moral dilemmas are resolvable 
Act-consequentialism focuses, restrictively so, on the notions of 'right action' and 
'morally right action' (this also applies to act-utilitarianism and deontology). According 
to these moral theories, 'ethics' is often conceived as a search for 'right' and 'wrong' 
answers to moral dilemmas. The aims of moral theories are not clear-cut; indeed there 
is disagreement on this in the literature. Questions include: what is it that moral 
theories should do? What do persons want and expect from moral theories? 
Williams 19, for example, believes that it is unrealistic to expect one, or even a hybrid, 
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moral theory to resolve moral problems and dilemmas. This is because the moral life is 
too richly textured and complex for this to be possible. Obligation-based moral 
theories, as noted, have at their core the desire to provide action guidance and 
develop some kind of decision procedure for settling moral dilemmas. These theories 
fail to account for other aspects of the moral life that are so obviously important and yet 
these aspects are either completely ignored or neglected in large part by 
consequentialism and deontology. Williams, is, I believe, known by others as an 'anti-
theorist'. Anti-theorists generally reject the claim 'the pivotal aim and role of a moral 
theory is to provide action guidance for people'; it is true to say that the term 'anti-
theorist' is often used in a derogatory sense. 
The neglect of moral remainder 
Hursthouse, a virtue ethicist, would agree with Williams. Hursthouse has examined the 
large body of philosophical literature on moral dilemmas, including the possibility that 
there are, or could be, 'irresolvable' dilemmas. The latter are described as situations 
"where doing x and doing yare equally [my italics] wrong, but one has to do x or y, or 
one in which two moral requirements conflict but neither overrides the other".2o Most 
notably for the aims of this thesis, Hursthouse discusses the subject of 'moral 
remainder', an idea that is embedded in this body of literature. Hursthouse explains 
this important but neglected subject thus, 
Suppose there are irresolvable dilemmas and someone is faced 
with one. Then, whatever they do, they violate a moral 
requirement, and we expect them (especially when we think in 
terms of real examples) to register this in some way - by feeling 
distress or regret or remorse or guilt, or, in some cases, by 
recognizing that some apology or restitution or compensation is 
called for.21 
This emotional response - the remorse, guilt, distress, or need for restitution - is the 
moral remainder, that is, the agent's emotions during and after an irresolvable 
dilemma. Moreover, Hursthouse believes that when one is dealing with dilemmas that 
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are thought clearly resolvable, these cases are resolvable only with remainder. This is 
because the moral requirement that is overridden retains considerable moral and 
emotional force. 
The subject of moral remainder is somewhat neglected in the moral philosophy 
literature that examines moral dilemmas. Hursthouse also examines a second body of 
literature on dilemmas in applied ethics. As an example of this type of dilemma, she 
gives: should the intensive care doctor lie to the patient who survived a car crash which 
killed the rest of her immediate family? Hursthouse believes that this second body of 
literature nearly always ignores the first. Hursthouse holds that the contributors to this 
literature appear not to "even entertain the possibility that the dilemma they are 
discussing is irresolvable".22 Indeed the assumption appears to be that there is one 
correct decision that the theorists' chosen moral theory will discover. Hursthouse 
believes that usually deontology or utilitarianism are chosen. Further, Hursthouse 
believes that the contributors neglect to mention moral remainder, instead they focus, 
often almost exclusively, on the question "Which is the right act in this case, x or y?,,23 
What accounts for this oversight in ignoring moral remainder in applied ethics debates? 
Hursthouse believes that writers commit one of several fallacies, and this helps to 
explain the terrible failure to discuss (or even mention) remainder. 
The first possible fallacy is 'the false dilemma'. This occurs when the writer "take[s] the 
dilemma to be 'either x is the morally right act to do here (without qualification) and y is 
the one that's morally wrong or y is the morally right act (without qualification), etc"'.24 A 
third possibility is ignored, for example, '''Well, they are both pretty awful, but 
(supposing the dilemma is resolvable) x isn't quite as bad as y",.25 Hursthouse claims 
that people assume there is, in moral dilemmas, one side that is unreservedly morally 
right and the other side is simply wrong. This assumption runs, as Hursthouse notes, 
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deep in ordinary common sense morality and extends to conflicts between two different 
people. 
Hursthouse asks, "Why is the fallacy harder to see when the choice is between two 
courses of action?,,26 Her response is that this concerns, in part, confusing "two 
different senses of the phrases 'morally right decision', or 'right moral decision'''.27 In 
the following quote, Hursthouse illustrates one way in which these phrases are used, 
Suppose we have a moral dilemma which is resolvable x is worse 
than y. Then the decision to do y rather than x is, in the circum-
stances, the right decision. Moreover (supposing the decision to 
have been made on the moral grounds that x is worse than y), it is 
a moral decision, or one that has been made morally. So it is the 
'morally right decision' or the 'right moral decision' ... 28 
There is a second different way of using the phrases 'morally right decision' and 'right 
moral decision'. This concerns the use of these phrases to mean a good deed or a 
morally right act. In Hursthouse's words, 
As such, it is an act that merits praise rather than blame, an act that 
an agent can take pride in doing rather than feeling unhappy about, 
the sort of act that decent, virtuous people do and seek out occasions 
for doing ... Moreover, people can take pride in deciding to do such 
actions- they are the sorts of decision that decent virtuous people 
make- and are praised for thus deciding, whether or not the act comes 
off. Suppose it does not come off, well, that is a pity, but still, we say, 
they made the 'morally right decision', the 'right moral decision'; good 
for them.29 
The difference still might not be easy to see, so it will be useful to consider the 
following claim, which helps to bring the difference out. The claim is '''When morally 
right decisions come off - when the agent succeeds in doing what she intended to do -
we get morally right action"'.30 This applies to the second way of using 'morally right 
decision'. But, according to Hursthouse, "if we are using 'morally right decision' in the 
first way, we cannot say this truly, for it is obviously false".31 Hursthouse gives the 
following example to illustrate, 
The man who has induced two women to bear a child of his by 
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promising marriage, can only marry one, but he may not be in 
an irresolvable dilemma; it may be worse to abandon A than B 
and let us suppose he makes 'the morally right decision' and ' 
marries A, perforce breaking his promise to B and condemning 
her child to illegitimacy. He merits not praise, but blame, for 
having created the circumstances that made it necessary for 
him to abandon B; he should be feeling ashamed of himself, 
not proud, and so on. 32 
The above scenario came about because of the man's intentional actions and desires. 
Hursthouse, however, still thinks that when the case involves a dilemma brought about 
through no fault of the agent, the act chosen - the one evil thought marginally less evil 
than the other - will 
still not be a morally right or good act, not one that leaves 
her with those 'circumstances [so] requisite to happiness', 
namely 'inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, 
[and] a satisfactory review of [her] own conduct' as Hume so 
nicely puts it. On the contrary, it will, or should, leave her with 
some sort of remainder. 33 
As noted, the resolution of dilemmas in applied ethics literature fails to mention moral 
remainder. Hursthouse believes that frequently the writers prevaricate on 'morally right 
decision' and this leads to a false dilemma. Whether this difference between the two 
senses of 'morally right decision' and 'right moral decision' is concealed on purpose or 
the writers are truly ignorant of it in the first place, is uncertain. It is hard to accept the 
latter. However, if the writers did appreciate the difference then it would be good 
scholarly practice to acknowledge this (perhaps as a footnote) to the readers. It is 
possible that the writers have not thought about the use of 'morally right decision' and 
'right moral decision' in the same way that Hursthouse clearly has. At any rate, there is 
confusion between two very different questions, namely, "Which is the morally right 
decision, to do x or to do y? and "Which is the morally right action ... x or y?,,34 
Hursthouse claims, "If there are no irresolvable dilemmas, the first question does not 
pose a false dilemma, but even if every moral dilemma is resolvable, the second 
certainly does, for the correct answer may well be 'Neither,,,.35 For example, during an 
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armed bank robbery a hostage collapses, clutching his chest. The armed robber has to 
decide whether to (a) carry on mercilessly or (b) get medical help and allow the doctor 
to gain access. He decides to do (b). This decision is, on Hursthouse's view, morally 
right because the hostage is helped; to carry on regardless would have been a greater 
evil. But one cannot say that the robber's action is morally right because he was acting 
viciously - robbing a bank is not a good deed - and he should feel guilt and be blamed 
for creating the situation in the first place. Perhaps the hostage would not have 
collapsed if the robber had not carried out this vicious act in the first place. 
Problems with utilitarianism 
Ignoring other peoples' rights 
The aforementioned quote by Mill makes it quite clear that utilitarianism - in all its 
forms - is no ally to individual people. This point has been picked up on by other moral 
theorists, especially rights-based theorists who argue that utilitarian thinking often 
leads to a violation or overriding of peoples' rights. For instance, because the interests 
of the many are to outweigh or negate the interests of the few, rights to respecting 
one's autonomous decision-making capacity can be violated or rights to freedom and 
liberty can even be outweighed. 
One aspect of ordinary morality that has not been touched on is that people very often 
do think according to crude utilitarian or consequentialist views. Imagine a 
disagreement where 7 people claim that The Beatles split up in 1969, while 1 person 
firmly believes it was 1970. The majority of individuals - the 7 - would probably think 
they were correct and think the other chap is wrong; of course in this example, he 
would be actually correct. Or suppose a group of people are undecided which film to 
see at the cinema and it is agreed that the group shall not split up. Six out of ten want 
to see the new James Bond film, while the other four wish to see the latest film Noir by 
Hampton. I would suggest that the resolution of this problem would see the group 
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trotting off to see the Bond film, thus leaving four disgruntled film buffs. While these 
examples might appear trivial, they are representative of what occurs in ordinary lives. 
It seems to me that people do spend time - I am not sure how much - thinking about 
the outcomes and consequences of actions and omissions. I believe too that this might 
involve some reflection concerning one's needs and interests and the interests and 
needs of other people. It is clear that the interests and rights of individual people could 
be ignored, violated or overridden by utilitarian reasoning. 
No action guidance until the second premise. 
Hursthouse examines the first and second premises put forward by act utilitarianism 
and concludes that it is not until the second premise that one is given specific guidance 
on how to act morally, that is, told what the right thing to do is. A utilitarian, according 
to Hursthouse, might initially present her account of right action thus 
P. 1. An action is right iff ['iff means 'if and only if'; my words] 
it promotes the best consequences. 36 
However, despite the above linking the utilitarian concepts of 'right action' and 'best 
consequences', it fails to provide guidance on how to act. One must understand what 
counts as 'best consequences' for this to be so. Therefore a second premise, 
specifying this, must be provided. For example, 
P. 2. The best consequences are those in which happiness is 
maximized.37 
The above premise forges the utilitarian link between 'best consequences' and 
'happiness'. Hursthouse believes, however, that in utilitarianism the slogans do not 
succeed in singling out the most important notion, for just as the Good is singled out, 
so too equally perhaps could the concepts of 'happiness' or 'consequences'. 
Regarding the rather uninformative first premise of act-utilitarianism, Hursthouse thinks 
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that this point is seldom, if ever, mentioned simply because people are so familiar with 
how utilitarians specify the notion of 'best consequences'. 
But while the second premise of utilitarianism routinely offers no surprises, according 
to Hursthouse it is possible that obscure things could emerge. For example, 
Someone might specify the 'best consequences' as those in which 
the number of Roman Catholics was maximized (and the number 
of non-Catholics minimized). Or someone might specify the 'best 
consequences' as those in which certain moral rules were adhered 
to.38 
It is this familiarity and the ideas that people (intuitively) bring to the subject that help 
form and maintain this understanding of, for example, the meaning of 'best 
consequences'. The answer to 'what are best consequences?' is not given in the first 
premise of act-utilitarianism. But the gaps are filled in because each of us has a pretty 
good idea of what counts as 'a good consequence', namely something that will, say, 
produce pleasure or happiness or relieve suffering. 
Utilitarianism's single rule and misrepresenting morality 
Act-utilitarianism and other common conceptions of consequentialism provide just one 
rule: 'an act is right iff it maximizes best consequences'. A standard objection of 
utilitarianism is that in applying its single rule, without the need for judgement, "it 
misrepresents the texture of our moral experience, making it out to be much simpler 
than it really is". 39 Because it fails to question whether or not its single rule does apply, 
fails to consider the plausibility of its extension, and denies any higher order rules, it 
fails to 
capture the number of occasions where we want to say, 'This other 
(non-utilitarian) rule or consideration just does apply here, and it is 
not simply obvious that it is outranked by the rule about minimizing 
suffering, though I agree it sometimes is - don't you see?40 
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Furthermore, the single rule of act-utilitarianism is couched in evaluative concepts, 
such as, 'happiness', 'well-being', and 'best consequences'. Utilitarians can resolve this 
problem by grounding their form of theory on empirical claims, for example, by defining 
'happiness' as the satisfaction of preferences or desires. The single rule of 
utilitarianism is evaluative, for there are clearly problems for the utilitarian who makes, 
for instance, a distinction between the higher and lower pleasures. 
There is another standard objection to utilitarianism. This is "that, according to non-
utilitarians, utilitarianism so frequently yields the wrong resolutions of hard cases".41 
Hursthouse believes that it might be difficult to distinguish between the above two 
standard objections to utilitarianism. But she claims it is possible to see the difference. 
There are cases where deontologists (and virtue ethicists) agree with utilitarians that 
the right thing to do is to minimize suffering. But while the utilitarian simply thinks it 
adequate and sufficient to apply his single rule, deontologists (and virtue ethicists) 
think getting to this resolution is far from simple, 
for example, in order to avoid a great amount of suffering that would 
be brought about by keeping it, a promise had to be broken, is 
something that has to be taken into account; judgement has to be 
exercised to determine whether this was the sort of promise that 
could be broken and whether the good effects of doing so are 
sufficient to justify it, and so on.42 
So, according to this objection, deontologists (and proponents of virtue ethics) claim it 
is wrong to equate the content and quality of our deliberations with the simple 
application of the utilitarians' single rule. This is a claim I fully endorse; indeed it is one 
of the prime motivations for this thesis on the virtues and virtue ethics. 
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Misrepresenting morality: Stocker43 on modern moral theories' account of moral 
motivation 
Stocker is dissatisfied with modern ethical theories, including utilitarianism and 
deontology, for not providing a rich account of the moral life. In his view, these theories 
over concentrate on actions and consequences. Stocker is especially dismayed with 
obligation-based theories, because they fail to examine moral motives. Or, they 
provide an account of moral motivation - crudely, the motives for one's actions, 
thoughts, and feelings - that is so wrapped up in inflexible and strict obligations that it 
provides an unsatisfactory account of moral motivation. This account is often described 
as 'unnatural' and 'unconvincing'. A pivotal example from Stocker illustrates this point 
very well. I quote at length 
.. you are in a hospital, recovering from a long illness. You are very bored 
and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in again. You are now 
convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and a real friend -taking 
so much time to cheer you up, travelling all the way across town, and so 
on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he 
always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what he thinks will be best. 
You at first think he is engaging in a polite form of self-deprecation, 
relieving the moral burden. But the more you two speak, the more clear 
it becomes that he was telling the literal truth; that it is not essentially 
because of you that he came to see you, not because you are friends, 
but because he thought it his duty, perhaps as a fellow Christian or 
Communist or whatever, or simply because he knows of no one more 
in need of cheering up and no one easier to cheer Up.44 
How would one feel if this happened? Would one be pleased to hear Smith's motive for 
his visit? Most probably, one would be disappointed and rather upset to hear that 
Smith did not visit, because he wanted to be a good friend, or because he really liked 
you and was concerned about your health. His act appears calculating. In relation to 
Smith's motive, Stocker says, "surely there is something lacking here - and lacking in 
moral merit or value".45 
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Smith's actions appear good, even kind. But his motive is the problem. The motivation 
for his visit is an abstract sense of duty, 'to do the right thing'. People form friendships 
and relationships with others that are mutually valuable and beneficial. Friendships 
ought to be made and maintained for their own sakes, not because one perceives that 
there is an obligation to do so. Would one wish to be like Smith? Would one wish Smith 
to be one's friend? Would one wish to live among people like Smith? The answer to 
these questions is surely in the negative and an emphatic one at that. And yet, theories 
of obligation, such as, consequentialism and deontology focus almost exclusively on 
the idea that people must obey certain moral obligations, rules, and principles. 
Act-consequentialism and the problem of intuitions 
An important objection of act-consequentialism (and consequentialism in general) 
concerns the way it creates conflicts with, or at least fails to accommodate, some of 
our moral intuitions. These intuitions are held about a range of acts, practices and 
beliefs in the world. Frey gives the following as examples, 
frown upon murdering or torturing someone, upon enslaving people 
or using them as means, upon acting in certain contexts and so 
using people in certain ways for mere marginal increases in utility, 
all of which act-utilitarianism is supposed to (be able to) Iicense.46 
Although some intuitions are deeper, more sound than others, the above are all deep-
rooted examples of moral intuitions found in Western liberal society. Critics of act-
consequentialism, for example, deontologists and virtue ethicists, hold that other moral 
theories (usually the one adopted by the critic) can better account for, at least, some of 
these intuitions. 
All of these intuitions appear to relate in some way to our respect for persons' lives. As 
this is a sound and fundamental moral notion, it is particularly interesting to ask, how 
does act-consequentialism license these intuitions concerning the rightness of acts? 
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The answer lies with another of consequentialism's main tenets: the act-
consequentialist is compelled to call acts right if they have better actual consequences 
than other alternative acts. For example, if it is thought that act x - to murder a dictator 
who is responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent people - will produce the 
best consequences among three options (x, y, z), then act x, because its 
consequences are better than y or z, would be the morally right act to perform. 
However, Frey responds to this form of reasoning by claiming that this conclusion 
"conflicts with our moral intuitions or ordinary moral convictions,,47 or what, I believe, 
SIote48 means by 'commonsense morality'. 
Utilitarianism: impartial ism and conflicts between intuitions. 
I shall discuss the above ideas in more depth. People have different needs and 
interests. However, despite this variety, utilitarianism insists that when deciding what to 
do, one ought to consider and rate everyone's interests as equally important. J., S. Mill 
believes that, 
Utilitarianism requires [the person] to be as strictly impartial as a 
benevolent and disinterested spectator.49 
Mill has his supporters, including Rachels. In the first chapter of The Elements of Moral 
PhJJasaphy,50 impartiality is included as a fundamental moral requirement. 
But why is the notion about impartiality so important in our moral lives? Why should 
John be impartial towards his wife, Helen? The basis of close relationships, families, 
and marriage is love, affection and partiality between those involved. People tend to be 
partial towards their spouse, family, close friends, and colleagues. Is there anything 
wrong with mothers who love their children, care for them, put them first, and protect 
them above all else? Parents tend to care for their own children in ways that they do 
not care for other children. Parents behave partially all, or nearly all, of the time with 
their children. What is wrong with this? Isn't this one characteristic of being a 'good' 
90 
parent? If parents were not partial, their children might be ignored, feel neglected, or 
harmed in some way. The same thing applies to how each of us treats our friends. 
Partialism is a feature of friendship; it is expected between friends. For instance, while 
Sam would come to the rescue of his best friend, Jake, he might well pass by a 
stranger in need, because Jake has not met this stranger and feels no affinity towards 
him. An important part of our moral lives concerns friendships with, and affection for, 
others. Moral theories, such as utilitarianism, which urge impartiality, find it difficult to 
account for these aspects of the moral life. Indeed utilitarianism provides a crude, 
simplistic account of this morally important feature that fails to portray real life as it is. 
Critics of act-consequentialism argue that many moral intuitions support partiality 
towards loved ones and ourselves; that one should put their own needs and interests, 
and those of loved ones, ahead of others, especially strangers. This idea appears 
sensible since persons are morally responsible for one's own lives. But while one can 
help others, including strangers, and aid their distress, one is not morally responsible 
for others' lives as a whole. And of course, if one neglects their own life one might be 
unable or less able to help others. In sum, critics claim that act-consequentialism 
produces conflicts with or fails to accommodate some of our deeper moral intuitions. 
But what about those occasions when moral intuitions and the claims made by 
consequentialism coincide? Frey believes this omission - it is seldom mentioned - is 
noteworthy. One explanation why this might be so is that the critic of act-
consequentialism somehow believes that these established intuitions are either 
compatible with, or are produced from, his theory of the right. Two possible pOSitions 
emerge from this, 
on one of which rightness has nothing whatever to do with an act's 
consequences and on the other of which the rightness of certain 
acts has nothing whatever to do with an act's consequences. 51 
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It will become clear in this thesis that virtue ethics is an example of the first position. 
There is also a third position, noted by Frey, which is not anti-consequentialist. This 
view holds that the rightness of an act concerns its consequences plus something else, 
for example, the motive from which the act was performed. This view is a combination 
or hybrid account. While it might not be anti-consequentialist, its action guidance will 
depend on the moral force given to the motives that are taken into account when 
determining the rightness or wrongness of the act. 
Which intuitions are deeper than others? 
It was noted earlier that some moral intuitions are thought more secure or deeper than 
others. Indeed, according to Frey, some philosophers believe that certain deeper 
intuitions are more true than any normative moral theory. This begs a couple of 
questions, one of which I will deal with and the other I will put to one side. First, I will 
set aside the question of whether moral intuitions have probative force in ethics.52 I will 
instead deal with the following question, which intuitions are more secure than others 
and why? Critical thinking is needed to respond to this question. However, according to 
Frey, irrespective of which critical methodology is adopted, some intuitions remain 
intact and survive after intense critical scrutiny. Rawls53 believes that if one's chosen 
moral theory produced a result that was contrary to one's deep intuitions, for example, 
if slavery was justified by the theory, then this provides sufficient reason for one to 
revise or amend the theory. 
Another problem arises in attempting to clarify which moral intuitions are more secure 
or deeper than others. There is disagreement on this because of factors including 
cultural diversity and gender differences. Whatever the reason though, the outcome is 
that thinkers side with different intuitions concerning particular acts or classes of acts 
which they regard as crucial. Therefore the goal of arriving at just one or two deep and 
secure intuitions is complicated. Problems remain, in my view, regarding exactly how 
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one can compare the deepness or correctness of moral intuitions. I believe the fact that 
several intuitions are proposed as crucial indicates wide variation and a lack of 
consensus among thinkers. And holding more than one or two reduces the strength of 
the intuitionist's claims. One also needs to note the effect of historical eras on one's 
willingness to label some intuitions as more favourable or correct than others. For 
example, Frey believes that whereas truth telling and promise keeping were once 
highly favourable, secure intuitions to hold, nowadays opinion has altered somewhat. 
For example, Frey states that the wrongness of abortion has perhaps [my italics] taken 
over as one of the more secure contemporary moral intuitions. However, there is no 
empirical evidence for this, indeed there are no reasons given in support of Frey's 
claim. He does believe, however, that one's moral intuitions depend, to a large extent, 
upon one's political orientation, 
someone who is politically conservative not uncommonly puts the 
wrongness of abortion into the favoured class, whereas political 
liberals are very unlikely to agree. 54 
Perhaps, then, Frey believes that the secure moral intuition regarding the wrongness of 
abortion is true if one is a conservative. Because of the large number of conservative 
voters (Frey is an American, does he therefore mean republicans?), he might firmly 
believe that there are many people who would hold and defend this moral intuition. 
However, this discussion demonstrates the difficulty in defending moral claims, in this 
case concerning assumptions about the number of people holding a moral intuition 
about the wrongness of abortion. 
Whatever the disagreements between the scope, depth, and limits of moral intuitions, 
attacks on act-consequentialism are very often launched because of the assumption 
that some intuitions remain despite critical scrutiny. It is hard to see how such intuitions 
as 'slavery is morally justifiable' could survive once rigorous critical examination has 
been conducted. Indeed, as discussed above, an intuition of this kind would probably 
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require an amendment in the moral theory that grounds it. If an intuition survived 
critical reflection, it would most probably be a legitimate and defensible one. 
Motivated by this problem regarding intuitions, theorists have aimed to develop act-
consequentialism by incorporating all manner of conceptual devices into the structure 
of the theory (I shall focus on Hare's indirect form of consequentialism in a later 
section). The aim is that results can then be obtained in particular cases that are more 
compatible with the deep and secure intuitions identified by critics of act-
consequentialism. Sidgwick is, according to Frey, one example of the aforementioned 
kind of thinker. In Book IV of The Methods of Ethics55 , Sidgwick aims to convince 
readers that act-consequentialism does indeed provide support for aspects of 
commonsense morality; although he admits that there are parts and details of the 
theory that are incompatible with commonsense morality and hence require 
reformulation. Sidgwick took the view that amending act-consequentialism was 
necessary to respond to some of the conflicts between the application of act-
consequentialism and the views taken to be representative of commonsense morality. 
This view is in opposition to the hard line utilitarian view adopted by Smart. 56 However, 
according to Sidgwick, it remains the case that act-consequentialism is unable to 
sweep aside all of commonsense morality, so that with regard to justice, for example, 
act-consequentialism should give way. 
Intuitions - the need for supporting argumentation 
This debate over the correctness of moral intuitions leaves me wondering how two 
claims can be squared. On the one hand, Rawls' claim that slavery is morally 
unjustifiable and that nothing more needs to be said to defend this position. And on the 
other hand, the idea that moral philosophy, or more strictly philosophical analysis, is 
intended to be a rigorous pursuit, which aims to search for, and defend, secure 
foundations for moral beliefs. One is left with the feeling that Rawls has not been 
94 
successful here, or at least he fails to go far enough. More is needed concerning the 
legitimacy and justification of Rawls' claim regarding slavery. This is true even if one 
agrees (as I do) with his view that slavery is morally wrong. One is required to provide 
supporting reasons for one's beliefs so that others can then evaluate these. It is 
possible that one could hold deep moral intuitions, which others might abhor, for 
example, extreme racist views. It is therefore crucial that supporting argumentation is 
provided, which allows for investigation and critical examination. 
If commonsense morality with its secure moral intuitions about particular acts is a 
plausible view, then this provides problems for act-consequentialism. Despite 
epistemological concerns, for example, what justifies moral intuitions?, I accept that 
people often hold deep intuitions about a range of acts in the world, including the 
wrongness of murder, slavery, and torture. Act-consequentialists are motivated to bring 
their theory into line with some of these deeper moral intuitions. However, as a result of 
doing so, act-consequentialists minimize their theory's merits, for example, its alleged 
simplicity. (But it is arguable whether consequentialism, espeCially the utilitarianism of 
Smart, could accurately be described as a simple moral theory.) Nevertheless, viewing 
act-consequentialism, as a plausible moral theory would be further hampered if it failed 
to account for some deeper moral intuitions, especially those thought too secure to be 
mistaken, which besides the aforementioned include the evil of child abuse. 
Merits of consequentialism 
It avoids the charge of moral relativism 
One of the merits of act-utilitarianism, its proponents allege, is that it avoids the charge 
of moral relativism, which affects deontology (and virtue ethics). This is because act-
utilitarianism's first premise, unlike deontology's, contains just one rule: 'an action is 
right if it produces the best consequences'. Of course, one then needs to know what 
'best consequences' means; this is given in its second premise 'best consequences 
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are those that maximize happiness'. It is plausible to suggest that act-utilitarianism is 
not guilty of moral relativism. 
Consequential ism is codifiable 
Another feature of consequentialism (and deontology) is that they aim to be codifiable, 
that is, these theories hold that ethics should be conceived as a set of obligations, 
rules, and principles that provide specific action guidance. This is held, almost 
assumed, to be one of consequentialism's merits. Pincoffs57 noted that this was the 
dominant view of a normative ethics. According to Hursthouse, codifiability means that 
universal obligations, rules, and principles possess two features, 
(a) they would amount to a decision procedure for determining what 
the right action was in any particular case; (b) they would be stated in 
such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and 
apply then correctly. 58 
Hursthouse calls this 'the strong codifiability thesis'. While this feature can be seen in a 
positive light, one can also understand that it could, if other morally important features 
were forgotten, prove objectionable. 
Rule-consequentialism 
Rule consequentialism has arisen and developed in no small part because of the flaws 
in act-consequentialism regarding its conflicts with some secure moral intuitions. Rule-
consequentialism develops rules that are judged morally right if the consequences of 
adopting such rules are thought more favourable than unfavourable to the majority of 
people. Rule consequentialism does not judge or test the morality of particular actions, 
rather it tests the morality of rules such as 'lying is wrong' or stealing is wrong'; 
adopting rules such as these is usually thought favourable for everyone. Because it 
does not target specific acts, rule consequentialism provides more general action 
guidance for people compared to the single rule of act-consequentialism. However, 
does rule-consequentialism fare better than act-consequentialism? Not according to 
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Frey, who believes that, in at least the versions of rule-consequentialism known to him, 
it "has long been known to suffer from certain types of instabilities that seem irreducibly 
part of the theory"s9. This view is shared by Lyons60 who claims that rule-
consequentialism collapses into act-consequentialism. It is certainly true that in 
avoiding the problems associated with act consequentialism, new problems are 
created for rule consequentialism. For example, under rule consequentialism it might 
be thought socially beneficial to introduce a rule prohibiting slavery. However, it is 
possible that "on balance, a rule permitting slavery actually produces more benefit for 
society" .61 Part of the problem is that once one agrees that certain moral intuitions 
have an important role to play in morality and once one thinks that some of these 
intuitions are true, it becomes more difficult to accommodate these intuitions within a 
consequentialist structure. In other words, rather than trying to maintain some sort of 
consequentialist theory, it might be more profitable to turn to moral intuitionism instead. 
Given this and the importance of deeper moral intuitions, it might be that a non-
consequentialist moral theory could better accommodate these intuitions. Critics of 
both kinds of consequentialism (and more specifically, act and rule utilitarianism) 
suggest that this flaw - consequentialism's inability to accommodate deeper moral 
intuitions - explains why these forms of moral theory have failed to catch on. I accept 
that the conflict produced by act-consequentialism with regard to some deeper moral 
intuitions provides it with a serious problem. But I would disagree with the assertion 
that act-consequentialism has not caught on. Of course, a lot depends on precisely 
what is meant by 'to catch on'. But from electronic searches of the general ethics 
literature, it is evident that obligation-based moral theories in general, and 
consequentialism in particular, are popular, if not to say dominant, theories in the 
literature. (The nursing literature searches produced very similar results - this will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.) 
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Hare's indirect consequentialism 
Hare62 has famously developed an indirect split-level account of act consequentialism 
in an effort to better accommodate those secure moral intuitions that remain after 
critical examination. Because Hare's theory aims to respond to important criticisms of 
act-consequentialism, I shall now spend some time examining his account. 
Hare disagrees with the common notion that deontological (or in his words, 'absolutist') 
and utilitarian methods of moral reasoning are incompatible. He claims that it is 
possible to distinguish between two different levels of moral thinking, and that this is a 
potentially viable and productive approach. Hare thinks that the absolutist approach is 
most suited to problems, which one faces "without much time for reflection about 
them", 63 whereas the utilitarian approach is most suited to moral problems "which we 
think out, in general, what our attitudes to these problems ought to be".64 
Hare briefly outlines the two approaches, absolutism and utilitarian. He has this to say 
about the former, 
We have first those who tend to speak in terms of people's rights 
and the corresponding duties of other people towards them -
rights and duties which are thought of as in some sense absolute.65 
However, according to Hare, this approach fails to tell us what rights one has or when 
conflicts arise, which rights are to be respected and which overridden (I examine the 
notion of rights later in this Chapter). 
The utilitarian approach concerns doing what is in the 'best interests' of people, aiming 
to ensure that what is done will promote one's interests and welfare. For Hare, 
however, a true utilitarian is impartial, that is, everyone's interests are treated equally. 
For example, within health care, Hare claims that in the majority of cases a patient's 
interests will take precedence over the interests of others. Thus, a utilitarian would 
98 
make his decisions on the basis of the patient's interests. Hare conceives a utilitarian 
to be, 
One who thinks that when faced with a moral decision he ought 
to act in whichever way is best for the interests of those 
affected.66 
Hare criticizes the practice by philosophers and bioethicists of proposing obligations, 
for example, the duty of beneficence, and calling for a weighing of such duties when 
there are conflicts between these. He rejects this practice mainly because no 
explanation is provided for whichever so-called solution is suggested. Hare also rejects 
the method of 'lexical ordering', where an attempt is made somehow to prioritise 
duties. This is another common objection levelled at obligation-based ethics, one that 
is often overlooked when one is given long lists of different kinds of duties, for instance, 
prima facie, perfect, imperfect, 'x stricter than y' and absolute. Despite this confusion, 
one is expected to be able to use these as decision-making guides. Hare makes a 
second point in relation to lexical ordering. He asks, will there not be situations when 
this ordering will not work out? For example, suppose that the duty to respect a 
patient's autonomy is ranked higher than the duty of beneficence. Will there not be 
occasions when the latter will be considered more morally important than the former? 
Examples of this sort of disruption to lexical ordering abound in nursing, often giving 
rise to paternalistic interventions.67 Thus, one's sense of not knowing how to proceed is 
compounded. 
Hare's initial premise behind this two-level account of moral reasoning is that a single 
level of moral thinking cannot resolve conflicts, for "if conflicts arise at one level, they 
cannot be resolved without ascending to a higher level".68 He cites the famous (since 
Kant) example of, 
a madman is seeking out a supposed enemy to murder him, and I 
I know where the proposed victim is; do I, if I cannot get away with 
evasions, tell the truth to the madman?69 
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According to an absolutist, the conflict can be resolved by calling one of the duties 
absolute and the others given weaker status. In this example, telling the truth might be 
held to be stricter, and therefore, the proposed victim's life will be sacrificed. In 
contrast, the utilitarian is not so concerned with this type of duty. According to him, 
neither duty is to be given absolute status; instead, one has to try and work out what 
will be for the best all round. If one considers the interests of all concerned impartially, 
what will do most good? The response, presumably, would be to tell a lie. However, 
Hare notes an objection here concerning the utilitarian's failure to acknowledge any 
duties, for example, truthfulness is ignored because maximizing utility is seen as the 
sole aim. 
Hare claims that the above kind of dispute can be resolved if the two levels of moral 
thinking - intuitive and critical - are distinguished. According to him, "at the intuitive 
level, we have these intuitions about duties and it is a good thing that we do".70 The 
development of a conscience depends upon these intuitions, whether utilitarian in 
outlook or not. This serves a socially pragmatic role, as Hare believes that firm 
dispositions are invaluable to maximizing utility. However, what happens when conflicts 
among these intuitions arise? One cannot appeal to intuitions to resolve conflicts 
between intuitions. On those occasions when one wants to know which intuitions one 
should have or exactly which duties one ought to abide by, one will need to appeal to 
some other feature of morality. 
At the critical level, there is no appeal to intuitions, instead the utilitarian is given the 
monopoly. Hare writes, 
We form in ourselves and others, for good utilitarian reasons, sound 
intuitions prescribing duties, and the disposition to feel bad if we go 
against them; the content of these intuitions is to be selected 
according to the good or bad consequences of our acquiring them; 
when they conflict in a particular case, we have to apply utilitarian 
reasoning and do the best we can in the circumstances; but when 
the case is clear and there is no conflict, we are likely to do the best 
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by sticking to the intuitions.71 
Hare describes in further detail both levels of moral thinking. He claims that the intuitive 
level is predominantly concerned with making moral decisions faced in everyday life. 
These intuitions or habits of thought (Hare thinks it unimportant what these are called) 
have been cultivated and developed during our childhood and upbringing. He believes 
that people usually follow these prima facie duties and principles, without much 
reflection. However, there are at least two reasons why the intuitive level is insufficient 
for moral thinking. First, these moral intuitions do not by themselves demonstrate that 
one's moral judgements are correct because, for example, the moral education that 
developed these intuitions might have been misguided, such as, that cultivated within a 
deeply racist environment. Second, in order to be useful, these prima facie principles 
need to be simple and easy to follow. However, as a result of this simplicity, cases 
arise in which these principles conflict and yield no determinate answers. I suggest 
however that this criticism applies not only to thinking at the intuitive level, but also to 
moral reasoning per se using an obligation-based approach. This is partly because this 
approach aims at (a) making moral decisions and (b) resolving moral dilemmas. 
Hare goes on to claim, because of the above, that both levels of moral thinking are 
required for a complete account. In summary, he holds that 
the critical level is that at which we select the principles to be used 
at the intuitive level, and adjudicate between them in cases where 
they conflict. 72 
But how does one manage to do the above and know precisely when to engage in 
critical thinking? Hare's own account is based upon philosophical and logical analysis. 
Words such as 'ought' and 'wrong' are analysed, 
in order to determine clearly, first their meanings, and then, as part 
of these, their logical properties; and thus, as a consequence of their 
logical properties, the rules for arguing about questions formulated 
in terms of these concepts. 73 
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Most intuitions are moral, although some are logical or linguistic. It is pOintless to 
appeal to intuitions to settle conflicts between intuitions. Logical intuitions are not 
expressed in moral judgements, but in statements of logic, that is, in terms of the 
logical consistency and coherence of propositions and sentences. According to Hare, 
the failure to distinguish between these two types of intuitions is responsible for much 
confusion in moral philosophy. 
Hare believes that moral judgements provide us with universal prescriptions that can 
form the foundation of a plausible account of moral reasoning, "which supports most of 
our common moral convictions".74 For example, he writes, 
most of us accept the principle that it is wrong in general to confine 
people against their will. If 'wrong' expresses a negative universal 
prescription, or universal prohibition, this is easy to explain. For 
then in saying that it is wrong to do this, we are prescribing that it 
never be done. And the reason why we are ready to prescribe this 
is that we imagine ourselves in various circumstances in which 
other people might wish to confine us against our will, and 
unhesitatingly prescribe that they should not. ...... it is not difficult to 
see intuitively that one who is prepared to prohibit involuntary 
confinement in all hypothetical cases in which he would be the 
victim will be prepared to assent to a general prohibition.75 
Hare believes that exceptions to general principles can be included. However, because 
people are not superhuman, do not have complete information, or infinite time at their 
disposal, one merely has to do the best one can in the particular circumstances. When 
one has sufficient time, one can do the best critical thinking possible. It is hoped that 
one can then establish a set of general, prima facie, and relatively simple principles for 
use at the intuitive level. 
These principles are selected having taken into account real life and the sorts of 
situations one might face, therefore extreme examples do not arise nor count against 
the theory. It is then, according to Frey, likely that acting in accordance with these 
principles will produce overall consequences that are as good as alternatives. 
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However, doubt should be raised on the certainty of such claims. A necessary 
component of consequentialist theories is their ability to predict the consequences of 
acts, that is, to posit claims about future events. How one does this and the degree of 
certainty one can have with such beliefs is open to debate. 
Hare's account is indirect because, due to the two distinct levels of thinking, no direct 
and extensive appeal is made to an act's consequences. The effect of this is that act-
consequentialism is redundant at the intuitive level; there is no application of 
consequentialism on a case-by-case basis. And, as noted, it is the latter that is the 
source of much of the disagreement between act-consequentialism and ordinary 
morality. Therefore the conflicts that arise in direct consequentialism do not arise in 
indirect consequentialist thinking, or at least this is what advocates of indirect 
consequentialism allege. 
Hare's indirect form of consequentialism has other merits too. As noted above, at the 
intuitive level, there is no consequentialist thinking on a case-by-case basis. On this, 
Hare writes, 
in seeking to maximize human well-being on each and every occasion, 
we may fail to maximize human well-being overall; we may do better 
overall not to try to maximize well-being on each occasion.76 
At the critical level where act-consequentialist thinking is employed to produce the 
action guidance principles executed at the intuitive level, there is no good reason why 
these principles cannot include deontological features, such as, moral duties or rules. 
Therefore, Hare's account responds well to common charges made against direct 
consequentialism by deontologists, because it accommodates deep moral intuitions 
and makes moral duties and rules part of the theory too. 
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I shall summarize Hare's work on indirect consequentialism. Direct consequentialist 
thinking produces conflicts with some secure and deep moral intuitions. The act 
thought to have the best consequences might be frowned upon and rejected as the 
right act by some of these moral intuitions. Indirect consequentialist thinking avoids this 
problem, 
it has the act-utilitarian acting in accordance with the general rules, 
duties, and rights - all of which can bar direct appeal to 
consequences in order to determine rightness - selected by act-
utilitarian thinking as giving us the best chance overall of max-
imizing human well-being. 77 
Criticisms of Hare's theory 
General objections remain in relation to the uncertainty of successfully predicting an 
act's consequences. More specific criticisms can be levelled at Hare's theory, however. 
While the core of this indirect theory remains act-consequentialist, deontological rules 
and duties can also be found within its structure. But such rules and duties, while 
embedded within the theory, are not present in the foundation of the theory. Moreover, 
according to deontologists, it is these rules and duties that really matter in ordinary 
morality, thus indirect consequentialism remains seriously flawed. Furthermore, these 
'general rules, duties and rights' might include, for example, obligations of beneficence, 
respect for persons' autonomy, rights to liberty, and the duty not to harm others. 
Because of such diversity, this two level indirect account of consequentialism requires 
rigorous consequentialist and deontological theories. If not, then superficiality and 
inadequacy, in terms of providing moral guidance, would result. 
Proponents of indirect consequentialism, such as Hare, would not be impressed with 
this objection. Hare's account aims to show that, unlike direct consequentialism, doing 
act x for a mere marginal increase in utility is not a morally right or correct act. In this 
respect, it is a fruitful attempt to make consequentialism a less stringent moral theory. 
In response to this criticism from deontologists, the indirect consequentialist could ask, 
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why does it matter that rights and duties are not foundationally embedded in the 
theory? Advocates of deontology might respond by stressing that, according to their 
lights, hybrid theories are less coherent than single theories, because by definition 
hybrids rely on a merging of two or more largely incompatible theories. As such, hybrid 
theories are thought less adequate and provide less clarity regarding action-guidance, 
that is, telling people what to do. 
Indirect accounts of consequentialism, despite their attempts to modify the theory, still 
remain focused on the major tenets of obligation-based theories. These include: the 
importance of consequences in morality, the focus on the notion of 'right action' and 
action-guidance, maximizing, or at least satisfying, one's interests, and in the case of 
utilitarianism, viewing everyone's interests, including strangers, as equal. Therefore, 
indirect consequentialism continues to provide an incomplete and hence inadequate 
account of the moral life. 
Consequential ism - conclusions 
Consequentialism clearly demarcates between right and wrong acts. It provides, at 
least on some accounts, a simple and intuitively appealing explanation of what makes 
right acts right and wrong acts wrong. However, consequentialism has been criticised 
on the grounds that it can be difficult for people to foresee all of the possible 
consequences of all of one's acts. And indeed, it is hard to know what these 
consequences will be, even in those cases considered straightforward. 
Act-consequentialists have attempted to respond to criticism that their theories fail to 
accommodate aspects of commonsense morality. These strategies go some way to 
accommodating deeper moral intuitions, which is a positive move. 
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However, the versions of consequentialism discussed have several things in common. 
First, they aim to provide action guidance. Second, they aim to develop decision 
procedures. Third, they aim to provide an account of the Right. However, in my view, 
more notable is the fact that these theories ignore completely or neglect to discuss 
several other morally important features. Examples of these other morally important 
features are providing a rich account of persons' moral character, the idea of moral 
education, and the role of the emotions in morality. I have noted several objections that 
are commonly levelled at the content of consequentialist theories. Furthermore, 
because of the aforementioned omissions, I argue that act, rule, and indirect 
consequentialism are incomplete and thus inadequate moral theories. 
Deontology78 
Deontological theories can be characterized as 'backward looking'. These theories 
again begin "Act x is right if __ ", but instead of filling in the blank by reference to the 
consequences of an act, they typically claim that what makes right acts right (and 
wrong acts wrong) is some other morally important feature that occurs at the same 
time as or before the act. However, as with consequentialists who often disagree about 
what the good and bad consequences are, or who the recipients of the consequences 
should be, or whether such a theory should be a maximizing theory, deontologists 
often disagree over what these morally important features are. For example, some 
insist that moral principles that encapsulate the intention or motive behind the act 
should be paramount, others look to divine commands, and yet others look to 
intuitions. Agreement however is reached on one idea: "the end doesn't always justify 
the means". In other words, good consequences alone are not sufficient to make an 
act morally right; and conversely, bad consequences do not necessarily make an act 
morally wrong. 
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Moral philosophers who advocate some form of deontology differ over the precise role 
attributed to consequences in morality. For example, Kanf9 held that consequences 
were completely irrelevant to an act's rightness or wrongness. Others, such as ROSS80, 
are less radical on this believing that while consequences might be relevant, there are 
others features - the intrinsic value of moral principles, intentions and motives, to 
name but three - that can be regarded, at least sometimes, as more important. 
Contemporary Deontologl1 
To promote an understanding of deontology, it is fruitful to look closely at differences 
between deontological and consequentialist moral theories. 
It is clear from the aforementioned introduction that deontologists believe that there are 
some acts that are intrinsically wrong; wrong because of the sort of act they are. These 
sorts of acts are, irrespective of the consequences, morally unacceptable and 
impermissible. Even ends that might appear morally admirable cannot legitimately be 
achieved by these unacceptable means. According to Davis, deontologists hold that 
acting morally, or as we ought to act, involves the self-conscious 
acceptance of some (quite specific) constraints or rules that 
place limits both on the pursuit of our own interests and of our 
pursuit of the general good.82 
While this might be true, deontologists also usually agree that neither is it morally 
required for us to (a) always aim to promote our own interests or (b) pursue the general 
good. Deontologists think morality is largely a matter of sufficiency and neither of the 
above pursuits provides sufficient moral grounds for action. 
Deontologists are dissatisfied with consequentialism for several reasons, most of which 
have been noted in the previous section. Furthermore, consequentialist theories can 
be criticised, according to deontologists, on the grounds that they encourage or allow 
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us to sometimes treat other humans in inhumane ways. Deontologists often allege that 
such consequentialist theories misunderstand or misinterpret what it is to be a person. 
Rawls argues that theories of right action can be exhausted by reference to just two 
categories: teleological and deontological. He writes, 
The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good ... 
The structure of an moral theory is, then, largely determined by how 
it defines and connects these two basic notions ... The simplest way 
of relating them is taken by teleological theories: the good is defined 
independently from the right, and the right is defined as that which 
maximizes the good. 83 
Rawls contrasts a deontological theory with a teleological theory in two ways. First, the 
former do not "specify the good independently from the right" 84 and second, 
deontological theories do not "interpret the right as maxmizing the good".85 Fried goes 
further on the relationship between the good and the right, 
The goodness of the ultimate consequences does not guarantee the 
rightness of the acts which produced them. The two realms are 
not only distinct for the deontologist, but the right is prior to the good. 86 
At least three things can thus be said about deontologists' views on the right and the 
good. First, the Right is not definable in terms of the Good. Second, the claim 'the 
Good is prior to the Right' is rejected. And third, there is no clear relationship between 
doing right and doing good. 
For deontologists, acting right is concerned with refraining from doing things that are 
known (before the fact) to be wrong. Davis refers to the requirements that restrain us 
from doing these sorts of acts as 'deontological constraints'. These include various 
laws, rules, principles, prohibitions, proscriptions and limitations. Persons are obliged, 
according to deontological views, to refrain from doing acts known to be wrong 
even when they foresee that their refusal to do such things will clearly 
result in greater harm (or less good).87 
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An obvious observation can now be made: deontological views are non-
consequentialist. Also, the former are non-comparative and non-maxmizing. According 
to a deontologist, the wrongness of telling lies has nothing to do with the possible bad 
consequences of telling a particular lie or the general negative effects of lying. Rather, 
the wrongness of telling lies on the deontological view is 
because of the sorts of things they are, and are thus wrong even when 
they foreseeably produce good consequences. 88 
Consequentialist theories, as noted, are based on an impartial consideration of others' 
interests or welfare, while deontological views clearly are not. A typical example (given 
by Davis) clarifies this point. Imagine a scenario whereby one might harm one innocent 
person to prevent the deaths of five innocent people. If a deontologist refuses to harm 
the one, knowing full well that this (impermissible) act would prevent five innocent 
deaths, then this clearly shows that the interests of the six do not count, or at least do 
not count equally. If this was the case, that is, their interests were all taken into account 
equally, then this act (to harm the one) would not only be permissible, but most 
probably obligatory. However peoples' interests are complex and cannot be 
satisfactorily perceived and evaluated in this crude way. This point is noted by 
deontology, deontological views are not based on an impartial consideration of 
interests. As Davis explains, 
For that [impartially considering interests] would seem to allow - if not 
require - that each one of the five's interests be weighed against 
those of the one; it would seem to allow - if not require - us to (for 
example) toss a coin five times, in order for each of the five's 
interests to receive the same consideration that the one's interests 
are accorded.89 
There is another area in which deontological views differ from consequentialist 
impartiality. Deontologists insist that one is not allowed to violate a deontological 
constraint, by doing a particular act, 
even when our doing so would obviate the necessity of five other 
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people being faced with the decision to violate a deontological 
constraint or allow even more serious harm to occur.90 
Deontologists hold that it is forbidden to harm one innocent person to decrease the 
number of deaths. Moreover it is forbidden to harm one to decrease the number of 
killings carried out by other people who possess the character and motivations 
considered no worse, morally, than ours. As noted earlier, consequentialists hold that 
everyone's interests, including one's own, should be judged impartially. Thus one could 
claim that this stringent tenet of impartialism leads consequentialism to deprive one of, 
or at least interfere with, ones' personal autonomy. A consequentialist assesses his 
own interests, in effect, his life, as no more important than the interests of a total 
stranger. But surely, Davis claims, if one is to have and sustain lives worth living, then 
one ought (and needs) to assign more weight to one's own interests, simply because 
one's interests form one's life.91 This favouritism is more than merely tolerated by 
deontologists. Respecting personal autonomy may mean that one prioritises and gives 
more weight to one's own interests and concerns, compared to those of others. 
Deontological views provide more weight to one's own avoidance of wrongdoing 
('wrongdoing' here means a violation of deontological constraints), compared to the 
interests and lives of others. Moreover, deontological views 
require that we assign more weight to our own avoidance of wrong-
doing than we do to the avoidance of wrongdoing tout court, or the 
prevention of wrongdoing to others. 92 
Ultimately by a deontologist's lights, the preservation of one's moral integrity and 
excellence is not only more important than the preservation of others' lives, it is also 
more important than the preservation of others' moral integrity and excellence. 
Commenting on this issue, Davis remarks 
We may not save a life with a lie even when the lie would prevent 
the loss of life by deceiving an evil agent who credibly intends to 
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kill several innocent victims. 93 
Deontological constraints 
There are three features of deontological constraints - the system of prohibitions or 
rules that form the basis of deontological views - that require closer inspection. These 
are that constraints are (a) usually formed as negative formulations, (b) usually 
narrowly framed and bounded, and (c) usually narrowly directed. Each of these will 
now be discussed in more detail. 
Deontological constraints - negative formulations 
Deontological constraints are usually formulated as 'Thou shalt nots' or prohibitions. 
While it might be theoretically possible to transform these negative prohibitions into 
positive prescriptions - for example, 'do not tell lies' would become 'tell the truth' -
deontologists regard the latter as inequivalent to negative prohibitions. While the 
deontologist is aware that the same bad or untoward consequences might arise from 
'lying' and 'failing to tell the truth', and that these kinds of acts might arise from the 
same kind of motivations, it is also clear that 'lying' and 'failing to tell the truth' are not 
the same kinds of act (another example would be 'harming' and 'failing to benefit'). 
'Kinds of acts' are the objects which deontologists deem right or wrong. It will therefore 
be possible for a deontologist to forbid 'lying' (one kind of act), while perhaps being 
ambivalent on 'failing to tell the truth' (a closely related, but different kind of act). On 
this Fried thinks, 
In every case the [deontological] norm has boundaries and what 
lies outside those boundaries is not forbidden at all. Thus lying 
is wrong, while withholding a truth which another needs may be 
perfectly permissible - but that is because withholding a truth is 
not lying. 94 
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Deontological constraints - narrowly framed and bounded 
The second feature is that deontological constraints are usually narrowly framed and 
bounded. This means that a person's obligations and other deontological views are 
explained in narrow terms and quite restrictive. Davis believes that this is important 
because one's understanding of a person's obligations and responsibilities will depend, 
in part, upon one's understanding of the scope of deontological constraints. And, as 
she notes, this will include various contrasting views about what constitutes different 
kinds of acts. 
Deontological constraints - narrowly directed 
The third feature of note is that deontological constraints are narrowly directed. This 
means that these constraints attach narrowly or specifically to peoples' decisions and 
acts, rather than generally to any of the possible consequences of their decisions and 
acts. 95 Nagel says on this point, "Deontological reasons have their full force against 
your doing something - not just against its happening".96 
Intention and foresight in deontology 
The distinction between intention and foresight is often explicated to help explain the 
narrow-directed ness of deontological constraints. This distinction holds that only if one 
intentionally harms another does one violate the constraint against harming the 
innocent. If for some reason, one chooses not to take action to prevent harm befalling 
others, then this is not a violation of the deontological constraint against harming the 
innocent. This remains the case if the harm that befalls someone is foreseen as a 
possible consequence of one's permissible action, as long as one's action was not a 
chosen means or towards a chosen end. However, one's action might be open to 
criticism on other grounds. According to deontological views and expressed in 
commonsense morality, 
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we are not as responsible for (or not fully agent of) the foreseen 
consequences of our acts, as we are for the things we intend.9? 
As noted earlier, the majority of deontology's obligations are formulated negatively as 
prohibitions or impermissions. For deontologists, the category of the impermissible is 
fundamental because it grounds the definition of the obligatory: "what is obligatory is 
what it is impermissible to omit".98 However, it is unclear what people are obliged to do. 
Nevertheless, agreement surrounds the idea that people need to devote most of their 
time and energy to the realm of the permissible. On this, Fried remarks 
One cannot live one's life by the demands of the domain of the 
right. After having avoided wrong and doing one's duty, an 
infinity of choices is left to be made.99 
A stark contrast emerges between consequentialism and deontology. For 
consequentialists, the notion of the Right is strong and prior to the Good, while for 
deontologists the Right is usually held to be a weaker notion, deontologists tend to 
make the Good prior to the Right. Consequentialism in general terms holds that a 
course of action is permissible 
when and only when it is the best (or equal best) option open 
to an agent: it is never permissible to do less good (or prevent 
less harm) than one can.100 
Thus in a sense consequentialists achieve what Davis calls moral closure: "every 
course of action is either right or wrong (and actions are permisSible only if they are 
right),,101; this 'simplicity' is seen as one of the merits of consequentialism. Contrast this 
with deontology's views: an act might be permissible without it being the best act or 
even a good option. 
The above tenet of consequentialism attracts criticism because it ensures that 
consequentialism is a strenuous and rigid moral theory; there is a lack of what Davis 
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calls 'moral breathing room'. In summary, for deontologists, consequentialism makes 
mistakes relating to the notions of permission, obligation, and the Right. 
Deontology and the 'doctrine of double effect' 
Although there are problems surrounding the tenability of the distinction between 
intention and foresight, many deontologists appeal to this to provide a plausible 
meaning of narrow-directedness. In describing the 'doctrine of double effect', Nagel 
states 
to violate deontological constraints one must maltreat someone 
else intentionally. The maltreatment must be something that 
one does or chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather 
than something one's acts merely cause or fail to prevent 
but that one doesn't aim at. 102 
If one did not intend to do the act in question, then one cannot legitimately be accused 
of violating a deontological constraint. One might have done something wrong, but if it 
was not one's chosen end or means then, according to this doctrine, one has not done 
anything wrong at all. 
It is possible to see the connection between narrow-directed ness and narrow framing. 
The prohibitory force of deontological constraints attaches only to those things 
intended. Given this, it is clear that, for example, a lie is a different kind of act than is a 
failure to tell the truth. Lies (as attempted deceptions) are necessarily intended, while 
failures to disclose the truth do not necessarily aim at deception. Furthermore, accept 
that the concept of intention is developed and explained in terms of choice as a means 
to an end. For example, something counts as an intentional harming of the innocent 
only if it - the harm - was chosen either as an end or a means to an end. If this 
plausible claim is accepted, then foreseen harms are different from harms chosen as a 
means to preventing others' harms. In Davis' words, 
If an agent harms one person in order to prevent five others 
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from being killed in a rockslide, what he or she does is an 
intentional harming, and thus violates a deontological 
constraint. But if the agent refuses to kill the one to save 
the five, then, since the deaths of the five are not the 
agent's chosen means or the agent's chosen end, there is 
no violation of a deontological constraint. 103 
Consequentialism faces problems because of its need to predict the consequences of 
an act. Does deontology avoid such practical problems? There is no need by 
deontology's lights to speculate about the possible consequences of an act since, as 
noted, deontologists believe that acts are wrong (or right) because of the sorts of acts 
they are. Possible lists of wrong acts drawn up by deontologists will have in common 
that, in some way, they violate one or more of the deontological constraints. Nagel 
provides perhaps a representative list: 
Common moral intuition recognizes several types of deontological 
reasons - limits on what one may do to people or how one may 
treat them. There are special obligations created by promises 
and agreements; the restrictions against lying and betrayal; the 
prohibitions against violating various individual rights, rights not 
to be killed, injured, imprisoned, threatened, tortured, coerced, 
robbed; the restrictions against imposing certain sacrifices on 
someone simply as a means to an end; and perhaps the special 
claim of immediacy, which makes distress at a distance no diff-
erent from distress in the same room. There may also be a 
deontological requirement of fairness, of even-handedness or 
equality in one's treatment of people. 104 
However, while it appears that deontologists do better than consequentialists in this 
area of morality, some theoretical problems remain. If deontologists reject the link 
between an act being wrong (or right) and its bad (or good) consequences, then what 
is it about a wrong (or right) act that makes it wrong (or right)? In other words, why are 
the items on Nagel's list above, there? (And Nagel's list is fairly representative of 
deontology.) In reply, deontologists can appeal to several sources. For example, some 
deontologists appeal to common moral intuitions, while others appeal to religion, for 
instance, Judaeo-Christian teachings. 
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However, deontological constraints are also derived from another more fundamental 
principle. This principle is frequently presented as something like 'it is morally 
obligatory to respect every person as a rational agent'. The foundation for this principle 
is held to be Kant (discussed further in Chapter 6), although there is some blurring 
among interpretations. Donagan's formulation more closely follows deontology's 
format: "It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as 
a rational creature".105 According to many deontologists, including Fried and Donagan, 
part of respecting others as rational creatures is that one should refrain from subjecting 
them to the sorts of treatment proscribed by deontological constraints; indeed this is 
framed as a moral requirement. 
Nagel goes further on the above point. In his view, if one identifies certain sorts of 
conduct as evil - for example, harming a child so that her frightened babysitter reveals 
some piece of important, perhaps life-saving, information - then it is clear that this 
conduct is something that one must not do. According to Nagel, 'evil' conduct means 
that one should be moved to eliminate it rather than maintain it. He believes that if 
consequentialists allow that it is right to lie to or harm the innocent, then they have an 
unsatisfactory understanding of what evil means or what it is for someone to be evil. 
Furthermore, this is true even if the desire and intention is to prevent greater harm or 
promote the greater good. 
Davis claims that none of the aforementioned sources - moral intuitions, religion, or 
the principle of respect for persons - satisfactorily grounds deontological moral 
judgements; likewise Hursthouse believes that 'intuition' and 'perception' are "entirely 
unsatisfactory notions".106 For example, take appeals to common morality. The picture 
of the universe, once thought true by the Church Fathers, is now widely rejected. It is 
now widely thought that the views of priests and monks that dominated early religious 
morality are punitive or prejudiced. Therefore, as Davis warns, 
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If traditional common morality can easily be seen to have such weak 
parts, it is wise to be sceptical, or at least cautious, about other 
parts, and about the foundation that holds all the parts together. 107 
Problems with deontology 
No action guidance until its second premise 
Hursthouse has examined the first and second premise of simple deontology (the kind 
of deontology known to many people, loaded with moral rules). She argues that, as in 
act-consequentialism, it is not until the second premise of deontology that people are 
given specific action guidance. In the second premise one is given information on what 
counts as a correct moral principle, rule, or duty (these three notions forge the link with 
right action in the first premise). As Hursthouse explains, there are several possible 
ways in which to describe a correct moral rule or principle, for example, it is one that "is 
laid down on us by God" ... "is universalizable" ... [or] "would be the object of choice of 
all rational beings".108 Deontologists will defend and justify those rules that they believe 
are correct, for example, they might defend rules permitting or prohibiting euthanasia, 
coercion, or suicide. But what does this turn on? The answer to this is not forthcoming. 
Moreover, Hursthouse believes that in many versions of deontology, it is untrue to say 
they "'begin with' the Right, for they [as noted above] use the concept of moral rule or 
principle to specify right action".109 Hursthouse notes that Frankena discusses versions 
of what he calls 'extreme act-deontology' wherein a right action "just is right".110 
Hursthouse believes that in deontology, as in consequentialism, one is so familiar with 
the moral obligations, rules, or principles proposed. This familiarity grounds one's 
understanding of the content of the obligations, rules, and principles given in the 
second premise of deontology. Furthermore, one has a good idea what a correct moral 
principle or rule is; for, when this premise is given, we have in mind, say, 'do not kill', 
'do not break promises' and 'tell the truth'. But Hursthouse thinks one would be 
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surprised to find contenders such as "'Purify the Arian race', 'Keep women in their 
proper place, subordinate to men', 'Kill the infidel"'.111 However, as she points out, 
these have at some point in time all unfortunately counted as 'correct' moral rules. In 
sum then, given the first premise of a simple yet common form of deontology, one is 
not actually told what is to count as a correct moral obligation, rule, or principle. But 
familiarity with what one believes a correct moral rule is fills in the blanks. 
Wrongful harming or the permissible causing of harm? 
People have views about what sorts of acts are right and wrong, and beliefs regarding 
the limits and bounds of peoples' moral responsibilities for their deeds. These help us 
to determine whether an act that causes harm is viewed as a case of wrongful harming 
or merely the permissible causing of harm. Individuals' different normative moral views 
- about what one should do and how one should live - lead them to have different 
beliefs about this distinction. Thus, one who is swayed by consequentialism 
will see a refusal to lie to one person in order to prevent serious harm 
from befalling five other people as a case of wrongfully harming the 
five, while someone with less consequentialist leanings might not.112 
Either way, when individuals try to follow deontological views - for example, 'avoid 
wrongful harming' - they will interpret these views differently and, as a result, probably 
end up acting in different ways in their attempts to follow such guidelines. 
Appealing to the notion of respect 
It is also prudent to be cautious about appealing to a fundamental moral principle, such 
as, respect for persons. The notion of respect commonly employed is far from 
transparent; indeed it appears that the conception of 'respect' or 'respect for rational 
persons' is used in a narrow, technical or legal sense. Moreover, this idea is not 
clarified when one talks about respecting persons as rational creatures. 
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A lack of clarity also surrounds another feature of respect. The requirement of respect, 
according to deontological views, is thought not to include "respect for other beings as 
possessors of welfare".113 The reason for this omission is unclear. Remember that 
, 
according to deontological theories, one ought to allow five people to be killed by a 
rockslide rather than harm one person ourselves. But surely this entails serious 
disrespect for the lives of the five? It is hard to defend the technical, narrow account 
usually given to respect. Even if plausible defences of this account could be provided, 
Davis thinks another important question remains, "why should respect be seen as 
something that morally outweighs the requirement to further others' well-being?,,114 In 
other words, why does the obligation of beneficence usually rank lower than respect for 
other people? 
Consequentialists frequently come under attack for maintaining that "as long as human 
beings can remain alive, the lesser of two evils is always to be chosen .... ,,115 In their 
defence, consequentialists claim that minimum conditions must be met for a life worthy 
of a human and these conditions cannot be sacrificed. While this consequentialist 
position is open to criticism, it is quite clear that deontologists fare little better. The 
deontological position maintains, for example, that the whole community should die 
rather than violate the deontological constraint 'refrain from killing the innocent'. Davis 
suggests that deontologists need to reflect on the reasoning behind the following 
scenario, 
a proposed effort to save hundreds of lives by (for example) killing 
one innocent person that constitutes a failure of respect so great 
that it is worth sacrifiCing all of those lives. 116 
The reasoning behind the above scenario appears to make little sense; at least it 
counters deep moral convictions relating to the human need, and moral responsibility, 
for saving lives and generally promoting others' interests. 
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Criticisms of the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between intended and 
foreseen harm 
Criticisms have been levelled at the principle of double effect and questions raised 
over the tenability of the distinction between intended and foreseen harm. These 
criticisms possess some merit, and as such, create problems for contemporary 
deontology. In response, deontologists will either need to expand the scope of their 
prohibitions or they will need to admit that these prohibitions do not carry absolute or 
categorical force. However, if the first point is addressed then serious problems relating 
to conflicts between duties arise. And if the second point is tackled, then the very 
structure of deontological views is threatened, because if deontological constraints do 
not produce absolute or categorical force, then what sort of force do they possess? 
How would a person tell between a forbidden act and one that is not? When the 
absolute force is removed from deontological constraints, then deontological views 
collapse into a type of moral pluralism, or even worse, an intuitionist type of moral 
pluralism. 
However, according to Fried, deontologists do not believe it is justifiable to refuse to 
violate a deontological constraint when the consequences of such a refusal would be 
dire. On such extreme cases, Fried says 
And so the catastrophic may cause the absoluteness of right and 
wrong to yield, but even then it would be a non sequitur to argue 
(as consequentialists are fond of doing) that this proves that 
judgements of right and wrong are always a matter of degree, 
depending on the relative goods to be attained and harms to be 
avoided. I believe, on the contrary, that the concept of the 
catastrophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the 
extreme situations in which the usual categories of judgment 
(including the categories of right and wrong) no longer apply.117 
But while allowing the violation of deontological constraints in extreme circumstances 
helps to prevent deontology from fanaticism, it also undermines it as a plausible moral 
theory. Adding a so-called 'catastrophe clause' is particularly problematic. How does 
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one goes about distinguishing a 'catastrophic' situation, one in which right and wrong 
no longer apply, from one which is only deemed 'dreadful', where right and wrong do 
apply? I share Davis' concern with this arbitrary decision. In extreme circumstances or 
not, these decisions remain moral decisions. Terrible circumstances do not, according 
to Davis, relieve us of our obligation to act morally; indeed one could suggest that 
terrible situations demand more from people, but whether this is framed in terms of 
duties or obligations or the exercise of virtues is another quite different matter. The 
idea that the notions of right and wrong are somehow not applicable in dire 
circumstances is one that Davis believes "encourages complacency ... It is one that any 
reasonable person ought to reject".118 I concur with the reasoning. But I suggest (from 
chapter 4 onwards) that one can also view morality in terms of acting well, that is, 
exercising the virtues, for example, being a kind, patient, and just person. Or 
conversely, one can act badly, that is, exercise the vices, for example, being a cruel, 
impatient, and unjust person. 
Criticisms of deontology's rules 
Hursthouse criticises the rules of simple deontology. Three points are made. First, as 
noted, the rules of consequentialism are, in part, based on several evaluative 
concepts, for example, happiness. The rules of deontology, for example on lying, are 
also evaluative, and as such limit their ability to provide adequate action guidance. 
Deontologists might try to claim that their rules are somehow empirical or non-
evaluative but Hursthouse119 believes this would be a mistake. This is because most , 
deontologists are keen to invoke principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. And 
as Hursthouse claims, these moral principles also rest on fairly evaluative concepts, 
such as, 'promote the interests of clients' and 'do no harm to clients'. 
Second, adult deontologists need to think very hard about what constitutes 'promoting 
their well-being', 'respecting their autonomy' and 'harming someone'. This point was 
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made earlier in relation to the evaluative terms involved, but now it is made in relation 
to the need to exercise judgement. Children in general, Hursthouse notes, have a poor 
grasp of these sorts of terms, and parents have to work hard to improve their 
understanding of these complex and vague terms. 
Third, so-called 'mother's-knee' rules, for example, 'Don't lie' and 'Keep promises', are 
only easy to apply when the cases are easy to resolve. Once the cases become hard , 
so too does the understanding and application of the rules. Once again judgment is 
involved as is "a grasp of such things as 'the sort of promise that may be broken, or 
need not be kept, or (even) should not be kept and should never have been made",.12o 
Moral and legal rights: a critique 
I shall now briefly describe and critique the notions of rights. I have not debated rights-
based moral theories 121 in this thesis. This might be criticised because in general 
ethics, health care generally, and especially in adult and mental health nursing, there is 
widespread focus and attention on rights, both moral and legal.122 
Like many other notions and concepts in ethics - for example, the notion of 'best 
interests' - the notion of rights is portrayed as simple, yet is complex. The notion of 
rights is a relatively recent idea. It is thought that rights emerged during the 
Enlightenment, crudely the period of history between the 16th and 18th centuries. Moral 
rights, as they were conceived, were seen as a means of providing and protecting 
certain important liberties, such as rights to freedom and preservation of life. 
Nowadays, both moral and legal rights are acknowledged, especially in contemporary 
health care. The latter, for example, patients' rights to refuse treatment, are grounded 
in common law. But moral rights, for example, to be respected as a rational person, are 
grounded in moral values and beliefs, which clearly are subjective and personal 
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notions. Numerous moral and legal rights compete against each other. Thus, as noted 
by Hare earlier in this Chapter, conflicts between rights arise; these conflicts can be 
between two or more moral rights as well as moral and legal rights. However, it is not 
clear how to resolve these conflicts; indeed, it is not clear how one can know which 
rights one has and in what circumstances these can be overridden. 
I have five concerns with the notion of rights, which I shall now describe. 
First, in ethics one is concerned with moral, not legal, rights and this fact is often 
overlooked. As noted, legal rights are encapsulated in common or statute law. Usually 
legal rights in health care are grounded in common law. Moral rights are not 
synonymous with legal rights. This fact needs recognition. Second, a deeper 
examination is required on the origin and intended purpose of moral rights. For 
example, where do rights come from? Are they entitlements to certain things (for 
example, health care), liberties (for example, freedom), or generally claims for 
protection? 123 Third, I suggest that when rights are invoked, for example in terms of 
justice, one needs to bear in mind one's corresponding moral responsibilities. For 
instance, if one has a moral right to have a coronary artery bypass operation, then one 
has a moral responsibility to ensure that both pre and post operatively one does 
everything possible to make the surgery successful. This might include stopping 
smoking before the operation. These corresponding moral responsibilities are fraught 
with tensions and are often neglected in discussions about rights. Fourth, another 
aspect of rights that causes me concern is the seemingly endless lists that are 
nowadays produced from people who want certain protections or feel entitled to x or y. 
For example, 'I surely have a right to smoke a cigarette in public' or 'I have a right to 
park my car in this space even though it's for a disabled person'. These are examples 
where one's corresponding responsibilities have been disregarded. Possessing rights 
123 
should mean that one behaves decently in return, meaning that the needs and 
interests of other people should be taken into account. 
To close this section, I believe it is not so much the moral right in question that is 
problematic, as long as the right can be adequately justified (however, this is not 
always done nor is it easy to do). Rather, it is the manner in which people exercise 
'their' rights that I find objectionable. From a virtue ethics perspective, moral rights can 
be exercised either virtuously (for instance, kindly) or viciously (for instance, cruelly). 
How other people respond to peoples' requests or demands for their perceived moral 
rights is of fundamental importance in morality. It seems to me that if one requests and 
exercises rights kindly or justly, then this serves as an illustration of that person acting 
morally well or being morally good. The virtues of justice and respectfulness should 
maintain that justifiable moral and legal rights are not, without good reasons, 
overridden. 
Deontology and intuitions: a response 
Before I conclude this chapter, I shall discuss a possible response from deontologists 
with regard to their dependence upon intuition, to discover whether they can overcome 
this problem. 
This dependence upon intuition is denied, at least by some deontologists, in an attempt 
to respond to this standard objection. These deontologists advocate the 'strong 
codifiability thesis' noted earlier by Hursthouse. In her words, 
They suppose (a) that they have (or will be able to formulate in time) a 
complete and consistent set of rules in which second-order ranki~g 
rules or principles settle any conflicts among first-order rules, which 
have been formed with much more precision than the 'mother's-knee' 
versions, and which may also be supposed to have had many 
necessary exception clauses built into them. Such a system would 
determine what was required in every situation and (b) would not rely 
on intuition or inSight to resolve conflicts.124 
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If the above albeit extravagant strategy is accepted, then it would appear that 
deontology could solve the conflict problem without dependence upon intuition or 
perception. 
But Hursthouse believes that such deontologists have a particular conception of what 
counts as an adequate normative ethics, namely one that provides adequate action 
guidance. These deontologists hold that an adequate moral theory is one "that yields a 
decision procedure which can be used to resolve conflicts or settle moral quandaries 
without recourse to moral wisdom".125 Act utilitarians, as noted, argue that their theory 
with its single rule provides just such a decision procedure. If one wants a moral theory 
that prescribes right action and ignores other morally important features, then act-
utilitarianism is one to take seriously. 
On the 'strong codifiability thesis', O'Neill describes it as "an algorithm not just for some 
situations but for life".126 But Hursthouse believes there are deontologists who for one 
reason or another do not accept this algorithm as an appropriate test of adequacy. 
Kantians would probably reject it since, as O'Neill claims, Kant denies the possibility of 
such an algorithm. According to O'Neill, Kant held that "every application of a rule 
would itself need supplementing with further rules".127 Other non-Kantian deontologists 
claim that the ability to recognise the morally important features of a concrete situation 
requires not only judgement but also '''moral sensitivity, perception, [and] 
imagination,.128 This, according to Hursthouse, is moral wisdom. The result in the end 
is a division of opinion about the meaning of adequacy in relation to moral theories. For 
example, for utilitarians an adequate normative ethics must provide an adequate 
decision procedure, while there is much disagreement on this by deontologists. 
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Deontology: conclusions 
I have noted several objections with deontological views that provide cause for 
concern. These include problems with the narrow framing and direction of 
deontological constraints, the lack of specific action guidance until deontology's second 
premise (despite an assumption to the contrary), a lack of clarity regarding the 
distinction between intended and foreseen harm, problems with the nature and content 
of deontology's rules and problems inherent in relying on intuition for resolving the 
ranking of obligations, rules or principles. 
Conclusions 
I have examined forms of consequentialism and deontology and noted some of the 
common objections levelled at these theories. Consequentialism makes the notion of 
the Right prior to the notion of the Good, while deontology views morality the other way 
around. However, both kinds of theory over focus on the role of moral obligations, 
rules, and principles in morality. The notions of permission, prohibition and the aim to 
prescribe right action are held to be extremely important. To this end, decision 
procedures are produced to resolve dilemmas. Both kinds of theory make assumptions 
about the nature of moral dilemmas, for instance, that they are a/ways resolvable. 
Furthermore, the notion of moral remainder discussed by Hursthouse is a very 
important topic. While there is intrinsically nothing about obligation-based theories that 
precludes discussing the role of emotions and feelings in morality, this does not appear 
to be acknowledged in the literature. Obligation-based ethical theories are incomplete, 
for example, the theories discussed in this chapter omit to provide a satisfactorily rich 
and textured account of peoples' moral character. Alongside thinkers such as Rachels 
and Williams, I believe that incomplete moral theories are therefore inadequate. 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND TENETS OF 
VIRTUE ETHICS 
Introduction 
I have established the importance of interpersonal responses to the end of being a 'good' 
nurse. Certain personal qualities such as kindness and honesty are deemed to be crucial 
to developing a therapeutic relationship between nurses and patients. These qualities are 
moral virtues. I have rejected the plausibility of obligation-based moral theories in general 
ethics. I shall now examine the moral theory that makes the virtues central to morality, 
namely virtue ethics. 
In this Chapter, I trace the origins and development of virtue ethics. I identify 3 main tenets 
of virtue ethics. I note the distinction between supplementary and strong forms. I examine 
Aristotle's virtue ethics. I look more closely at virtue ethics' account of moral character and 
moral education. I then examine recent work by Hursthouse on virtue ethics' account of 
action guidance. I note some common objections towards virtue ethics. I end this Chapter 
by claiming that good reasons exist for strong virtue ethics being plausible. 
The characterization of moral theories 
Characterizing moral theories is fraught with dangers. It is not easy to adequately 
explicate key aspects of complex theories so that both generalists can understand what 
the theory is about - its central tenets - and specialists can understand the theory's 
subtleties and distinctions. Inevitably certain aspects of the theory in question will be either 
omitted (often the more complex ideas) and other parts will receive repeated attention 
(often the more manageable ideas). It is fair to say that all moral theories have been the 
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victims of this tactic. However, it is unreasonable to expect an ethicist to have specialist 
knowledge of all moral theories; this is why theorists specialize in one type of theory in the 
first place. But perhaps because of this fact, it is necessary to realize that moral theories 
are often characterized with the use of slogans.1 For example, act-consequentialism is 
known as 'maximize the acts with the best consequences' and deontology is known as 'act 
in accordance with these moral rUles ... ' 
The origins and development of virtue ethics 
As noted in Chapter 3, ancient Greek philosophy, including the pre-Socratics but 
principally Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, focused on the notions of the good life for man, 
human nature, and as a requirement of these, the virtues. Despite a few moral 
philosophers, such as Aquinas and Hume, acknowledging the importance of the virtues in 
morality, virtue ethics as a moral theory was not realized until its recent revival. 
Anscombe2 in 1958 is recognized as initiating virtue ethics' revival. Virtue ethics now joins 
consequentialism (including utilitarianism) and deontology as an alternative moral theory. 
Anscombe argued that modern moral philosophy was bankrupt and misguided. She 
claimed that modern moral philosophy was grounded in the incoherent notion of a law, 
without a lawgiver. To virtue ethicists, this idea now makes no sense; neither do the 
related notions of obligation, duty, rightness and wrongness. Anscombe urged us to 
jettison the notions of 'right action' and 'morally right action', indeed the entire class of 
deontic (duty-based) notions. Things would be improved, she claimed, if such notions 
were no longer used. Conduct in general, or a particular act, could still be assessed but 
different aretaic (virtue and vice) terms would be used, for example, 'dishonest', 'fair', 
'kind', and 'unjust'. Instead of this flawed preoccupation with deontic theories and notions, 
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Anscombe urged us to return to Aristotelian ethics. For her, the virtues should once again 
be the focus of ethics. 
What do other moral theories say about the virtues? 
Kantians3 claim that virtuous people are more likely to possess the moral character that 
disposes them to act according to universal moral principles and laws. For utiltiarians 
, 
such as J S Mi114, people who possess the virtues tend to carry out those acts that 
maximise happiness and minimise suffering. For this reason, consequentialists advocate 
that people should cultivate virtue. However, one can see that within obligation-based 
ethics the value of the virtues is still seen in terms of acting in accordance with moral 
rules, obligations, and principles or producing good consequences. 
The central tenets of virtue ethics 
Critics allege that there is no such thing as a theory of virtue, meaning that all of the 
versions of virtue ethics are distinct and different. According to Rachels, there is "no 
settled body of doctrine on which all these writers agree". 5 In its defence, the revival of 
virtue ethics started quite recently and compared with obligation-based moral theories, 
virtue ethics is an immature, underdeveloped theory. In time with more scholarly interest 
and work, virtue ethics will, I think, clarify and refine its position. Furthermore, the above 
criticism can also be levelled at the many distinct versions of obligation-based moral 
theories. What is not in doubt, however, is that versions of virtue ethics share a set of 
concerns, which, as noted, are largely ignored in obligation-based ethics. I shall use the 
term 'tenet', because these concerns mark out virtue ethics as a distinct moral theory and 
a credible alternative to consequentialism and deontology. I shall list 3 central tenets of 
virtue ethics: 
1. A desire to provide a detailed account of persons' moral character; 
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2. A reluctance to fully endorse, or a rejection of, the assumption that moral theories 
necessarily have to provide an account of right action in terms of obligations; 
3. A desire to provide a plausible account of moral education - for example, how can 
adults best teach children to be moral agents? 
To this list, I would add that virtue ethics aims to provide persons with a more natural and 
convincing account of moral motivation, compared with the unsatisfactory account given 
by consequentialism and deontology (as discussed in Chapter 4). I shall examine moral 
motives in this Chapter and again in Chapter 7 in relation to virtue-based moral decision-
making in nursing practice. 
There are several aspects of morality that, while not explicitly linked to virtue ethics, have 
developed, in part, from examining the aims of moral theories and specifically, the notions 
of, and relationship between, 'right action' and 'good character'. An example of this is 
Hursthouse's claims in relation to moral dilemmas (discussed in Chapter 3). First, one 
should not assume that dilemmas are resolvable. Second, many dilemmas turn out to be 
'irresolvable' or 'tragic'. In all three types of dilemmas, it is morally appropriate for a person 
to feel moral remainder. This refers to feelings and emotions, such as, distress, remorse, 
guilt, and regret that a person feels during and after one's involvement in horrible 
situations, which one did not wish to be involved in. 
Moral remainder particularly applies to irresolvable and tragic dilemmas, because the hurt 
and damage to persons' lives is much more intense. Partly, as a consequence of 
Hursthouse's claims and partly because of virtue ethics' focus on the virtues and vices and 
the importance of such things as human respon~iveness and relationships, it seems to me 
that virtue ethics makes much more room for the role of feelings and emotions in the moral 
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life. Compare this to the obligation-based view, as exemplified by Kant, Kantian ethics 
, 
and other forms of deontology that views emotions as subjective and personal phenomena 
and therefore have no place in objective rule and duty based ethics. 
Virtue ethics: nomenclature 
One may distinguish between supplementary and strong6 (also called radical or free-
standing) theories. 
Supplementary virtue ethics 
Supplementary theories view the virtues and a corresponding virtue ethics as requiring 
assistance from a version of obligation-based moral theories. This approach (also known 
as essentialism?) combines an account of right action provided by obligation-based ethics, 
for example, consequential ism or deontology, with an emphasis on moral character 
provided by the virtues and virtue ethics. The account of the virtues is offered as a 
supplement to an obligation-based theory of right action. Rachels8 believes that this 
approach has much to recommend it. 
Supplementary virtue ethics: weak and moderate versions 
Supplementary versions of virtue ethics can be further subdivided into those that hold that 
(a) obligations and right action are more important than the virtues and moral character in 
morality or that (b) the virtues and moral character are more important in morality than 
obligations and right action. The former can be called 'weak' and the latter 'moderate' 
versions of virtue ethics. In weak versions, the claim is that moral character is not as 
crucial as prescribing right action and persons 'doing the right thing'. So that while the 
virtues have a role to play in morality, this is thought to be a rather unimportant one. The 
emphasis on right action and revealing the morally correct decision is one of the core 
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tenets of obligation-based moral theories. Conversely, moderate versions of virtue ethics 
view morality the other way around. Moderate versions believe that moral character takes 
precedence over right action. Therefore, it is more important for people to cultivate and 
exercise the virtues, thus taking care of moral character, rather than focusing on the idea 
of 'doing the right thing'; although the latter is where moral obligations remain implicated. 
Regarding the 'virtues as needs' claim made in Chapter 3, would there be differences 
between weak and moderate supplementary theorists? Take weak theorists first. Their 
position would be along the lines of 'well, yes, it would be a good thing if agents cultivated 
the virtues, but I prefer to think we're obliged to do this, although morality would remain in 
pretty good shape without everyone possessing the virtues'. But the moderate theorist 
would go further and claim that good moral character needs the virtues (although some 
might think this should still be framed as a moral obligation). 
Supplementary virtue ethics in medicine: Pellegrino and Thomasma 
Pellegrino and Thomasma's version of virtue ethics in medicine is a supplementary theory. 
It is clear that they regard moral principles as possessing greater moral force than the 
virtues. Moral obligations are certainly held to be important to the moral conduct of 
physicians. Without such duties, virtue ethics is left unable to adequately prescribe action-
guidance for physicians. So physicians might display the virtues - be of good character, for 
instance, be honest, just, and compassionate - and yet they still might end up doing wrong 
actions. Pellegrino and Thomasma see a strong link between moral principles and 
corresponding virtues, each supplementing and informing the other.9 
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Supplementary virtue ethics in nursing 
BrodiO published an influential article in 1988 in which she examined the supplementary 
role of caring and the virtues in adult nursing; I believe this is a moderate version of virtue 
ethics. Examples of supplementary virtue ethics in mental health nursing are those of 
Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva11 and McKie and Swinton. 12 I do not discuss the latter. But I 
note that while it is steeped in Aristotle and pays homage to Macintyre, both of whom 
advocate a strong virtue ethics, MacKie and Swinton's conception remains supplementary, 
albeit one that is perhaps moderate in terms of how important the authors view the virtues. 
Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva's virtue ethics 
Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva discuss the concept of virtue and the role of virtue ethics, as 
a necessary but insufficient complement to rule based ethics in psychiatric nursing. As 
well as ethical principles and rules, they claim that an emphasis needs to be given to 
relational aspects of nursing, that is, human interactions and the nurse-client relationship. 
For the authors, moral motivation, which has been largely ignored in traditional obligation-
based ethics, is necessary in a moral activity such as nursing, 
virtue ethics serves as a necessary complement in an ethical 
framework for health care practice with regard to the moral 
agent as such (the kind of person he/she ought to be) and 
the motivation for obeying or following a given moral 
obligation or duty in concrete situations. 13 
The authors argue that virtues enable the nurse to evaluate an ethical dilemma, identify all 
the morally relevant features and then apply the appropriate ethical rules and principles to 
the dilemma. Both intellectual and moral virtues are needed "for the realization of various 
kinds of duties or moral obligations ... ".14 Further, it is necessary to have practical wisdom 
as this allows for the "realization of the other virtues" .15 Teaching the virtues to student 
nurses involves classroom (theoretical) and clinical environment (practical) teaching, and 
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of particular importance is the use of good role models. The authors conclude that as well 
as the theoretical knowledge possessed by the nurse, it is morally necessary to consider 
"what kind of person one is as a moral agent".16 
Criticism of Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva's version 
This supplementary approach has its merits, for example, at least the authors recognize 
the importance of the virtues in moral decision making in nursing. It is, however, unclear 
whether the authors would argue for a weak or moderate position. My view is that this 
version represents a weak version of virtue ethics. Virtue is held to be necessary, but not 
sufficient to morality in nursing. The authors essentially claim that virtues help to provide 
the right motivation for the nurse in order to decide which moral rule to obey and follow. 
The authors clearly believe that in nursing, one needs nursing knowledge, moral principles 
and rules to make the 'right moral decision' or the 'morally right decision'. But I think that 
the authors are confusing two ways in which these terms can be used, which Hursthouse 
notes (this was explained in Chapter 3). I shall present a clinical situation that will be used 
to bring out this confusion: Mary, a 65-year-old female, diagnosed with a primary 
endogenous major depressive disorder, has had ECT with good results in the past. On 
this occasion, though, after the first two treatments she refuses to have a third. She is 
'reassured' into having another treatment by the charge nurse, despite saying "I don't want 
another treatment. ... I'm afraid. Don't make me go". After having this and subsequent 
treatments, she recovered and was discharged. 17 
Suppose that this is a resolvable dilemma: act x is to coerce Mary to have ECT, while act 
y is to respect her wish to refuse ECT. It is thought that act x should be carried out 
because it is more beneficial. This can then be called a 'right moral decision' or the 
'morally right decision' given the worse option of y. However, a second way in which these 
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terms can be used refers to a morally good deed, for example, when a person displays the 
virtues and performs an admirable act, one that others praise. This meaning cannot be 
applied to act x - helping to force Mary into having ECT is not a virtuous, morally 
admirable, or good deed. This confusion is one crucial problem with obligation-based 
moral theories in general. But it is also, in my view, the flaw in supplementary virtue ethics. 
I understand the reasons behind ethicists wanting to develop supplementary accounts of 
virtue ethics. For example, it might be thought that adding in the virtues will ensure that 
moral character is not neglected. But as long as virtue is conceived primarily in terms of 
helping persons (nurses) to decide upon which moral obligations, rules, and principles to 
act on, then introducing the virtues will not reveal the confusion between the two meanings 
of 'right moral decision/morally right decision'. Irrespective of whether the theory is weak 
or moderate this confusion will continue. The implication is that the virtues will only be 
allowed to operate as a necessary component of nursing ethics, as a way of identifying the 
correct moral rules or principles for use in particular situations. The focus will remain on 
the first meaning of 'right moral decision/morally right decision'; the second meaning, that 
is, a morally good, admirable and virtuous deed, will pass without reflection. 
Strong virtue ethics 
Strong versions of virtue ethics (also known as eliminatism 18) include Aristotle, Macintyre, 
and Hursthouse. I shall discuss Aristotle's ethics later in this Chapter. Chapter 8 is 
devoted to Macintyre's virtue ethics. Some of Hursthouse's claims were presented in 
Chapter 3 and 4 and her influence is felt throughout this thesis. These thinkers hold that 
virtue ethics and the virtues are capable of doing all the work of ethics. Rachels calls this, 
"an independent theory of ethics that is complete in itself".19 
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For strong virtue ethicists, one's moral character, moral motivations, and the justification of 
acts is couched solely in the virtues. These ethicists reject the use of 'right' and 'wrong'. 
They follow Anscombe in wanting to jettison all deontic notions from ethics. Instead, strong 
virtue ethicists would justify, for instance, not bullying someone, not because it is 'wrong', 
'unethical' or 'it breaks the moral rule "do not harm others'" but because 'it is cruel'. 
Instead of deontic terms, the language of the virtues and vices is employed. 
Aristotle's virtue ethics 
In this section, I examine Aristotle's conception of ethics, drawn from Book 1 and 2 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. I do so for two reasons. First, Aristotle is a pivotal philosopher in the 
history of virtue ethics and has influenced several contemporary moral philosophers, 
including Hursthouse. Second, this section provides the philosophical foundations for 
Chapter 8 on Macintyre's virtue ethics, Macintyre is another philosopher influenced by 
Aristotle. 
Aristotle on the good life 
It should be remembered that for the ancient Greeks, ethics was valued as one 
component of politics, so the focus was on the protection of the State. Ancient Greek 
ethics was not concerned with moral rules or universal principles that aim to instruct 
people what to do (these notions had not yet been conceptualized). Instead Greek ethics, 
in general, and Aristotle, in particular, was concerned with questions such as, 'what sort of 
people do we have to be if we are to live the good life?' 
What is this 'good life' that Aristotle made the focus of his ethics? To understand this, one 
needs to examine Aristotle's account of human nature. The opening words of The 
Nicomachean Ethics are 
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Eve~y art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought 
to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared 
to be that at which all things aim. 20 
It is noted however that some pursuits, for example child abuse, war, and terrorism aim at 
evil or causing great harm. Despite this Aristotle believed that actions and pursuits aimed 
at good. One might choose one good, say friendship, over another, say the pleasures of 
food, where neither holds priority. In this way, it is possible to go on ad infinitum. Aristotle 
thought that there must be a chief good, one that is chosen for its own sake. All moral 
inquiry sought to investigate the nature of this chief good. For Aristotle, it was important 
that everyone understood the need to pursue this chief good. In his view, if one needs to 
ask why, then one has misunderstood the nature of the good. 
However Aristotle's argument is circular. He believed that to know what the good consists 
of, one must have had the 'right' moral education and the 'right' character. In other words, 
one must be virtuous to know what the good consists of. But presumably one must know 
what the good consists of to be virtuous. 
Eudaimonia 
For Aristotle, the chief good for man was 'eudaimonia'. There is disagreement over the 
precise meaning of this term. W D ROSS21 and Benn22 translate this as 'happiness'. 
However, others use 'flourishing'. Which term is more appropriate? This is a difficult, and 
to some extent futile question, because as long as theorists make their conception clear, 
then mutual understanding should be possible. I shall, however, briefly discuss this notion 
because it is an important notion in Aristotle and other neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
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For many 'happiness' conjures up the satisfaction of physical and psychological needs, 
although some may be more myopic on this, viewing happiness solely in terms of 
satisfying physical needs. Perhaps 'flourishing' suggests a more overall state of affairs; 
when one flourishes one fares well and one's life goes well. Perhaps to fare well it is not 
just needs that need to be satisfied, but the promotion of one's interests too. This 
description could also apply to well-being, which so many obligation-based ethicists are 
fond of using, for example, when my interests are promoted then my well-being is 
promoted too. Happiness and well-being could therefore be synonymous. But is flourishing 
the same as well-being? Both terms suggest an organism's overall state of harmony. To 
fare well one's needs and interests need to be met, perhaps flourishing emphasises non-
physical needs such as emotional and spiritual needs. This debate could be discussed at 
length without drawing firm conclusions. However, in relation to the translation of 
eudamonia, it is plausible to suggest that well-being and happiness are synonymous and 
that flourishing shares some of these characteristics too. 
Benn remarks that eudamonia is not, like euphoria, a psychological state. Instead it refers 
to one's life faring well. If I am faring well, if my life is going well, then I flourish. Will I 
always be happy when I flourish? Will there be moments of unhappiness even when I 
reckon that, on the whole, I am doing well? Of course there will be. A typical day in the life 
of Robert, the charity worker (Chapter 3), will contain moments of sadness, distress, and 
unhappiness. Nevertheless, he fares well and succeeds in his role. A connection exists 
"between feeling happy and having your life go well". 23 But there might be moments when 
one's life, on the whole, is going well and yet one experiences sadness or misery from a 
myriad of sources and for many reasons. Given the diversity of human needs and 
h· ,,24 interests there will be "more and less fulfilling ways of going about these t Ings . 
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However, one is led very sharply into the moral high ground if one attempts to distinguish 
between these kinds of activities. 
In the thesis so far, instead of using the term 'flourishing' I have used the phrases 'to fare 
well', 'faring well' or 'one's life going well'. These phrases adopt the aretaic (virtue and 
vice) term 'well' and are thus more accurate in terms of peoples' traits, thoughts and acts. 
Both 'flourishing' and 'to fare well' form part of a typical conception of flourishing; I refer 
the reader to philosophical literature on the latter notion.25 In this Chapter, I use 
'flourishing' because this is the usual translation of Aristotle's 'eudamonia'. But in my view 
'faring well' and 'flourishing' are equivalent. 
What does flourishing comprise? 
For Aristotle, this concerns the function of the organism or object in question. Everything, 
whether a spoon, pencil or man had, according to Aristotle, a characteristic function or 
activity. For instance, the function of a knife is to cut. The characteristic function of man, 
Aristotle thought, cannot be biological living because this applies to a whole range of 
animals and plants. For such a function or activity to be characteristic of man, it needed to 
be unique to humans. This turned out to be, in Aristotle's view, the life of reason. In his 
words, this rational element is 
activity of soul exhibiting excellence, and if there be more than one excellence, 
in accordance with the best and the most complete. 26 
Man would flourish, according to Aristotle, as long as he met the function of reason. For 
Aristotle, it was important that man carried out his function, not in any fashion, but 
excellently, to the best possible extent. But what conception of excellence or good did 
Aristotle have in mind? On human good Aristotle claimed, "Human good turns out to be an 
activity of soul exhibiting excellence,,27 (although this actually sounds almost identical to 
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his definition of reason, above). For Aristotle, every human activity has an appropriate 
excellence and the aim for man was to carry out these activities in an excellent manner. 
Goodness and function 
For Aristotle there was a tight relationship between being a good person and human 
function. For a person to flourish, one must live in accordance with the distinctive function 
of man. As noted, Aristotle believed this was excellence in reason, which can be amended 
to improve its scope of meaning to 'reasoning and thinking'. Man lived well if he lived 
according to a rational principle. For Aristotle the best2a life was one of pure theoretical 
contemplation, that is, the life of a philosopher. Aristotle believed that the essence of being 
a good man was his ability to think well. This approach has advantages for the justification 
of morality, especially the desire to make it more objective. Moral truth becomes a 
naturalistic truth, in the sense that one can empirically assess (by using the special 
senses) whether x is good or not. One can watch man to see if he is living according to his 
function. Or one can observe a boat to see whether it moves smoothly over water and 
floats; if it does, it is a good boat. However, if it sinks in the water then it is not a good 
boat. This is true even if it looks fabulous; it is not a good boat because it has failed to 
meet its function. 29 
The use of 'good' 
The above discussion introduces an important point made by Benn30 about the use of 
'good'. When one considers 'the QE2 was a good ship', one does not mean both good and 
a ship. Rather one means 'the QE2 was good as a ship'. Further, if one says about 
Robert, the charity worker, that 'he is a good man' one does not mean both good and a 
man, but good as a man. This is because goodness is related to the degree that one 
succeeds in discharging one's function; this suggests a crude form of functionalism. 31 
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To speak of 'goodness in men' means that one compares men and makes a judgement. 
According to Benn, one means something like 'Jack is a good man, as far as men go' [my 
italics]. 'Good' is not only used here as a term of approval, it is also a descriptive term. 
How does this lead to a more objective ethics? Benn responds, 
if we can discern man's function, and discern who is living according to it, we 
have an objective, descriptive answer to questions about goodness in men. 32 
According to Aristotle's theory, if John performs an action that inclines him towards his 
function as a man then it is a right action and vice versa. If human goodness is construed 
in this way, then one negates the use of action-guiding principles and properties proposed 
by consequentialists and deontologists. Instead one needs to examine men in action and 
their goodness can be then evaluated. 
Hitting the right mark: the doctrine of the mean 
As noted in Chapter 3, virtue is not, according to Aristotle, a passion or emotion, nor is it a 
faculty, such as, the capacity to feel anger or fear. Rather virtue is a state of character. For 
Aristotle, it is possible to take more, less or an equal amount of everything, "and the equal 
[the mean] is an intermediate between excess and defect". 33 This is Aristotle's 'doctrine of 
the mean'. Take courage, for example. Here, the excess is rashness, while the deficiency 
is cowardice. A necessary quality of virtue on Aristotle's account is that it must aim at the 
intermediate. Aristotle qualifies this to mean 'moral virtue' for this "is concerned with 
passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect and the intermediate". 34 
Aristotle realizes, however, that it is not easy to be good; he believed "in everything it is no 
easy task to find the middle".35 
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Achieving the mean 
How should one go about achieving the virtuous mean? Determining the mean is not 
reducible to abstract, specific moral rules or general moral principles, such as, 'maximise 
the good' or 'always treat others as ends'. Aristotle claimed that it is best if one tries to 
disregard or dismiss aiming at pleasure because this is usually a partial judgement. He 
held that once this is done "we are less likely to go astray .. [and] .. we shall best be able to 
hit the mean". 36 The difficult process of determining the mean does not depend on 
reasoning, which might appear obscure coming from one who placed such an emphasis 
on this faculty in the political, intellectual and moral life. Aristotle claimed that perception, 
not reasoning, determined the mean. This was because the senses discover what is going 
on around us. This enables one to take stock of particular facts and circumstances needed 
to hit the mean. 
"Real" virtue 
Despite realizing the difficulty of hitting the mean, Aristotle lays down demanding criteria 
before people can achieve real virtue. For example, he held that giving away one's money 
was in terms of moral goodness insufficient. But, 
to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with 
the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it 
easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble37 . 
am uncertain whether the above stringent criteria could be met by anyone. Further, 
would one wish someone to be like this? The use of 'right' also makes for an incredibly 
subjective checklist. For example, one might get the motive and amount 'right'. But who 
counts as 'the right person'? Aristotle might have thought it virtuous to give his money 
away to a friend, another Athenian gentleman. But would he think it virtuous to give away 
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one's money to someone, such as a beggar, who probably needs it more? I suggest not, 
because the notion of needs did not feature in his ethics. 
Virtues and desires 
Aristotle believed that becoming virtuous was not a matter of learning moral rules. Instead 
besides cultivating certain dispositions, it concerned the education of one's desires. 
Aristotle viewed desires as "irrational elements in the SOUl". 38 While our desires might not, 
in themselves, realize a rational principle, when one's desires respond to a rational 
principle moral virtue is acquired. Reason need not ignore or override desire; indeed 
desire was the major motive behind all actions. On moral motivation, Aristotle held 
Actions, then, are just and temperate when they are such as the just or the 
temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just 
and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate 
men do them 39 . 
Aristotle thus makes a distinction between "acting virtuously, and acting in conformity with 
virtue". 40 He claimed that the exercise of the virtues - virtuous behaviour - must represent 
a person's true or real character; in other words, this must be second nature. For Aristotle, 
persons' dispositions to make the right choices are displayed in their desires. 
Moral education 
The education of character needs to be taught so that these dispositions are acquired. It is 
not an innate or natural process. It must begin early in a person's life, in early childhood, if 
she/he is to become a virtuous adult. In this sense, acquiring virtue is similar to any 
discipline requiring a certain skill, such as playing chess or learning to playa musical 
instrument, where both require plenty practice. One acts, firstly, as if one already 
possesses the disposition in question. This involves training oneself to do virtuous deeds. 
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In time, one gains the necessary dispositions to habitually achieve these things in 
accordance with reason and the good life. 
Moral and non-moral virtues 
There was no room in Aristotle's ethics for several common contemporary virtues, for 
example, kindness, compassion, and honesty. Instead the so-called cardinal virtues of 
justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance played a prominent role in his account of the 
moral life. These virtues were needed to enable human flourishing. For example, courage 
was needed to deal with dangerous and frightening challenges, while temperance was 
important because 
the ability to forswear or postpone the gratification of desire is essential to 
getting what we really want, and to lasting happiness.41 
Different historical eras value different virtues. For example, Aristotle valued pride (or 
megalopsuchia), while later thought did not. Indeed pride was condemned by medieval 
Christian philosophers as one of the 'seven deadly sins'. And while Aristotle condemned 
boastfulness, he did not value humility. But Aristotle held that flourishing consisted in more 
than just the possession of moral virtues; the distinction between the moral and intellectual 
virtues was noted in Chapter 3. 
Contemporary accounts of the virtues differ markedly from Aristotle's, hardly surprising 
given the 2500 years between them. For Aristotle, there was less difference between the 
moral virtues and other non-moral excellences. This limits one's ability to use his account 
to support a more contemporary - though perhaps, narrow-minded - account of the moral 
life. Despite this, several thinkers such as Hursthouse and Benn believe that one can 
derive much useful guidance on the moral life from Aristotle's ethics. 
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Objections to Aristotle's ethics 
Does man have a function? 
There are several established criticisms of Aristotle's ethics. First, it should not be 
assumed that man has a function; man might not be 'for' something. Just because man 
does things and these are in some way guided by a form of reasoning, does not in itself 
mean that this is man's function. People have various needs and interests and participate 
in a myriad of activities, which reflect one's values. These values, however, do not 
necessarily imply a function. In other words, 'can' does not mean 'should'; in Benn's words 
the mere fact that there are certain things he can do and sometimes does, is 
a poor ground for thinking this is what he should be doing. 42 
It is far from clear that man has a specific function. Therefore, it is unclear that the good 
life should be discerned as the fulfilment of such a function. (Compare this to the more 
simple function of eyes.) Even allowing that the good life is related in some way to human 
reason, it remains problematic to identify this "completely with the moral life". 43 However, 
Benn concedes that 
there is some connection between the flourishing of our most 
distinctive qualities, and the possession of moral virtue. 44 
Humans display many excellences besides moral ones. These include artistic and creative 
talents, social skills, beauty, physical strength, and mental determination. These qualities 
are valued in others as well as in us. Some of these are also unique to humans and as 
such, have a right to define the function of man. 
Is man's function unique? 
Second, let us accept that man does have a function. It still does not follow that this 
function (whichever activity is chosen) is unique to him. Even if no other creature lives 
151 
according to reason (and this is untrue), it is implausible to claim that this is what man is 
for and that doing this will ensure his goodness. 
Why choose 'reason' as the function of man? 
Third, accept that man participates in activities unique to him, such as, sportS.45 Why is it 
that the life of reason is chosen ahead of these other unique human activities? In reply, 
one might claim that al/ of these activities are rational, that is, involve some form of 
reasoning. One cannot, for example, participate in sport without reasoning. This appears 
true. But if so, one is left with a rather empty meaning of 'reasoning', because the range of 
activities is all-inclusive and too broad to be insightful. Instead, one could limit the sorts of 
activities that one believes reflect man's rational function, such as, philosophical enquiry. 
But besides these rational activities, many other activities, for example playing football, 
presumably thought 'non-rational' or 'less rational' than those identified will remain. Since 
it is claimed that other creatures cannot engage in philosophical enquiry or football, why is 
it that one of these other activities is not held to be the chief function? 
Elitism and injustice 
A fourth criticism charges that Aristotle is elitist when he claims that the life of 
contemplation is the best sort of life for a human to lead. It is possible to lead a good life 
by interacting with others, by helping and caring about others, and by displaying different 
forms and degrees of reasoning, such as practical reasoning. Social elitism is at the core 
of Aristotle's ethics. Furthermore, slavery and sexism also pervade his ethics. These were 
norms of society, women in particular were treat unjustly by the standards of modernity; 
even Hursthouse, a loyal neo-Aristotelian calls these views "deplorable".46 Only males of a 
high social standing, in effect Athenian gentlemen, could achieve full virtue. Contemporary 
virtue ethicists, for example, Hursthouse47 and Mclntyre48 are referred to as 'neo-
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Aristotelians' because they have rejected these outdated and unjust views and adapted 
their own versions accordingly. Benn claims that these criticisms should not detract from 
discussion of the remainder of Aristotle's ethics. He thinks it consistent to deny Aristotle's 
outdated and unjust ideas on slavery, women, and social hierarchy and still accept other 
plausible strands in his virtue ethics. 
Why lead the moral life? 
A fifth and perhaps more notable objection to Aristotelian ethics questions the connection 
between the moral life and the sort of life that might benefit an individual. This is not as 
close and sUbstantial as Aristotle supposed. One is thus led to ask, "does it pay to lead the 
moral life?" 49 It is possible for one to fare well without being virtuous. For instance, Benn 
mentions the wealthy aesthete 
who lacks a social conscience, and surrounds himself with fine things 
and refined human company. 50 
It might be that the morally virtuous life is not the life that one wishes to lead. The virtuous 
life might be seen by some as too restrictive, lacking joy, and perhaps failing to benefit the 
person. So while one can say that possessing the virtues will help one's life to go well, this 
may be insufficient to convince one to fully cultivate and exercise the virtues. Morality, 
according to maximizing consequentialism, dictates that to prevent harm coming to others 
and ideally to promote their wellbeing, one ought to, on occasions, make major sacrifices 
to the quality of one's own life. In other words, one has quite strict obligations that urge 
one to have concern for others, even strangers. This is a tenet of obligation-based ethics 
and yet it is often overlooked; many people appear not to realize this commitment to total 
strangers. But some people might not accept this claim if scrutinized or at least they might 
question its pragmatism. Some Christian ascetics might want to claim that by making such 
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sacrifices, one leads the good life. But Benn thinks this position is exaggerated, believing 
instead that it is more plausible to say 
that a certain sacrifice of genuine well-being, of the good life for us, is 
necessary if we are to act well. 51 
Responses to criticisms 
I shall make two points here. 
First, it is possible for contemporary Aristotelians to accept the claim that denies creatures 
have a purpose, and yet still accept other claims made by Aristotle. For example, eyes 
have evolved over many millions of years; they exist and they enable their bearers to see. 
However, as Benn claims, they did not develop literally in order to see. A purpose does 
not necessarily lie behind the process of evolution by natural selection. However, eyes do 
enable their bearers to see. In contrast, eyes that do not enable vision are damaged or 
defective. Supporters of Aristotle's functionalism may ask, 'what do eyes do best? The 
answer presumably is 'seeing'. Then advocates of Aristotle might ask, 'is there something 
that humans do best?' For some, the response is 'reasoning'. In other words, for these 
thinkers people will flourish - fare well and lead good lives - if they reason well. 
My second point concerns the second criticism made earlier: that the function of man must 
be unique to him. This might be wrong because the meaning of 'a rational principle' could 
be understood too narrowly. There are many forms of reasoning. Words like 'rational' and 
'thinking' cover a multitude of these forms, which include practical reasoning, theoretical 
contemplation (the best life of all, according to Aristotle), perception, and experiencing 
emotions. It is hard to sharply define and delineate these sorts of reasoning. All involve, to 
some degree, an element of understanding. Further, it is unhelpful to make crude 
generalizations. For example, in saying something like 'emotions do not involve reasoning' 
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one errs, since there is a rational element to experiencing emotions. Indeed everything 
one does could be said to involve some form and degree of reasoning. It is alleged then 
that although other creatures feel and perceive, the way in which humans do so is unique. 
I concur with Benn in claiming that all aspects of one's life is affected by one's ability to 
reason, the latter understood broadly. 
Contemporary virtue ethics and moral character 
I shall now describe virtue ethics' account of persons' moral character, including its 
response to the impartialism advocated by utilitarianism. In relation to the second tenet, I 
look at Hursthouse's account of action-guidance, which she frames in terms of 'v-rules'. I 
then make a brief point about virtue ethics in relation to the moral education of people. The 
first and third points are two of virtue ethics' advantages over obligation-based moral 
theories. Hursthouse's claims are in response to the major objection levelled at virtue 
ethics, namely, that it fails to provide adequate action guidance. Following this section, I 
discuss some objections to virtue ethics and consider the plausibility of strong virtue 
ethics. 
Obligation-based moral theories focus on the consequences of acts and the nature and 
content of moral obligations, rules, and principles. These theories largely neglect 
questions about people's characters and their lives. But morality concerns people's acts, 
thoughts, and feelings. Nothing occurs without a person's direct or indirect involvement. 
To rectify this inadequacy of obligation-based moral theories, one of the main concerns of 
virtue ethics is to provide a richer more textured account of moral character. 
Virtue ethics gives special consideration to people's character traits, both the virtues and 
vices (discussed in Chapter 3). Virtue ethicists are primarily concerned with the kind of 
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person one is or wants to be. Requirements of a virtue ethics approach to morality include 
self-reflection, for example, on what kind of person one is and thinking specifically about 
the sort of life one wishes to lead. It is important to think about the value of friendships and 
relationships with others, as one of the aims of this approach is to live well within families 
and communities. Important questions include: 'how can I be a morally good (excellent) 
person? How ought I to act in particular situations and circumstances? What does acting 
in a certain way, say, kindly or cruelly say about me as a person? And, how and why 
ought I to respond to this person's needs? 
In an attempt to derive some action guidance regarding the general question, 'what sort of 
person should I be?', one can ask another more specific question, 'what would a virtuous -
for example, honest - person do in these circumstances?' Virtuous people will be repelled 
at the thought of vicious acts and take great pleasure in carrying out virtuous deeds. This 
can be sharply contrasted to Kant's ideas on moral worth; for him pleasure was 
unimportant when carrying out acts. 52 Back to Stocker's example for a moment (Chapter 
3), while one might have some admiration for those who act just from a sense of duty, "we 
tend to think better of agents who like to do what they ought, because their good deeds 
express their real character". 53 
The role of motives is also crucially important in virtue ethics. One criticism of obligation-
based moral theories is that they provide a hard and inflexible duty-based account of 
moral motivation, which does not accurately reflect the lives of humans (see the 
discussion based on Stocker's example, Chapter 3). Siote is one virtue ethicist who 
believes that virtues provide one with the reasons and motives for acts, thoughts, and 
feelings. In contemporary moral philosophy, Siote was, I believe, the first person to 
propose a strong version of virtue ethics in the form of a full text treatment. 54 Siote 
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believes that the virtues are admirable character traits and this forms one's reason for 
cultivating and exercising them. His version is unusual in that it is not grounded in 
Aristotle. Instead Siote's theory is derived from the moral sentimentalism of Hume and 
Martineau. In Siote's theory, there is one foundational virtue, namely, caring. 'Caring' is 
admirable and this does not depend upon, for example, the consequences of caring. For 
Siote, virtues are motives. For example, kindness is a morally admirable trait, a virtue; it 
also serves as the motive for action. The rightness of an act on Siote's view derives from 
the nature of the motive behind it. If a person does a deed from the motive of kindness , 
then it is a kind deed; as such it is a morally good and right deed. 55 
The two central questions in normative ethics - what should I do? and how should I be? -
are not necessarily incompatible, despite the objection from obligation-based ethicists that 
action guidance is ignored in virtue ethics. However, it is true to say that different versions 
of virtue ethics attach various degrees of priority upon the status and importance of right 
action and prescribing action-guidance versus the notion of moral character. One could 
generalize and claim that obligation-based moral theories are act-centred and virtue ethics 
is agent-centred, because the latter makes moral character so important. But it would be 
unfair to claim that virtue ethics is agent-centred rather than act-centred. According to 
Hursthouse, virtue ethics is often characterized as a moral theory that concerns 'Being' 
and ignores 'Doing'. There is a grain of truth in this claim, which Hursthouse singles out as 
one of the slogans used to inaccurately describe virtue ethics. Some obligation-based 
ethicists do interpret virtue ethics in this simplistic way, but this is a misconception. 
Virtue ethics: the focus on the moral character of persons 
Obligation-based moral theories are charged with ignoring the assessment of moral 
character. But, according to many thinkers including Benn, this is a necessary component 
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of an adequate moral theory. Sometimes one comes into contact with people who have 
committed evil and deplorable deeds. For many people, actions and beliefs are either right 
or wrong. Some actions and beliefs are more absolute than others; that is, actions and 
beliefs are either absolutely right or absolutely wrong. For example, 'value human life' and 
'do not murder' are for many, absolutely right beliefs, while 'harm children' is for many an 
absolutely wrong belief. Rather than just looking at these from an act perspective, virtue 
ethics is able to provide an insight into persons who commit such acts or hold such beliefs 
, 
because of its emphasis and reflection upon moral character, motives and, emotions, So 
instead of asking, "how is the world improved or made worse by such and such an 
action?" the virtue ethicist is concerned about "what the doing of this action would reveal 
about the one who does it?,,56 For example, would an honest or compassionate person do 
such a thing? Or are these the acts or thoughts of a dishonest or cruel agent? According 
to Benn, this way of reasoning leads us to 
a set of moral concerns that is more plausible than anything that can be 
delivered by purely action-based accounts. 57 
Benn provides an example that encourages one to focus on the person's thoughts. The 
thought in question is: having sexual fantasies about someone one knows is unavailable. 
This type of feeling might not result in any sort of wrongdoing. But Benn asks us to 
consider the following scenario: Butch fantasises about Liz, who is engaged. This does not 
necessarily mean that Butch will go on and attempt to seduce Liz. Indeed, some people 
might think that these kinds of private thoughts are pretty harmless as long as no one is 
harmed. However, Benn believes that this is not so simple. He holds that the 
aforementioned example concerns "the relationship between fantasy and genuine desire", 
58 a topic that involves complex questions. For Benn, the insight into one's real character 
and desires highlighted by these sorts of thoughts cause him concern. In this example, 
Benn believes that Butch's fantasies surely reflect or express a small part of his real 
158 
desires and character. He thinks that envy, at least on some occasions, makes these 
spiteful deeds wrong. He writes 
an envious person might do spiteful things, but perhaps more often he 
will simply have envious thoughts, nursing his unhappiness that 
someone else has something he has not (and perhaps does not even 
want).59 
People's characters are formed from one's particular set of virtues and vices. These form 
and shape one's motives, be they good (for example, benevolence) or bad (for example, 
envy). Benn thinks that motives give actions their moral complexion. This helps to dispel 
the common assumption 
that the only thing to worry about, with respect to certain private imaginings, 
is that they might be acted out. There is as much truth in the reverse; if they 
are acted out, much of what is objectionable about the actions is the motive 
and state of character from which they spring. 60 
Virtue ethics and impartialism 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that obligation-based moral theories, including various forms of 
consequentialism, produce conflicts with some deep moral intuitions, such as, the 
wrongness of murder, slavery, and torture. Consequentialism, particularly utilitarianism, 
advocates impartialism; and yet some moral intuitions support partialism towards one's 
loved ones. The virtue ethicist, however, does not face the stringent problem of 
impartialism. Instead virtue ethics can accommodate the notion of partialism quite easily. 
Rather than asking what the abstract notion of impartiality and partiality mean, virtue 
ethics seeks to identify, explicate, and understand the virtues involved in forming and 
sustaining close relationships with others. Virtue ethics also aims to understand how one 
virtue, say, honesty relates to another, say, compassion. For example, compassion is an 
example of an other-regarding virtue (to be examined in Chapter 6), while loyalty is an 
example of a partial virtue exercised most often between friends and loved ones. 
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Hursthouse on action guidance and the v-rules 
I noted the contribution made by Hursthouse in Chapter 4 where she discussed the 
neglected topic in the applied ethics literature of moral dilemmas being resolvable only 
with remainder. In On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse also aims to respond to the common 
charge that virtue ethics cannot provide a person with adequate action-guidance. 
Obligation-based ethicists charge that the virtuous agent will have no idea what to do in 
particular dilemmas, because they argue that virtue ethics fails to come up with any rules 
for conduct. Hursthouse believes that this is wrong. In her view, people have access to a 
whole range of virtues and, as I noted in Chapter 3, within the structure of these virtues 
(and vices) there is considerable moral guidance. For example, the virtues include 
compassion, honesty, and patience. The virtuous person would therefore characteristically 
be compassionate (to be discussed in Chapter 7), true to her word, and patient in the 
circumstances. Virtuous persons would not be non-compassionate or cruel, lie, or 
impatient. Hursthouse believes that despite one's own initial uncertainty, it is possible to 
have a very good idea of what the virtuous person would do. For example, Hursthouse 
asks, 
Would she lie in her teeth to acquire an unmerited advantage? No, for 
that would be both dishonest and unjust. .. Might she keep a 
death-bed promise even though living people would benefit from its 
being broken? Yes, for she is true to her word. And so on.61 
Furthermore, Hursthouse believes that virtue ethics "comes up with a large number of 
rules".62 It clearly gives one prescriptions for action, for example, 'do what is honest, 'do 
what is just and 'do what is compassionate'. But virtue ethics also tells one what not to do, 
for example, "each vice [is] a prohibition - do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, 
160 
mean". Hursthouse calls these the v-rules. I believe that this refers to 'virtuous' or 'vicious' 
rules, but this is not made clear. 
In developing this thesis about the v-rules, Hursthouse demonstrates that virtue ethics 
does present an account of right action that includes rules, so denying the common 
criticism that it fails to. This criticism is grounded in the view that virtue ethics is about 
'Being' rather than 'Doing', one of the slogans used to characterize virtue ethics. It is more 
accurate to claim something like 'virtue ethics focuses on Being, that is, moral character 
but does not do so at the expense of Doing, that is, action guidance'. Thus, virtue ethics 
provides rules for guidance. It is now possible to rebut the claim that for virtue ethics to 
work adequately, it needs to be supplemented with other obligation-based, for example, 
deontological, rules. 
Given that virtue ethics does provide rules for action, are there any reasons left for 
thinking that it cannot tell people what to do? Perhaps the v-rules of virtue ethics are the 
wrong sort of rule? Rules like 'do what is honest' and 'do not do what is unkind' are like the 
rule 'Do what the virtuous person would do'. Hursthouse believes that the v-rules provide a 
different sort of action guidance than that supplied by the rules of deontology and the one 
rule of act-utilitarianism. More specifically, Hursthouse believes that the v-rules "are 
couched in terms, or concepts, that are certainly 'evaluative' in some sense, or senses, of 
that difficult word". 63 
It appears that deontologists are discontent with the rule, 'Do not kill' as they have refined 
it to include more sophisticated and evaluative terms, such as, 'Do not murder', 'Do not kill 
the innocent' and further 'Do not kill unjustly' (although as Hursthouse notes, the latter is a 
specific form of v-rule). Deontologists might argue that the v-rules are inferior to their own 
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rules when it comes to the moral education and guidance of children. In the case of 
children, "the simple rules we learnt at our mother's knee are indispensable".64 The v-rules 
are 'thick' concepts in the sense that they are complex and sophisticated notions to pick 
up on. This is so for adults, but at least they can think harder about what constitutes 
harming someone or promoting someone's well-being. For children (depending upon age 
and degree of physical, mental and moral maturity), this process will be more difficult. In 
effect, some v-rules, including 'act charitably' and 'don't act unjustly might well be 
regarded as inappropriate for use with children; as Hursthouse notes "[these thick 
concepts are] Far too thick for a child to grasp".65 
Hursthouse believes that the above objection - the v-rules are inadequate in providing 
guidance for children - is slightly different from the general one claiming that the v-rules do 
not provide action guidance. It is more specific and concerns 
a condition of adequacy that any normative ethics must meet, namely 
that such an ethics must not only come up with action guidance 
for a clever rational adult, but also generate some account of moral 
education, of how one generation teaches the next what they 
should do". 66 
According to Hursthouse, there are two reasons why this criticism is false. First, she holds 
that the claim that toddlers are taught only deontological rules is wrong. She thinks that 
sentences like 'Be kind to your brother, he's only little' and 'Don't be so mean, so greedy' 
are taught to children on a regular basis. However, she admits that while 'fair' and 'unfair' 
are taught, 'just' and 'unjust' are not for some reason. Second, Hursthouse believes that it 
is unnecessary for a virtue ethicist to deny such significant deontological rules as 'Do not 
lie' and 'keep promises'. While Hursthouse thinks it is wrong to define a virtuous agent as 
one who acts in accordance with deontological rules, it is perhaps an understandable 
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mistake to make, because of the obvious connection between the rule about not lying and 
the need to cultivate and exercise the virtue of honesty. 
It should be clear by now that distinctions between deontological moral rules and the 
virtues concern motives, ends and value. Implicated here is the acknowledgement that, on 
the one hand, deontologists think it sufficient to teach a rule prohibiting lying, whereas on 
the other hand, virtue ethicists "want to emphasize the fact that, if children are to be taught 
to be honest, they must be taught to love and prize the truth".67 But, according to 
Hursthouse, this end will not be realized via the deontological method. However, the 
important point is that virtue ethicists do not have to deny the usefulness of teaching 
children these sorts of moral rules in order to reach this end. 
In summary, Hursthouse argues convincingly that virtue ethics comes up with rules for 
action - the v-rules. These include 'be honest' and 'do as the compassionate person 
would'. Moreover, virtue ethicists can also accept and accommodate the deontologist's 
familiar rules; certainly these rules, for example, 'do not lie' need not be rejected. The 
distinction between the two is concerned with their different moral foundations. For 
example, deontology states that lying is wrong because it violates the rule 'do not lie' 
therefore lying is morally prohibited. On the virtue ethics view, however, people should not 
lie because it would be dishonest and dishonesty is a vice. 
Virtue ethics and moral education 
Obligation-based moral theories ask, 'Is this action morally right or wrong?' In response, 
one typically thinks of reasons for and against doing the act. One often believes that the 
act with the best (most convincing) reasons should be carried out. If an obligation-based 
ethics is adopted, these reasons will be related to (a) maximizing utility or at least 
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producing good rather than bad consequences and (b) abiding by moral rules or 
principles. There is, however, a third source of knowledge that people can utilize when 
they want to know what to do. This is to seek the moral guidance of someone else 
, 
someone whom one believes is morally wiser than oneself, someone whom one admires. 
Indeed, the main 'method' of teaching the virtues is by instruction from others, observing 
other people whom are virtuous and admired and aiming to be like these people. Virtue 
ethics recognizes that these points are important and crucial in people's moral lives. 
However, obligation-based ethics appears to ignore this option. Indeed, asking others for 
their view is almost regarded as morally deficient. I suggest that many people seek 
guidance from 'wiser' people, including close friends, relatives, and colleagues. This fact is 
particularly important for virtue ethicists who believe that it should be accepted and 
endorsed for what it is, namely, a claim about something that does happen. People are a 
valuable resource of knowledge, ideas, and views that is sometimes needed when one 
really does not know what to do. Of course, this is rejected by obligation-based ethics 
because these theories hold that all dilemmas can be resolved as long as the person acts 
in accordance with its obligations, rules, and principles. But this fails to represent the 
moral life in realistic terms, richly textured and full of moral confusion. Virtue ethics, by 
acknowledging and encouraging people to seek moral guidance from others, helps people 
to lead morally good lives. 
Objections to virtue ethics 
What is virtue ethics? 
A common criticism is that virtue ethicists are unable to come up with a simple short 
answer to the question, what is virtue ethics? However, no one appears bothered that this 
is also the case with deontology and utilitarianism. Nevertheless, this objection is thrown 
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at virtue ethicists as if it is a flaw in the theory itself, which is somehow meant to make 
virtue ethics less plausible. 
Hursthouse believes that it is hard to describe virtue ethics in broad terms, "to get all virtue 
ethicists in", and at the same time, describe it "sufficiently tight to keep all deontologists 
and utilitarians out".68 She thinks that this challenge is excessive. It is, I think, unfair, 
because if virtue ethicists could do this, then they would be unique among ethicists. The 
majority of individuals interested in moral philosophy simply do not know much about 
virtue ethics. This provides one reason why the non-proponents of virtue ethics want it 
explained in a few sentences or less. This is in contrast to the familiarity evident towards 
deontology and utilitarianism. These obligation-based theories are taught and studied in 
depth during undergraduate philosophy courses. And, in nursing education, there is 
evidence to suggest that consequentialism and deontology dominate the teaching of 
ethics. 69 I believe that Hursthouse would agree with my claim that virtue ethics is not 
taught as widely as the traditional obligation-based moral theories. Perhaps as more 
thinkers become accustomed to and more knowledgeable about virtue ethics, this 
situation will change for the better. It seems to me sensible to think that as more and more 
undergraduates learn about the virtues and virtue ethics, there will be less reason to be 
ignorant of this approach to morality. 
Strong virtue ethics - a viable view? 
Obligation-based ethicists believe that strong virtue ethics is implausible. Philosophers 
who accept the importance of virtues in morality include Rachels70 . However, he also 
believes that strong virtue ethics is not a viable view. Rachels accepts that theories that 
emphasise right action usually neglect the importance of moral character in the moral lives 
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of agents. Virtue ethics, irrespective of its form, focuses upon moral character. But as 
Rachels reminds us, 
Moral problems are frequently about what we should do. It is not obvious how 
according to Virtue ethics, we should go about deciding what to do. 71 ' 
Rachels thinks this strong approach is unnecessary. He believes that one could retain the 
notions of 'morally right' and 'right action', but interpret these from within the virtue ethics 
framework. It appears, however, that Rachels has not conceived the action guidance 
derivable from the virtues and vices in the way that Hursthouse has done. I believe that 
her v-rules thesis provides a plausible and satisfactory response to the common charge 
that virtue ethics cannot tell people what to do. Many people know other people whom 
they admire and regard as virtuous. One needs to think of these sorts of people and ask, 
for example, 'aunt Daisy is really kind, I wonder what she would do in this situation?' 
Instead of thinking in broad terms, that is, encompassing all the virtues together, it is 
morally preferable if one takes one virtue at a time and thinks about what each separately 
entails. For instance, how should I act, think, and feel if I wish to be honest? 
Moral rules and deontic language versus aretaic terms 
In everyday life, there are numerous common moral rules72 and principles, some stricter 
and weightier than others. For example, 'do not harm the innocent', 'tell the truth', and 
'don't break promises'. These principles are considered indispensable by many 
deontologists. It is claimed that the content of these principles cannot be completely 
understood simply by reference to a specific virtue. In 8enn's words, 
the concept of the virtues makes little sense apart from the idea that a virtuous 
individual is disposed to do the right things - and we seem to need some other 
account that can tell us what the right things are. 73 
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Such an objection reflects the view that virtue-talk cannot replace action-talk. For many, 
the concepts of 'right' and 'wrong' action are so important in morality that one should not, 
as Anscombe74 suggests, jettison them. Contrast this to a virtuous person: a virtuous 
person is disposed to think virtuously, that is, in terms of those virtues she cultivates. 
Further, she is disposed to do virtuous deeds, that is, act from the virtue of, for example, 
honesty. Strong virtue ethicists do not talk in terms of 'right action' or 'morally right action'. 
Instead they use the specific language of the virtues. I suggest that instead of merely 
referring to someone as 'virtuous', one should be more accurate and use the relevant 
virtue, for example, 'John is a just man' or 'Mary is a patient lady'. In this way, one can get 
a much better, more detailed picture of the kind of people John and Mary are. 
Furthermore, instead of using deontic language such as 'right' and 'wrong', virtue ethicists 
refer to one's acts by using aretaic terms such as 'John (and Mary) act well' or conversely 
'he acts badly' about someone who has cultivated the vice of dishonesty. 
Benn on virtue ethics' exclusivity 
Benn is interested in virtue ethics' exclusivity. He asks, "With what, exactly, is virtue ethics 
being contrasted?,,75 Does it provide substance and content which other moral theories, 
such as, utilitarianism and deontology, do not? This question asks one to consider how 
strong (action guiding) the version of virtue ethics is under examination. Questions 
implicated here focus on the role of deontic notions. For example, are obligations and 
moral rules necessary to tell people what to do when faced with moral problems and 
dilemmas? Or can the virtues, operating within a virtue ethics framework, do all the work 
of ethics? Can virtue ethics provide adequate action-guidance? In short, can it do all that 
is required in morality? I suggest that because virtue ethics makes virtuous (good) moral 
character more important than the aim of 'making moral decisions' or the notion of 'right 
action', it does have something substantial and fruitful to say. 
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However, the above claim fails to convince Benn. He asks, suppose some actions are 
good and praiseworthy, while others are bad and blameworthy. Suppose further that the 
virtuous person (one who has cultivated the virtues) will do the good deeds and ignore the 
bad. The important question remains, 
Why shouldn't the good and the bad themselves be understood in terms of an 
action-based (non-virtue based) theory such as utilitarianism??6 
Take utilitarianism as an example. Suppose the good deeds were those that maximised 
well-being and minimised pain and suffering, while the bad deeds decreased well-being 
and perhaps increased pain and suffering. It would be plausible for the utilitarian to say 
that the virtuous agent has a steady disposition "to promote the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number?" For utiltiarians, benevolence comes close to such a disposition. This 
point helps to explain why some critics, not only obligation-based ethicists, but also weak 
virtue ethicists, argue that virtue ethics fails to contribute anything new to moral theory. 
Furthermore, some critics claim that virtue ethics cannot adequately replace obligation-
based moral theories, such as, consequentialism and deontology, because right and 
wrong conduct cannot be replaced with discussion of virtuous or vicious character. These 
critics fail to notice the action guidance derivable from virtue and vice terms (discussed in 
Chapter 3). In sum, virtue ethics is charged with failing to provide something that might 
make the theory attractive and convincing to non-virtue ethicists. 
The problem of completeness 
Related to the plausibility of strong virtue ethics, Rachels?? identifies a problem concerning 
the sufficiency of virtue ethics. He asks, 'Is the virtue theorists' explanation of what we 
ought to do sufficient?' He believes that this explanation is incomplete. Take honesty as 
an example. The strong virtue ethicist tells us to be honest because it is a moral 
excellence that will help both the possessor and the benefactor to fare well in life (note: I 
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am talking about faring well and leading good lives in a moral sense). Conversely, being 
dishonest or deceitful are vices, which interfere with how humans are able to get on in life. 
As noted, those who cultivate the virtues are worthy of admiration and praise. Those who 
cultivate the vices are worthy of nothing less than moral repugnance. Probably the largest 
group of people are those who fail to realize the importance of the virtues; these traits are 
therefore not cultivated. However, neither do these people cultivate the vices. The moral 
assessment of these people is more difficult; one needs to know what kind of people, on 
the whole, they are. 
What do the virtues entail? 
Another related problem is the difficulty in knowing what a specific virtue entails. For 
instance, what precisely does it mean to be honest? I examined this type of question in 
Chapter 3, but since it is a criticism levelled at virtue ethics, I shall look at it again. The 
supposed difficulty in answering this question is one reason why Rachels thinks 
deontological rules are important in morality. According to him, the response to 'why 
shouldn't I lie?' needs to be more than 'because it goes against the character trait of 
honesty'. Why is it better to have the trait of honesty rather than its opposite? Convincing 
reasons are needed to show why it is morally preferable to be honest rather than 
dishonest (to be kind rather than unkind and so on). In response to this, Rachels writes 
Possible answers might be that a policy of truth-telling is on the whole to 
one's own advantage; or that it promotes the general welfare; or that it is 
needed by people who must live together relying on one another.78 
However there is a problem with Rachels' comments above. The first response is akin to 
ethical egoism, the second utilitarianism, while the third is reminiscent of 
contractarianism. 79 For Rachels, strong virtue ethics is flawed because its justification for 
action guidance is inadequate. But it is notable that Rachels fails to mention 'we need the 
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virtues to fare well and help others' lives to go well too'. This is not the same as ethical 
egoism, utilitarianism, or contractarianism. It is a crude form of neo-Aristotelianism. 
Virtue ethics and the charge of moral relativism 
From within a virtue ethics framework, reasons for action will all be related or connected to 
the virtues and vices. Particular virtues and vices are deemed important in one's life and 
this depends, in part, upon one's needs and interests. This claim is, however, open to the 
charge of moral relativism. Critics might argue that no two persons have identical lives; 
they would suggest that in many cases people's needs and interests diverge. Each person 
chooses to cultivate only those virtues that will help one's life to fare well. But this means 
that different persons will cultivate different virtues. Two points spring to mind. First, there 
is no guarantee that persons will all cultivate the same virtue. Indeed depending on the 
number of people in question, completely different virtues might be seen as important and 
cultivated. For example, out of 100 people, 25 cultivate honesty, 25 cultivate patience, 
another 25 cultivate compassion and the remaining 25 cultivate courage. The second 
point springs from the first. Each person in this small community believes that the virtue 
that they cultivate is important to human flourishing; this is, after all, why they chose to 
cultivate it in the first place. It is alleged that moral relativism reigns because no absolute 
moral truths are generated by this approach; each person believes that 'their' virtue is the 
most important one to cultivate. However, while this claim is true as it stands, it fails to 
accurately represent the precise role of the virtues in morality. The virtues are positive 
character traits, moral excellences that it is good for people to inculcate, because they 
help one's life to go well and they tend to benefit others. The virtues are admirable traits to 
possess. People can realize why it is important to cultivate the virtues (and conversely 
why the vices should not be cultivated). One can see that in the above example, the 
cultivation of the 4 virtues - honesty, patience, compassion and courage - would help 
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their possessor and the other 75 in the community to fare well. But might the 25 people 
who are honest cause tensions for the remaining 75? Or might those who act 
courageously cause problems for the others? There is clearly something in this. As it 
stands, this conception of the virtues might lack sufficient theoretical resources to 
satisfactorily ground the virtues. This point is picked up again in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
The problem of incompleteness - revisited 
The strong virtue ethics approach faces another more general difficulty, related to the 
problem of incompleteness. Reasons to do with the virtues and vices help one to know 
whether to favour or object to an action. Rachels holds that strong virtue ethics must agree 
with the following claim, 
that for any good reason that may be given in favor of doing an action, there 
is a corresponding virtue that consists in the disposition to accept and act on 
that reason. 80 
Rachels thinks this is untrue. For example, suppose one has to decide how to distribute 
scarce medical resources. One might decide that it is best to do that which will maximise 
the benefit for the greatest number of people. Rachels asks, is there a virtue that matches 
this disposition? Probably not, if there is believes it should be called 'acting like a 
utilitarian' . 
However, this example is too crude to be revealing. First, according to obligation-based 
ethics, the allocation of scarce medical resources will be carried out from the principle of 
distributive justice. From a virtue ethics perspective, the legislator will be just, he will act 
justly. He will be fair when allocating the resources. While this will be far from 
straightforward, acting justly should help to eliminate unjust and partial actions 
Considerable action guidance can be derived from the virtue and vice terms of 'Just' 'fair' 
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and 'unfair'. Clearly the virtues of benevolence, honesty, and integrity are important in 
making these types of decisions too. Rachels' example concerning the allocation of 
resources is perhaps too simplistic to be really helpful. Many sources of data will be first 
identified, including epidemiological data on the incidence of AIDS and data on the 
incidence of other diseases, for example, coronary heart disease. The allowable 
expenditure will be identified and a just percentage of the expenditure would be allocated 
to help those with AIDS and a just percentage allocated to help those with coronary heart 
disease and so on. Of course it is not as simple as Rachels or I make out. Many other 
criteria will be taken into account. However, acting justly and avoiding acting dishonestly, 
for example, together with considerable self-reflection, will help to rule out injustice. 
Virtue ethics: conflicts between virtues 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that one common objection to the virtues approach to morality 
was conflicts between virtues and how this approach can respond to this criticism. 
Rachels81 identifies the 'conflict of the virtues' as a serious problem for virtue ethics. How 
is one meant to resolve situations where two or more virtues have been identified as 
important? Can the virtues be ranked? For instance, is honesty, in a given situation, more 
important than justice? Rachels says, 
Suppose you must choose between A and B, when it would be dishonest 
but kind to do A, and honest but unkind to do B.82 
There are reasons for and against both telling the truth (and acting unkindly) and 
withholding information (but acting kindly). Since both kindness and honesty are virtues, it 
is unclear what one should do. But at the end of the day one must do something. The 
pronouncement 'act virtuously' clearly fails to help. This is where the idea of ranking the 
virtues might come in. But can this be done? Rachels fails to provide responses to this 
question. 
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Conflicts between virtues: a response 
It is not true to say that because both honesty and kindness are virtues, a person will 
therefore have no idea what to do. People need to think deeply about the meaning of each 
virtue. One needs to think hard about what honest and kind persons are like, for example, 
what characteristically would honest and kind persons do? What behaviours does one 
expect from honest and kind persons? And what acts would honest and kind persons 
carry out? One should take into account particular circumstances and details in situations. 
These details will help to shed some light on which virtue is thought more important in a 
given situation. 
An example might help. Sally has bought a new dress for a party later that evening. She 
asks Tim, her husband, what he thinks of it. Tim hates the dress, but says that it's lovely. 
He believes that being honest would be unkind to his wife. He therefore decides to spare 
her feelings and is dishonest instead, believing that this is a kind thing to do. 
Accounts of honesty, as a virtue can be very demanding of the person. For example, 
Hursthouse provides an account of honesty in which she states that the honest person 
would never lie (tell an untruth), would avoid situations where lying was a possibility, would 
seek out situations where the truth could be told and would not wish to make friends with 
people considered dishonest. This interpretation of what it means to be an honest person 
will not be easy for many people to comply with, but such compliance is necessary in 
order to be called an honest person. Of course, one needs to think about the meaning of 
kindness too. 
On the above account, Tim was deceiving Sally by intentionally telling her an untruth; in 
this sense he was not being honest to her. If he had told the truth, this would have been 
173 
an act of honesty. Further, he believed the truth would upset Sally, but he failed to give her 
an opportunity to react to the truth. Sally might have been prepared for the truth. If Tim 
had not liked the dress, then she might have decided to try on another. The dress may 
have been for a really special occasion where Sally wanted to look her best. She now 
believes that the dress looks good on her, partly because of Tim's dishonesty (I say 'partly' 
because Sally thinks it looks good too and might have bought it irrespective of Tim's 
views). Of course, according to some of Sally's friends, the dress does look good; perhaps 
Tim's taste in fashion is conservative. At the party, Sally overhears several nasty remarks 
about her 'dreadful' dress. She returns home early in tears. Because Tim is upset at 
seeing his wife in such a distressed state, he admits that he does not really like the dress. 
Sally feels annoyed and upset at Tim's dishonesty, even though she understands his 
motive. Tim regrets his actions and feels upset that he was not honest with his wife. 
Another point that I think needs making is that both kindness and honesty are moral 
virtues. As such, these traits are examples of moral excellences, morally good traits of 
character that should be praised and admired. Acting from the virtue of kindness and 
acting from the virtue of honesty are examples of acting well. Tim exercised judgement 
and decided that he should act kindly, but dishonestly. Acting dishonestly is a vice and as 
such it is an example of acting badly. But I need to stress something here and that is the 
use of judgement. This is not to be taken lightly. Obligation-based moral theories, for 
example, the many moral rules and obligations of deontology and the one rule of act-
consequentialism, state that there is no need for persons to use judgment in making moral 
decisions. One need only abide by the rules and the morally right course of action will be 
revealed. Virtue ethics makes exercising judgement fundamentally important to morality 
and to the aim of persons faring well. Tim took into account knowledge of his wife, what 
sort of person Sally is, which traits she admires in others, previous experiences, and 
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perhaps discussions that the couple had had in the past about similar situations. Based on 
all of these things (and more), Tim made a judgment. The motive and reason for this 
decision was kindness. Therefore one can say that his motive was morally good. 
Also included in making a moral judgment is a complex phenomenon that I shall call 
'moral wisdom'. Some thinkers, for example Hursthouse, believe that moral wisdom 
encompasses several deep complicated notions including moral perception, sensitivity, 
and imagination. Each of these I take to be necessary to the virtue ethics approach to 
morality. Whether consciously or not, these notions are important in order to make good 
moral judgments. It seems to me that Tim sensed that the situation was morally troubling. 
He used imagination to put himself in Sally's position. By looking at Sally, asking her 
questions, and listening to her responses Tim was able to perceive some of the morally 
important features of this situation. Examples of these are: consequences and outcomes, 
rights, motives, intentions, principles, and naturally virtues and vices. I will not go further 
and say that Tim could perceive all the morally relevant features. This is because I believe 
that moral perception is fraught with difficulty and I doubt whether anyone would be able to 
assimilate every detail, especially when the situation is incredibly multi layered, as morally 
tense situations tend to be. I shall examine the exercise of judgment and moral wisdom in 
relation to nurses' moral decision making in Chapter 7. 
Conflicts between moral obligations and rules 
Obligation-based ethicists are not immune from the conflict problem as noted in Chapter 3. 
Often a ranking of obligations will need to occur, which is far from satisfactory. Deontology 
could be charged with failing to resolve conflicts between moral obligations, rules, and 
principles. Things are better, in this sense, for act-utiltiarians since they have only one 
rule, 'maximise utility'. But many deontological rules exist. These can take one of several 
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forms. For example, the rules taught as children by one's parents such as 'don't lie', 'tell 
the truth' and 'be kind to your elders', Ross,83 prima facie obligations and those proposed 
in medical ethics by Gert, Culver and Clouser.84 
Can one display a virtue in performing a bad or evil deed? 
Both Aristotle and Plato were troubled by this question. Foot and Benn examine this 
question in the philosophical literature. As examples, Benn gives the courage of a terrorist 
in planting bombs that might kill or injure innocent people and the kindness demonstrated 
by the 'Robin Hood' thief who steals from the rich and gives to the poor. One might ask 
whether the terrorist is courageous? Does he not display courage in planting bombs 
knowing that he could be killed or seriously injured if one exploded? Is the thief really kind 
or benevolent? He does appear to show some sympathy for the plight of the poor. Benn 
thinks that one's character is composed of both virtuous and vicious traits. But this is not 
the problem. His interest instead is in "whether a particular benevolent act can also be 
unjust, or a courageous act also cruel?,,85 Benn says, 
if we also allow that the more heedless of human suffering the terrorist is, 
the more courage he shows, we are implying that if he becomes more 
compassionate he also becomes less courageous. 86 
This opens the way to call any decrease in his courage, a deficiency. Likewise, accept that 
it is better to be 'perfectly benevolent' than just 'moderately' so. Further, accept that one 
who steals in order to help the poor displays a greater degree of benevolence than 
someone who refrains from stealing. A troubling implication arises because it appears that 
one ought to admire those who steal or kill. 
One response comes from Hursthouse. She believes that a virtue such as courage in a 
desperado would enable them to carry out "far more wicked things than they would be 
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able to do if they were timid".87 She claims that one arrives at a bizarre thought: that the 
virtues, which help a person to be morally good, to fare well in life, might end up in fact 
making a person do morally bad deeds. However, Hursthouse thinks that the desperado is 
daring rather than courageous. I concur with Hursthouse. In carrying out bad deeds, for 
example stealing, a person acts from the vices of dishonesty and injustice. The motive of 
the Robin Hood thief is clearly not one of the virtues; for in stealing he is not acting well 
and those whom he steals from will not fare well neither. I would suggest that this thief 
was acting like a utilitarian, because he was redistributing wealth to maximize the good. 
Furthermore, the degree of benevolence one develops is not directly proportional to the 
amount of happiness one creates. For instance, one could be a really kind altruistic 
person, but fail to create substantial happiness for others; indeed 'happiness' is such an 
arbitrary subjective term that it becomes almost meaningless. One could be a cruel person 
and yet make others happy by harming their enemies. Assuming, as Benn does, that it is 
generally better to create more, rather than less, happiness, this does not licence others to 
steal or cheat. From a deontological perspective, it is morally wrong to steal because it 
breaks the moral rule 'one must not steal'. But, from the virtue ethics perspective, stealing 
is an example of acting badly (not well) because it is unjust. Thieves can live good lives, 
but not morally good lives. Others, those who have had their possessions stolen, for 
example, clearly fail to fare well. 
Are the ends of human activity good or evil? Can someone, for instance, a Nazi soldier 
show courage when he is fighting for an evil cause? Does courage operate in this case as 
a virtue? Geach responds to this in no uncertain terms, 
Courage in an unworthy cause is no virtue; still less is courage in an evil 
cause. Indeed, I prefer not to call this nonvirtuous facing of danger 'courage,.88 
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This makes sense, since one does not wish to praise the Nazi soldier for what he does. 
However, he risks his life and acts in the face of danger. There is undoubtedly something 
about his actions that suggests it would be wrong not to refer to him as courageous. 
Rachels attempts to overcome this problem by saying, 
perhaps we should just say that he displays two qualities of character, one 
that is admirable (steadfastness in facing danger) and one that is not (a 
willingness to defend a particular regime). He is courageous all right, and 
courage is an admirable thing; but because his courage is displayed in an 
evil cause, his behaviour is on the whole wicked. 89 
However, this assumes that the soldier knew at the time that his cause was evil. But in 
truth how much freedom did a typical Nazi soldier have to refuse to fight? It was expected 
and obligatory for him to defend his country. Most probably, he would have been shot if he 
had refused to fight, so it might be said that he had no real choice. Irrespective of this, the 
above quote makes an arbitrary decision about what counts as 'courageous' behaviour. 
This appears to turn on the perceived goodness or badness of the activity in question. 
There is a sense in which courage for any soldier is clearly a virtue, needed in order to 
survive, protect comrades, and fare well. Furthermore, Rachels' response is unconvincing 
because in my view the notion of 'on the whole behaviour' and the exercise of specific 
virtues, tends to make an unhappy combination. 
Foot provides a more convincing response to the above problem. She thinks it is wrong (or 
at least something about this is wrong) when people who have demonstrated apparent 
virtue, but for a bad or evil end, are praised; an example being the 'courageous' terrorist 
considered earlier. It remains difficult, however, to say categorically that the terrorist was 
not in some way courageous - remember he could be killed or seriously injured in the 
course of planting the bombs. It does appear that the courage shown when trying to 
achieve good or noble ends is identical to the courage shown, like the terrorist, when 
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trying to achieve bad or evil ends. The fact that one person decides to achieve bad or evil 
ends might itself be a sign of a flawed character, a deficiency in virtue. But the deficient 
virtue is clearly not courage. If one denies that the terrorist shows courage, then one is 
defining courage arbitrarily to suit one's values. So if one approves of the ends, one might 
use the word 'courage', whereas when one disapproves of the ends in question another 
more derogatory term might be used. This usage is termed 'persuasive definition'. A good 
example, according to Benn, is the difference shown in calling a terrorist either a 'freedom 
fighter' or simply a 'terrorist'. Even though the nature of what they do is the same, those 
who approve of the terrorist's ends will call him a freedom fighter, while those who 
disapprove will call him a terrorist. Foot claims that when courage and benevolence are 
both displayed in the pursuit of bad or evil ends, "they do not operate as virtues in these 
cases". 90 
The above point requires further explanation. The foundation for this thought is the idea 
that "things do not always operate according to their natures". 91 Courage, by its nature, is 
a virtue. In the example of the terrorist however, it does not operate according to its 
nature. Other examples given by Benn are prudence and industriousness92. Both these 
operate by their nature as virtues. However prudence does not operate as a virtue "in 
people who are so obsessed with danger that they never take even rational risks,,93, while 
industriousness does not function as a virtue "in people who neglect their families to 
advance their careers". 94 Despite the earlier claim that one needs the virtues, for example, 
honesty, courage, and compassion to fare well and lead morally good lives, it seems that 
there will be times when these traits do not function as virtues, because they do not 
operate according to their natures. 
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Virtue ethics: supplementary or strong? 
Rachels concludes that a supplementary form of virtue ethics should be adopted because 
he finds a strong version unconvincing95 . However, as noted he has not been able to 
respond to Hursthouse's v-rules thesis. He is uncertain whether a combined theory could 
do justice to both the notions of 'right action' and 'virtuous character'. Will one notion be 
sacrificed to some degree by over emphasising the other? He thinks this is highly 
possible. Rachels suggests that the principle value, according to such an overall theory, 
might be human welfare. It follows then that a major objective will be for all humans to be 
able to lead satisfying and happy lives. Furthermore, he thinks one needs to consider, 
What sorts of actions and social policies would contribute to this goal and 
the question of which qualities of character are needed to create and 
sustain individual lives. 96 
According to this combined theory, the nature of virtue "could profitably be conducted from 
within the perspective that such a larger view would provide" 97. In Rachels' view, it would 
be acceptable for each part of the theory - 'right action' and 'virtuous character' - to be 
adapted and modified a bit here and there; he believes moral truth will be the benefactor. 
It is doubtful, however, whether a hybrid version, like the one proposed by Rachels, could 
work, because the starting points for deontic (duty-based) and aretaic (virtue and vice-
based) theories are fundamentally different. Modifying or adjusting one notion, whether 
'right action' or 'virtuous character' would mark the end of a coherent moral theory (this is 
a major reason why there are few hybrid theories). 98 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have examined the origins and development of virtue ethics. 
Supplementary versions of virtue ethics were identified and discussed. Merits of virtue 
ethics include its rich portrayal of persons' moral character. Strong versions of virtue ethics 
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have been developed including Aristotle's. One of the common charges against virtue 
ethics is that it fails to come up with rules and thus cannot provide adequate action 
guidance. However, in Chapter 3 I noted how people who think deeply and ask questions 
about the virtues can derive a lot of action guidance, especially from the vice terms. 
Furthermore, in this Chapter, Hursthouse has responded to the common charge that virtue 
ethics cannot provide adequate action guidance for persons by developing her v-rules 
thesis. I believe that these two claims - first, one's ability to gain action-guidance from the 
virtues and vices and second, the action-guidance derivable from the v-rules - means that 
a strong virtue ethics is a plausible option. 
181 
REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES 
1 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.4. 
2 G., E., M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" in Virtue Ethics eds. R. Crisp & M. 
Siote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
3 Kantians are inspired by Kant, though some diverge from him more than others. 
Contemporary Kantians include: M. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1995); and C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of 
Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
4 See for example, J. S Mill, "Utilitarianism" in Utilitarianism ed. R. Crisp (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
5 J. Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1999), p. 
177. 
6 For example, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. 
O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); M. Siote, From Morality to Virtue 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); M. Siote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics" in Virtue 
Ethics eds. R. Crisp & M. Siote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and R. 
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
7 G. Pence, "Virtue Theory" in A Companion to Ethics ed. P. Singer (Oxford: Blackwells, 
1991), pp. 249-258. 
8 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, pp. 189-193. 
9 Pellegrino and Thomasma's version of virtue ethics applied to medicine is best explored 
and viewed in the light of two previous texts that together develop a SUbstantial philosophy 
of medicine. See: E., D. Pellegrino & D., C. Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical 
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) and Pellegrino & Thomasma, For the 
Patient's Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
10 J., K. Brody, "Virtue ethics, caring and nursing", Scholarly Inquiry of Nursing Practice, 
1988,2 (2), pp. 87-96. 
11 K. Lutzen & A. Barbosa da Silva, "The role of virtue ethics in psychiatric nursing", 
NurSing Ethics, 1996, 3 (3), pp. 202-211. 
12 A. McKie & J. Swinton, "Community, culture and character: the place of the virtues in 
psychiatric nursing practice", Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 2000, 7, 
pp. 35-42. 
13 Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva, "The role of virtue ethics in psychiatric nursing", p. 202. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva, "The role of virtue ethics in psychiatric nursing", p. 203. 
182 
16 Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva, "The role of virtue ethics in psychiatric nursing", p. 210. 
17 M., S. Kashka & P., K. Keyser, "Ethical issues in informed consent and ECT" 
Perspectives in Psychiatric Care, 1995, 31, pp. 15-21, p. 18. ' 
18 Pence, "Virtue Theory", p. 253. 
19 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.189. 
20 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Bk. 1, 1, p.1. 
21 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
22 P. Benn, Ethics (London: UCL Press, 1998). 
23 Benn, Ethics, pp.161-162. 
24 Ibid. 
25 For example, D., B. Rasmussen, "Human Flourishing and the Appeal to Human Nature" 
in Human Flourishing eds. E., F. Paul, F., D. Miller Jr., & J. Paul (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 1-43. 
26 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.1, 7, p.14. 
27 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, 7, p.13. 
28 When Aristotle uses 'best' to describe a life, I think he refers to the sort of life that 
displays many moral and intellectual excellences, that is, many moral and non-moral 
virtues. Since for him, virtue is determined by a rational principle, which men with practical 
wisdom (one of the intellectual virtues) can discern, it makes sense that a life of theoretical 
contemplation, that is, the life of a philosopher should serve for him as the best life to lead. 
However, while it is commonly stated that achieving one's potential is a good and of value 
irrespective of the goals or standards attained, I believe that Aristotle on this conception 
would not offer praise to someone who, for example, achieved their highest mark of 42% 
in a maths paper, this for Aristotle, is not excellence of reasoning. 
29 Skinner (the behaviourist) used exactly the same kind of definition of 'goodness" in his 
reinforcement theory"; see B., F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour (New York: 
Macmillan, 1953). 
30 Benn, Ethics, p. 180. 
31 See P., M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1990), esp. chapter 2. 
32 Benn, Ethics, p.181. 
183 
33 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Bk. II, 6, p.37. 
34 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Bk. II, 6, p.38. 
35 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. o. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Bk. II, 6, p.45. 
36 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. o. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Bk. II, 6, p.46. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Benn, Ethics, p.180. 
39 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, revised J. L. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Bk. 11,5, p.35. 
40 Benn, Ethics, p.167. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Benn, Ethics, p.163. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 This is surely disputable, depending upon one's conception of sport, since many 
mammals, such as the big cats, spend much of their day playing with each other. 
46 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 1999. 
47 See for example, Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 1999. 
48 See, for example, his treatment of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in, A. Mcintyre, After 
Virtue - a study in moral theory, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985). 
49 Benn, Ethics, p.167. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Benn, Ethics, p.183. 
52 However, one should not think that Kant ignored the role of the virtues in morality. He 
wrote at length about virtue, believing that agents have a strict, perfect duty to cultivate the 
virtues in themselves· however the reason or motive for so doing was not to help agents to 
fare well in life, but r~ther to abide by the categorical imperative. Recently, some K~ntian 
moral philosophers and virtue ethicists have refocused on Kant's thoughts on the virtues, 
and much scholarly activity is now directed in this area. 
184 
53 Benn, Ethics, p.173. 
54 Siote, From Morality to Virtue, 1992. 
55 I refe~ the reader to: M. Siote, Morals with Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) his latest full text treatment on the subject; and E. Garrard, "Slote on Virtue" 
Analysis, 2000, 60 (3), pp. 280-284. 
56 Benn, Ethics, p.170. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Benn, Ethics, pp.173-174. 
60 Benn, Ethics, p.174. 
61 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 36. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 37. 
64 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 38. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 39. 
68 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p.3. 
69 S. Parsons, P., J. Barker, & A., E. Armstrong, "The teaching of health care ethics to 
students of nursing in the UK: a pilot study", Nursing Ethics, 2001, 8 (1), pp. 45-56. 
70 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 1999. 
71 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.190. 
72 For example, W., D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). 
73 Benn, Ethics, p.170. 
74 Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" eds. R. Crisp & Siote in Virtue Ethics. 
75 Benn, Ethics, p.169. 
76 Ibid. 
185 
77 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, pp.189-191. 
78 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.191. 
79 M. Lessnoff, Social Contract (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988); D. Gauthier, Morals by 
Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
80 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.192. 
81 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, pp.189-191. 
82 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.191. 
83 See, for example, Ross, The Right and the Good, 1930. 
84 B. Gert, C., M. Culver & K., D. Clouser, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). 
85 Benn, Ethics, p. 170. 
86 Benn, Ethics, p.17S. 
87 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 13. 
88 P. Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 29-30. 
89 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.180. 
90 Benn, Ethics, p.177. 
91 Ibid. 
92 While this might sound promising, does it apply to all the virtues? Does it, for instance, 
apply to justice? It is difficult to imagine justice not operating as a virtue. 
93 Benn, Ethics, p. 177. 
94 Benn, Ethics, p. 177. 
95 According to 8enn, virtue ethics cannot be free-standing. Instead it requires help from 
act-theories. He thinks this partly because impartial moral concerns are more morally 
important, and will override, the importance for one of the good life. So, if accepted, this 
means that (Aristotelian) virtue ethics cannot adequately capture the objectives of these 
concerns. 
96 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p.193. 
97 Ibid. 
186 
98 Hare's indirect two level account of utilitarianism (examined in Chapter 3) counts as a 
hybrid moral theory. But despite the fact that the second level contains deontological rules, 
Hare is certainly not viewed as a deontologist. 
187 
CHAPTER 6 - A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF OBLIGATION-BASED 
MORAL THEORIES IN NURSING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Having established the value of the virtues and the plausibility of a strong version of 
virtue ethics, I return to the topic of obligation-based moral theories, but I now 
contextualize these within nursing practice. 
This Chapter provides a critical account of obligation-based moral theories in the context 
of contemporary nursing practice. First, I consider reasons why obligation-based 
theories are popular in nursing. I examine the deontic approach in the literature and 
briefly describe 3 moral decision making tools. Then I describe and examine the 'Four 
Principles' approach to bioethics. I close by examining several flaws of obligation-based 
moral theories as utilized in nursing practice. I conclude that these theories are 
inadequate for use as a foundational nursing ethics. 
Why are obligation-based moral theories popular in nursing? 
Despite the widespread view that patient-centred and holistic nursing care ought to be 
key objectives of contemporary nursing practice, a biomedical focus on practice remains 
predominant. 1 The epistemological paradigm that grounds medical practice is 
empiricism. Consequently, there is a focus on the disease process, making diagnoses, 
identifying clinical needs, planning and delivering effective treatments, with an increasing 
emphasis nowadays on evidence-based practice 2 and clinical outcomes. 
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I discussed the popularity and dominance of the traditional obligation-based moral 
theories in general ethics in Chapter 4. In medical practice, the paradigm of empiricism 
and the primary focus on outcomes sheds some light as to why obligation-based moral 
theories have become so popular, if not dominant, in health care ethics. It makes sense 
to suppose that popular theories in general ethics will then be utilized in professional 
ethics. 
I suggest that the moral theories adopted by doctors have influenced and motivated the 
moral theories chosen and utilized by nurses. Doctors are charged with the medical 
responsibility of patient care. Although the role of a nurse (Chapter 2) is different to the 
role of a physician, there is reason to believe that medics greatly influence nursing 
practice and the work that nurses do. For example, Walsh and Ford3 state that the 
medical profession continues to dictate the breadth and depth of information given to 
patients and relatives. I doubt that this is the only example of practice in which medics 
exert influence, power and control over nurses. It is true to say that obligation-based 
ethics provides a framework of moral principles that can be used for reflection and 
application in particular situations. Such frameworks can, especially for novice nurses, 
serve as a useful moral checklist to facilitate moral reasoning including the aims of 
minimizing harms and making the right moral decisions. Both in terms of clinical nursing 
ethics4 and the teaching of ethics5 to qualified and student nurses, obligation-based 
moral theories are popular. 
Hospitals are large, complex institutions. To enable such institutions to operate 
effiCiently, the norm is to develop rules that persons must abide by. Rules can be 
utilitarian in content and scope. The aim is to maximize the effectiveness of the 
institution. Such familiarity of and reliance upon rules might help to explain why medics 
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and nurses favour obligation-based ethics over other alternative moral theories. 
Adopting a philosophical perspective that says 'I must follow the rules laid out by the 
hospital' can make it easier, at least for some people, to abide by moral rules because 
the type of thinking utilized is in essence the same. Walsh and Ford6 claim that nursing 
remains task orientated and that it is organized as a series of rituals and traditions. For 
example, carrying out clinical observations such as blood pressure and temperature 
every 4 hours and delivering so-called 'pressure area' care every 2 hours. It is plausible 
to suggest that nurses still perceive their work as a series of tasks (or jobs) that they 
need to 'get done' rather than spending quality time with patients.7 The aims and 
objectives of obligation-based moral theories - for example, an extreme focus on actions 
and their consequences, resolving moral problems and making 'right' moral decisions -
can be seen to cohere tightly with the emphasis in clinical practice on 'getting things 
done', making correct diagnoses, identifying outcomes of treatment and resolving clinical 
problems. In summary, there are reasons why nurses (and doctors) have adopted and 
continue to utilize obligation-based moral theories in clinical practice. 
Examples of the deontic approach in the nursing literature 
I shall now examine in brief some examples from the recent nursing literature in which 
the authors adopt an obligation-based approach. These articles invoke moral 
obligations, rules and principles to resolve moral dilemmas in nursing. The authors 
assume, or write as if they assume, that all dilemmas are resolvable. The authors 
appear to claim that there is one right or wrong answer to the dilemma. Sometimes the 
claim is that of the two harms present, one is less harmful or a bit more beneficial to the 
patient than the other. The possibility that a dilemma could be irresolvable is not 
mentioned; at least the authors do not make this possibility explicit to the reader. 
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This section aims to present an accurate representation of the obligation-based 
approach to morality frequently debated in the nursing literature, taught in ethics 
modules for nurses, and, as noted above, utilized in moral decision making in nursing 
practice. Fourteen articles were identified using the Cumulative Index of Nursing and 
Allied Health Literature (CIHAHL) in 1999. The keywords were 'ethics', 'mental health 
nursing' and 'psychiatric nursing'. I use five of these articles to illustrate the obligation-
based approach to ethics. However, four points need noting. First, the remaining 9 
articles are synonymous in their approach. 8 Second, the authors fail to regard the virtues 
as important to the ends of being a morally good nurse. 9 Third, subsequent literature 
searches conducted in 2002 and 2003 yielded similar findings. And fourth, obligation-
based moral theories are as popular and widespread in adult nursing literature as in 
mental health nursing literature; several examples of the former are cited throughout this 
thesis. 
1. Kashka and Keyser10 , by means of a principle-based approach and case study, 
examine ethical concerns in relation to informed consent and ECT. An ethical 
quandary is defined in terms of conflicts or tensions between two ethical principles, 
namely, beneficence and autonomy. They conclude that an increased emphasis 
upon ethical principles is needed from nurses. The authors believe 
nurses must be grounded in the ethical concepts 
discussed, [and that] knowledge of the specific situation 
is also necessary to the decision-making process. 11 
2. In an introductory chapter in a text on ethics in mental health practice, Kentsmith, 
Miya and Salladay12 claim that knowledge of philosophy, ethics and 'ethical thinking' 
will help nurses make 'better', 'clearer' and more justifiable day to day decisions. 
'Ethics' is defined as 
a branch of philosophy that examines right and wrong, what 
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should or should not be done, and the moral justifications 
for action. 13 
The authors subdivide 'ethics' into axiology - "the study of values" - and morality, which 
is further broken down into teleological, deontological, absolutist and relativistic ethical 
theories. No mention is made of the virtues or character traits needed to be a morally 
good nurse, a notable omission given the remark about axiology and discussion of the 
nurse-patient relationship early in the chapter. Kentsmith et a/ claim that nursing is 
regulated by ethical codes of conduct. They state that ten ethical principles are 
implicated in ethical practice, including "a responsibility to the client", "an obligation to act 
ethically" and "a respect for the law" .14 
3. Hopton 15 considers ethical arguments for and against controlling and restraining 
(C&R) individuals in severe mental distress. He sketches utilitarian and deontological 
perspectives in relation to the ethical justification of C&R. With the first, the 
conclusion is 
efficient restraint [the force used must be less injurious 
than the initial aggressive act] will minimise the 
harm done to both the restrained person and anyone 
else. 16 
Hopton holds that deontological arguments are of limited use insofar as there is minimal 
"agreement concerning how far a mentally distressed person is accountable for his/her 
actions".17 However, I suggest that the notion of responsibility and accountability for 
one's actions, while noted as an important issue in nursing, equally applies from a 
consequentialist perspective. Hopton continues to claim that an obligation exists, 
irrespective of ethical perspective, for nurses to protect innocent others from the violent 
acts of the mentally distressed. However, Hopton provides no qualification in relation to 
his discussion of utilitarianism. I do not know whether he means act, rule, or indirect 
utilitarianism or indeed whether he thinks this distinction is unimportant. This lack of 
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detail in moral theories and moral arguments is not uncommon in the nursing literature. 
In my view, crude forms of the theory in question are sometimes presented. Or as 
Hursthouse18 claims mere 'slogans' are used to describe these theories. Therefore, in 
part as a result of the literature being rather unsophisticated, nurses may fail to develop 
a substantial understanding of moral theories, including their problems and limitations. 
Also lacking in this article is any conception of 'harm' so central to Hopton's discussion. 
Do we wish to say that emotional suffering is a component of 'harm' in general? Or 
instead, is one solely referring to physical injury? I think Hopton would concur with the 
first question above, but perhaps he should have made this explicit. Similar points can 
be made regarding his discussion of 'deontological arguments'. Surprisingly, there is no 
explicit mention of one's 'right to psychiatric treatment' and more importantly 'rights to 
refuse treatment'. And although Hopton makes reference to one's need to protect others, 
no explicit mention is made to duties or obligations to protect innocent others. 
4. Chodoff19 distinguishes between, and explicates, the medical model and civil liberties 
approach to the ethical issue of involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill. He 
claims that these two different approaches are grounded by, respectively, 
consequentialist and deontological ethics. Issues such as medical necessity versus 
the notion of 'dangerousness', the role given to rights versus obligations and the 
justification of medical paternalism depend upon value judgements arising from 
these contrasting moral perspectives. Because of these issues and since no one has 
yet developed a sound 'method' for deriving 'ought' propositions from 'is', there is no 
certainty about the good and right thing to do in this matter. These claims - which I 
concur with - represent some of the serious flaws in obligation-based moral theories 
(Chapter 4 and also later in this Chapter). These criticisms provide good reasons 
why alternative ,moral theories, such as virtue ethics, should be examined. 
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First, Chodoff discusses utilitarian versus deontological approaches to ethics. He defines 
utilitarians as those who 
believe that the morality of an act is determined by the extent 
to which that act serves the good of individuals or the society.20 
Whereas, deontologists, 
maintain that whether an act has good consequences should 
not be the only factor determining its rightness or wrongness. 21 
Chodoff claims that the sole criterion for right action, besides the 'good', may lie in other 
intuited principles, such as, fairness, liberty and justice. The two moral approaches of 
utilitarianism and deontology are then applied to the ethics of involuntary hospitalization. 
Chodoff writes, 
the doctors who embrace the medical model are following 
a utilitarian ideal. For them the removal or diminishing of 
the barriers that mental illness imposes on the healthy 
functioning of their patients is the right thing to do. It 
justifies temporary deprivation of physicalliberty.22 
However, the civil libertarians see things differently; as Chodoff claims "they are more 
concerned with the coercive aspects and with the loss of liberty". For these thinkers, 
liberty as a value "trumps" 23 other values. Chodoff believes that psychiatrists should 
neither take too lightly the decision to involuntarily commit, nor place extreme emphasis 
upon the notion of physical liberty. With the latter, there will be some people with mental 
illness who require treatment, but presumably would not receive this. 
Chodoff provides an adequate definition of utilitarianism, although it is uncertain whether 
this is meant to encapsulate the doctrines of classical, act or rule utilitarianism. No 
mention is given to direct or indirect forms of utilitarianism, neither is there further 
discussion of Chodoff's interpretation of the 'good'. It is also a bit amiss that he fails to 
discuss the notion of a person's 'interests', as this is fundamental to utilitarianism. For 
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example, he does not mention that strict classical utilitarians hold that everyone's 
interests ought to be treat equally and impartially, that is, no special relationships, such 
as, doctor and patient are acknowledged. 
Chodoff briefly mentions 'obligations' in the article. However, he fails to discuss this or 
the 'duty of care' further. Despite these minor criticisms, his article can be praised 
because it does not make recourse to professional and legal duties. This has the 
advantage of facilitating a moral discussion. There are occasions when so-called 'moral' 
or 'ethical' debates end up as discussions about the law, legal rights and legal 
obligations. This is true across all nursing specialties, but it is particularly the case in 
mental health nursing where the two disciplines of ethics and law tend to merge together 
and the boundaries become blurred. 
5. Brown focuses upon and discusses "a number of key ethical issues with regard to 
drug treatment". 24 First, he considers the risks and benefits of drug treatment; this 
includes a brief section on the boundaries of mental illness. Second, the doctor-
patient relationship and the notion of informed consent in particular comes under 
scrutiny. Next, the patient's moral and legal rights with regard to drug treatment are 
discussed. Finally, Brown briefly examines the issues of drug costs and social 
justice. Brown does not propose a specific moral argument. Instead, he reviews 
ideas mainly concerning patient's rights, although he fails to philosophize on these. 
Examples of moral decision making tools or models 
One of the features of the obligation-based approach in general and nursing ethics is the 
aim to resolve moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas and moral problems are complex and 
multifaceted and by definition extremely difficult to resolve satisfactorily.25 Irrespective of 
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one's clinical and moral experience and knowledge base, dilemmas can be fraught with 
conflicts between obligations, values, desires and wishes. In an attempt to facilitate the 
resolution of moral dilemmas and problems, there are several examples of decision-
making tools and models in the literature. I briefly describe three of these below. This 
helps to illustrate some of the assumptions made by the obligation-based approach to 
morality. 
Kentsmith et al claim that using "systematic problem solving tools" can enhance "the 
analysis of ethical dilemmas".26 They give one such example which consists of the 
following 6 'stages': "determine the facts"; "analyse the ethical aspects"; "outline the 
options"; "make a decision"; "take action"; and "evaluate the decision". For novice nurses 
and/or nurses who struggle with understanding the discipline of ethics, such 'tools' and 
'stages' can clarify some of the moral issues and facilitate moral decision-making. 
However, these are conceptual tools that require application. It needs to be emphasized 
that these stages require nurses to ask relevant questions and think carefully about a 
wide range of nursing actions. 
Ericksen's theoretical framework model for dealing with the steps of ethical reasoning 
consists of 5 areas of knowledge: knowledge of oneself and one's values; b) knowledge 
of the situation; c) knowledge of the profession's values and standards; d) knowledge of 
the law; and e) knowledge of philosophy. It is claimed that by adopting this framework, it 
is possible "to make a decision that will be in the best interests of both nurse and client". 
27 The utility of this framework will be determined by the nurse's breadth and depth of 
knowledge across these 5 distinct areas. Plus, there is the difficult philosophical debate 
regarding the meaning and nature of 'best interests' to consider. 28 
196 
Dissatisfied with current measuring instruments29 , McAlpine, Kristjanson and Poroch30 
developed the Ethical Reasoning Tool (ERT) to measure the ethical reasoning ability of 
nurses. This tool measures nurses' thinking about practice dilemmas that are 
unprompted, instead of asking nurses to rank existing lists of issues. The authors claim 
that the ERT could be used to evaluate the teaching of ethics modules and to detect 
deficient areas of students' ethical reasoning. Possessing an empirical understanding of -
moral reasoning can be seen in a positive light, especially if it led to beneficial changes 
in the teaching of ethics to nurses. However, it is not clear what the ERT actually 
measures; it seems to me that it might measure a person's understanding of the 
question or one's ability to be articulate. 
The above 3 decision-making tools fail to examine a nurse's moral character, instead it 
is true to say that the focus is placed on the actions, but not the person who carries out 
the action. 
The four principles approach to biomedical ethics 
Beauchamp and Childress31 first proposed this approach to biomedical ethics 
(henceforth called 'principlism') in 1979. It consists of four moral principles: (a) 
beneficence, (b) non-maleficence, (c) justice, and (d) respect for autonomy. 
Beauchamp and Childress' influential text has developed through 5 editions and is 
currently one of, if not the, most popular texts used in the teaching of ethics to health 
care professionals. In the UK, thinkers, such as, Edwards32 and Gillon33 have 
advocated principlism. 
Principlism can be viewed as four second order moral obligations, derived from the first 
order moral theory of deontology. It is however difficult to be more specific because the 
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underlying philosophical foundation appears to derive from what Hursthouse calls 
'simple' deontology.34 The claim that principlism is a coherent moral theory has itself 
been attacked35; while Beauchamp appears to be a deontologist, Childress seems to 
be a utilitarian. However, there is no doubt that principlism represents an obligation-
based moral approach to resolving moral dilemmas in contemporary health care. 
Because principlism is popular in the literature and in both clinical ethics and nurse 
education, I shall discuss each principle in more detail in the following sequence: non-
maleficence, justice, autonomy, and beneficence. 
The principle of non-maleficence 
The principle of non-maleficence concerns balancing benefits against harms and 
generally minimizing the latter. There are many examples of this reasoning in nursing. 
For example, a nurse may note that a patient who is taking a particular psychotropic 
medication, such as lithium, is in distress because of excessive shakes. The nurse 
consults with the psychiatrist and the dose is lowered. This is more effective in that the 
patient's symptoms remain controlled, but the shakes cease. 
The obligation of non-maleficence 'to do no harm' (or in contemporary health care, 'to 
minimise harms') appears to be morally weightier than the obligation of beneficence. 
Simply put, from the obligation-based perspective it is not always possible to benefit a 
patient, thus it is more important to ensure that no harm or minimal harm is caused. 
However, the obligation-based perspective views 'benefits' in a narrow sense. As noted 
earlier, from the virtue-based perspective, the range of actions, thoughts and feelings 
that demonstrate benevolence, kindness and compassion is extremely wide. From the 
perspective of obligation-based ethics, the phrase 'no benefit' can mean something like 
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'I'm sorry, I cannot help you, there is no cure, there's nothing I can do for your cancer'. 
However, it is morally appropriate to consider actions such as listening to the patient's 
lived experience of illness and helping to alleviate physical discomfort perhaps by 
providing adequate analgesia or repositioning a limb as examples of actions and 
behaviours that in a number of ways help the patient. Nurses and health care 
professionals might interpret the obligation of non-maleficence in terms of just physical 
harms. Psychological or emotional harms can be overlooked. This might contribute to 
paternalistic actions, because the non-medical harms and interests of the patient 
perhaps remain unidentified. 
Clouser and Gert36 view this principle as unproblematic. They are however more 
specific about it, framing it in terms of the moral rules that they espouse, for example, 
"don't kill, don't cause pain and don't disable". 37 The principle of non-maleficence is 
straightforward because, according to Clouser and Gert, it does not blur the distinction 
between moral ideals (what Kantians call, 'imperfect' duties), which concern the 
prevention of harms and moral rules (what Kantians call, 'perfect' duties), which 
concern the avoidance of harms. 
The principle of justice 
This principle is often seen in terms of distributive justice: how scarce medical 
resources ought to be allocated. 38 However, retributive justice addresses such 
important ideas as blame and punishment and is therefore also important in nursing 
ethics. 39 According to the principle of justice, nurses should treat patients fairly and 
impartially irrespective of one's values and beliefs. Patient's individual needs should be 
identified and taken into account in planning and delivering nursing care. Of course, 
there will be times when caring for patients impartially will be difficult (Chapter 7). 
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Beauchamp notes that different theories of justice have been proposed. He writes, 
To cite one example, an egalitarian theory of justice implies that 
if there is a departure from equality in the distribution of health 
care benefits and burdens, such a departure must serve the 
common good and enhance the position of those who are least 
advantaged in society. 40 
Thus, the principle of justice can be understood to mean different things depending 
upon which theory of justice is adopted. Clouser and Gert attack this principle, as it 
"does not even pretend to provide a specific guide to action". 41 This criticism illustrates 
a general concern regarding principlism. This is that principlism does not provide a 
coherent philosophical foundation. Therefore, one is left without the necessary 
theoretical ammunition with which to make justifiable moral decisions. So, for example, 
under the Beauchamp and Childress account of the principle of justice, all that is 
offered are instructions regarding matters of distribution and recommendations towards 
fair allocation of resources. The problem is that one is not given a definite account of 
anyone theory of justice or fairness. This sort of omission is typically used to describe 
principlism as 'empty'. 42 Moreover, according to Clouser and Gert, the principle of 
justice blurs the distinction between moral rules and moral ideals. 
The principle of respect for autonomy 
Beauchamp describes 'respect for autonomy' as "the obligation to respect the decision-
making capacities of autonomous persons". 43 It appears to represent the core of their 
approach to biomedical ethics. Both this principle and the term 'autonomy' are 
widespread in contemporary health care. This now appears to be the predominant 
moral principle.44 The western liberal tradition, which emphasizes human freedom, 
liberty and human rights, is one of the reasons why the principle of respect for 
autonomy is held to be so important.45 Moreover, the Patient's Charter46 and the 
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Human Rights Act47 have increased patients' awareness of moral and legal rights, in 
particular the realization that patients have legal rights to refuse treatments. 
Before I examine what it means to respect someone's autonomy, I need to clarify the 
meaning of autonomy itself. 
48 Autonomy 
In contemporary health care ethics, the moral responsibility of nurses and other health 
care professionals appears to be understood, 
In terms of the rights of person-in-cares, including autonomy-based 
rights to truthfulness, confidentiality, privacy, disclosure 
and consent, as well as welfare rights rooted in claims of 
justice. 49 
A moral requirement of these autonomy-based rights involves allowing others to make 
their own health care decisions, in other words to promote personal rule. For this to be 
free, it needs to be 
Free from both controlling interferences by others and from 
personal limitations that prevent meaningful choice, such 
as inadequate understanding. 50 
However, it is not particularly clear what meaningful choice consists in. For example, 
even if, according to the above definition, it is agreed that an individual is acting or 
choosing autonomously, it is difficult to be accurate about which act or choice represents 
the autonomous nature of the individual. 51 Childress claims that health care 
professionals should pursue autonomy for their patients. He believes that autonomy is 
an end state of health but he also stresses that one should be aware that "individuals , 
may autonomously choose not to pursue [autonomy]".52 For example, someone could 
visit his doctor's practice and ask his doctor to 'sort me out'. This person trusts his doctor 
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and respects his doctor's expertise, therefore he wants the doctor to 'do his job'. This 
patient's choice remains an autonomous one. 
Besides Beauchamp and Childress, how do other health care ethicists conceive 
autonomy? Gillon, a respected ethicist and General Practitioner, defines autonomy as, 
The capacity to think, decide and act on the basis of such 
thought and decision, freely and independently, and 
without, as it says in the British passport, let or hindrance. 53 
In other words, at least one general component of autonomy is the notion of self-
determination. Others share this view. For example, in an article about the ethics of 
informed consent and the use of ECT Kashka and Keyser define autonomy as "one's 
right to self govern, to assert individual choice".54 This capacity - to think, decide, choose 
and act for oneself - is considered a good and is widely encouraged. Similarly, 'thinking 
for oneself' and 'getting by independently' are seen positively and people are usually 
praised for having these qualities. One crucial point made by Gillon is that when one 
performs an act or makes a choice, these should be voluntary and not hindered or 
prevented by unwanted interference. 
Regarding mental illness, there is a view that mental illness per se will adversely affect 
one's mind to the extent that one will be unable to make one's own health care 
decisions. This is a gross oversimplification. Certainly some 'severe' mental illnesses 
such as clinical depression and schizophrenia can affect the faculties of perception and 
reasoning. But even with these illnesses, things are not straightforward and predictable, 
as one cannot generalize individual responses to and experiences of illness. Kashka 
and Keyser hold that psychiatric patients, unlike for instance surgical patients, are "less 
capable of considering complex information". They claim that symptoms of mental 
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disorder affect cognition, mood and judgement. Thus decision-making competence can 
be adversely affected and decisions might be less rational. But again it is not useful to 
generalize. The view that everyone with a mental illness will be less able or unable to 
make one's own health care decisions is a false and inaccurate belief and should be 
contested. The notion of decision-making competence is a graded concept that is object 
and subject specific. Regular evaluation is necessary, because the presence of mental 
illness does not necessarily mean that one will be incompetent to make health care 
choices. 
One of the concerns with the idea of acting autonomously is that people can argue that 
they should be allowed to do what they want. Justification for this claim is derived in 
part from the principle of autonomy and more importantly, the moral requirement that 
one should respect the autonomy of others. However, a crucial question surrounds the 
notion of harming others. For example, is it morally justifiable to limit one's autonomous 
behavior if one harms or threatens to harm others?55 There needs to be some limits 
applied to the range and scope of autonomy. In nursing practice and education, 
because the notion of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy are 
particularly important, it is valuable for nurses to have some understanding of these 
notions, including their meaning, application and problems. However, this does not 
always occur. Inadequate understanding and misguided application of this principle 
can often result. The application of a moral principle to a particular situation, perhaps 
deemed to be a moral problem or dilemma, with the aim of resolving the problem, is a 
feature of the principilist approach. 
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Kant on autonomy 
The focus and emphasis on 'respecting one's autonomy' is commonly attributed to the 
moral philosophy of Kant. He believed that 'Reason' and the ability to make rational 
choices defined a person. 56 For Kant, rational nature existed as an end in itself , 
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of another, always at the same 
time as an end and never simply as a means.57 
However, Kant's conception of autonomy (he called it 'autonomy of the will') contrasts 
with the more liberal interpretation it holds today. Kant rejected the idea of democracy. 
He claimed that many people should not be allowed to vote. He also believed that 
some people could not be trusted to fulfill their moral duties. Kant held that people's 
rational choices should be respected because people have the capacity to choose. 
However, he also believed that one's actual choices should not necessarily be 
respected for what they are. Furthermore, despite being recognized as the founder of 
the notion of autonomy, I believe that Kant would support paternalistic interventions in 
at least some situations in contemporary health care. 58 
The meaning of the notion of autonomy is far from clear, both in theory and in practice. 
It is clearly more complex than often realized. It involves many strands of thought and 
issues pertaining to broad and deep areas of human life, such as, choosing and 
deciding. The term autonomy can be used to refer to different ideas, depending upon 
which issue one wishes to support or reject. Nevertheless, some consensus is reached 
on a 'minimum conception' of autonomy. This might include such issues as allowing 
the competent patient to make one's own health care decisions (even if others deem 
these decisions to be bad). 
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It is one thing to agree on certain issues pertaining to autonomy, but what might it 
mean to respect someone's autonomous decisions? 
Respect for autonomy 
Knowing what is meant by 'respect for autonomy' is different from understanding the 
range of issues and subjects that fall within the gamut of autonomy. Downie ana 
Caiman suggest that 
To respect a person as an autonomous being ...... is to take 
into account in one's conduct that he/she has an autonomous 
nature, that he/she is self-determining and self-governing 
or that he/she has desires, feelings and reason.59 
Precisely how can a nurse show respect for a patient's choice? 
Does a nurse show respect if she asks a patient for his view on having a treatment 
such as chemotherapy or electro convulsive therapy (ECT)? This does not appear 
sufficiently true. Surely showing respect concerns more than just asking someone for 
their view. Is respect shown when a nurse asks a patient for his view and listens 
closely to his reply? Again, one can listen to a friend's views on, for example, the 
quality of situation comedies on UK TV, but if one proceeds to ridicule ones friend's 
views then this behavior might upset him. This sort of behavior does not demonstrate 
respect. 
Does a nurse respect a patient's choice by telling him openly that she disagrees with 
his choice? This is certainly an honest thing to do. Respect could be shown if the nurse 
listens closely to what the patient says and makes it clear to him that she values his 
view. Indeed, a large part of showing respect to a patient involves the delivery of well-
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developed interpersonal skills (Chapter 2). Finally, is respect shown if and only if 
despite disagreeing with a patient's choice, for example, 'no nurse, I don't want another 
EeT treatment', the nurse and multidisciplinary team abide by the patient's decision? 
One can see that showing respect (and disrespect) is a complex notion, which involves 
several related issues. 
The principle of beneficence 
An important reason behind the inclusion of this moral principle lies in the historical 
tradition of health care ethics. For centuries, the accepted goal of medicine was one of 
medical beneficence. It remains widely accepted that nurses, doctors and health care 
professionals should strive to serve this particular end of health care. According to 
Beauchamp, 
The principle of beneficence expresses an obligation to help others 
further their important and legitimate interests by preventing and 
removing harms; no less important is the obligation to weigh and 
balance possible goods against the possible harms of an act. 60 
Kashka and Keyser claim that beneficence should be outcome centred. They believe 
that "doing good for clients, or acting in their best interests is the primary value [in 
nursing]".61 In their view, beneficence "involves the perceived duty to 'do good', to 
contribute to the welfare and happiness of others".62 In relation to beneficence, Frankena 
states 
We ought to do the act or follow the practice or rule that will 
or probably will bring about the greatest possible balance 
of good over evil. 63 
One should note that this is a utilitarian interpretation of beneficence. Other possible 
conceptions include rights-based (libertarian) and of course virtue-based. The latter 
views benevolence (including kindness) as the corresponding virtue to the obligation of 
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beneficence. 
Irrespective of the philosophical grounding, the moral foundation of nursing remains the 
obligation of beneficence. The motivation for nurses to 'do good' for their patients has 
several sources. These include patients and their relatives, the NMC, one's colleagues, 
society and one's own moral code. According to this principle, nurses are obliged to 
benefit patients. Examples of acting from this obligation are too numerous to list, but 
include: administering paracetamol to a patient to alleviate a headache; repositioning 
someone in bed to prevent a pressure sore; administering chemotherapy to kill cancer 
cells; providing ECT to treat depression; feeding a patient; and comforting a patient by 
listening to his narrative account of illness. 
Clouser and Gert make the charge that this principle (along with justice and autonomy) 
makes a serious error. They claim that it blurs the distinction between moral ideals and 
moral rules. Furthermore, they criticise this principle because it fails "to distinguish 
between the preventing (or relieving) of evil and the conferring (or promoting) of goods". 
64 Clouser and Gert argue that to prevent or relieve harm one may be justified in violating 
certain moral rules, whereas' no such justification would be possible when merely 
conferring benefits. 
Some criticisms of principlism have been noted in this section. From a virtue-based 
perspective, one major criticism of principlism is its neglect of the role of the virtues in 
the moral lives of patients and nurses. It was not until the fourth edition of Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics in 1994 that the topic of the virtues and a corresponding virtue ethic 
was thoughtfully, yet still only partially, debated. This position has been greatly 
improved by Beauchamp and Childress in the latest 2001 edition. The latest edition 
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contains a substantial chapter devoted to the role of the virtues in biomedicine and a 
rigorous account of virtue ethics as an alternative moral theory. These changes are 
perhaps in response to the degree of criticism that previous editions of the text 
received for its failure to examine the moral character of nurses and patients and the 
moral theory of virtue ethics. 
Disadvantages of obligation-based moral theories in nursing 
In Chapter 4, I examined the merits and disadvantages of obligation-based moral 
theories in general ethics. Some of these have also been repeated in this Chapter. I 
shall now summarize some of the main disadvantages/weaknesses of this approach to 
morality. 
First, obligation-based moral theories focus on the nature and consequences of actions 
and the idea that nurses are obliged to act in accordance with certain morally weighty 
obligations. I would add that this focus is excessive and as a result other morally 
relevant features such as virtues, motives and intuitions (these are discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 7) are ignored and neglected. For example, the moral character of the 
person (both nurse and patient), how the content of the obligations should be applied 
and the role of emotion in the moral lives of nurses and patients are all glossed over. 
Second, the aims and objectives of obligation-based theories include the resolution of 
moral dilemmas and problems. As highlighted in the literature (earlier in this Chapter and 
in Chapter 4), it appears that an assumption is made that all morally tense situations can 
be 'satisfactorily' resolved. But the issue of how a nurse might feel during and after these 
sorts of complex, morally emotive situations is not debated. 
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Third, obligation-based moral theories, in particular act-utilitarianism, but also forms of 
deontology, neglect the role of judgment in the moral life of nurses. This is in sharp 
contrast to the reality of contemporary nursing practice. 55 Also, there is no discussion or 
examination of the notion of moral wisdom, which again is an important consideration 
regarding how nurses make moral judgments. It seems that the reality of clinical nursing 
is not acknowledged. 
Fourth, as Hare noted in Chapter 4, obligation-based theories, especially deontology, fail 
to provide sufficient action-guidance and direction to resolve the myriad of conflicts 
between duties that arise in nursing practice. Attempts at lexical ordering and assigning 
different moral weights to distinct obligations do not go far enough. Nurses are still left 
without the necessary conceptual tools whereby an attempt can be made to clarify 
complex, multidimensional conflicts. 
Fifth, the notions and concepts used in obligation-based theories are evaluative in 
nature. As a result it is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at shared meanings and 
common understandings. For example, the notions of 'harms', 'benefits', 'interests', and 
'respect' are all far from simple to fully comprehend. Especially for novice nurses, this is 
not an ideal situation. Instead, it is one that leaves some nurses either (a) bewildered at 
the complexity of the discipline of ethics or, in my view, worse, (b) certain that by simply 
following a moral principle or rule, a morally correct and right action is guaranteed. 
Sixth, in general obligation-based moral theories tend not to debate the moral education 
of nurses. In other words, exactly how and why should nurses be taught to be morally 
good nurses? 
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Finally, it seems to me that obligation-based ethics coheres tightly with the biomedical 
model. I have mentioned how the empirical paradigm of medicine emphasizes certain 
features of clinical practice, for example, clinical outcomes and results. One of the 
attractions therefore of obligation-based moral theories, especially consequentialism, is 
that they too focus to a large extent on the consequences and outcomes of actions and 
omissions. However, one of the most pressing aims of contemporary nursing is to move 
away from 'doing tasks' and 'achieving good results' and instead to promote and deliver 
patient-centred and holistic nursing care. If nurses only utilized obligation-based moral 
theories then there is a danger that the content (aims and objectives) of such theories 
will conflict with and oppose these objectives of contemporary nursing. Rather than the 
relational or narrative perspective taken by virtue ethics, I view obligation-based ethics 
as detached theories, because their focus is not on the person (the patient and nurse) 
but the act itself. 
Conclusions 
Adopting an obligation-based moral approach in nursing means that nurses are in effect 
compelled to abide by certain moral obligations, for example, beneficence. This 
approach focuses on the nature and consequences of actions, especially the idea of 
right and wrong actions. The Right - that is, aiming to identify and carry out right actions 
- is seen as prior to the Good - that is, being a good, moral nurse. The emphasis is on 
right (correct) actions instead of good nurses, good moral character and morally good 
actions. Note that a morally right action/decision is not necessarily equivalent to a 
morally good deed (Chapter 4). 
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According to the deontic approach, nurses are obliged to act 'ethically' and 'do the right 
thing'. This means that nurses ought to act in accordance with moral obligations, rules 
and principles. But moral obligations, rules and principles are external to the person; 
therefore these morally relevant features might not seamlessly integrate with the kind of 
person (nurse) one is. In other words, obligations that instruct nurses to act in certain 
ways might not represent the actual natural character of the nurse. So, for example, a 
cruel nurse can still benefit a patient, perhaps by giving him paracetamol for a headache. 
It is quite clear that this act - giving paracetamol - has a beneficent effect. However, it is 
less clear what the nurse's motive is. Perhaps she would respond by saying that she 
acted from the duty of beneficence. But it has been noted (Chapters 3 and 5) that 
something of value is missing from actions that are not performed from the virtues. 
Moreover, if this nurse uses the obligation-based approach to guide her practice, then it 
is possible that she will not reflect about kind and compassionate thoughts and feelings 
and how these sorts of morally relevant features can have a positive impact on the lives 
of patients. Furthermore, from my experience of teaching ethics to both student and 
qualified nurses it appears that there is some blurring between moral and legal 
obligations, responsibilities and rights. Instead of their practice being guided by moral 
virtues or moral principles and/or moral, some nurses are motivated to act from a legal 
duty.66 
Obligation-based ethics hold that nurses who do not abide by external obligations, rules, 
and principles have in some sense failed their 'professional' status as nurses and could 
- depending on the particulars - be held blameworthy for their actions or omissions. 
While this might appear to be reasonable, much will depend on the particulars of each 
situation. For example, it is possible for a nurse, with an unblemished career, whom 
colleagues admire, to end up in dispute with the NMC because she was deemed to 
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contravene or breach a specific professional rule. Perhaps in the circumstances the 
precise rule was one that the nurse felt was harsh and/or inflexible. Perhaps she acted 
well to help the patient. However despite acting from the virtue of, for example, honesty 
or kindness, this nurse ends up being suspended and investigated by the NMC. It was 
thought that her kindness breached a professional rule set forth by the NMC in its Code 
of Conduct. 67 Does one episode of 'rule-breaking' warrant the premature end of this 
nurse's clinically and morally excellent career? 
Codes of conduct are clearly important for the protection of the public from Clinically 
incompetent and morally corrupt or bad nurses. If nurses wish to fare well in a 
professional sense, then they need to abide by, or at least not contravene, the code of 
conduct. Serious misconduct is grounds for losing one's nursing registration. However, 
this does not mean that codes of conduct68 in general and the NMC code in particular 
are without their problems. The NMC code is both deontological and consequentialist in 
content. It focuses on patients' interests, outcomes, and benefits. It fails, however, to 
provide conceptual adequacy. Furthermore, despite the contemporary emphasis on 
effective, high quality care there is a definite failure - a lost opportunity - to identify and 
examine the important role played by moral virtues in the work of nurses and the impact 
of the virtues in providing morally excellent care. 
In Chapter 4, I examined several flaws of obligation-based moral theories in general 
ethics. In this Chapter, some of these flaws have been examined in the context of 
nursing practice. Four notable flaws of these theories are: their neglect of the moral 
character of nurses and patients; their over focus on the nature and consequences of 
actions; their ignorance of the crucial role played by emotion in the moral lives of 
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patients and nurses; and the incompatibility of obligation-based theories with the current 
emphasis upon, and desire to promote, patient centered and holistic nursing care. 
Because of these flaws, obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate 
moral theories for use as a foundational ethics in nursing practice. In the next Chapter, I 
apply the virtue-based approach to morality and a corresponding virtue ethics to nursing 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 7 - VIRTUE-BASED MORAL DECISION MAKING IN 
NURSING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
I shall first summarize several points made in Chapter 2. 
First, illness causes people to feel certain emotions, for example, vulnerability, 
helplessness, and powerlessness. The process of hospitalization can intensify these 
feelings. Second, patients depend on nurses for help to meet their needs and 
interests. The nurse-patient relationship should be a helping and therapeutic 
relationship. Third, nurses work within a multidisciplinary team. Within this team 
approach, nurses' roles are multifaceted and complex. But the development and 
sustenance of a helping relationship is one role of the nurse. Nurses help to ensure 
patients' survive and recover from illness and fare well if possible. Or when nursing 
patients with terminal illness nurses help to ensure patients have good deaths.1 
Fourth, nurses can view the patient's illness in the form of a narrative; such illness 
forms only one aspect of a patient's life. To understand a narrative, a nurse needs to 
listen, ask questions and converse with the patient including the desire to listen to the 
patient's lived experience of illness. This approach contrasts with the medical model. 
Fifth, according to some patients and some patients' relatives, being a 'good' nurse 
and providing 'high' quality care includes such issues and themes as: nurses 
spending time with patients; getting to know patients; and listening to patients to find 
out their problems and needs. The helping nurse-patient relationship is valued as 
greatly as, if not more than, other clinical interventions. According to some nurses, 
empirical evidence suggests that being a 'good' nurse requires both practical abilities 
and moral qualities; the latter include demonstrating honesty, compassion and 
trustworthiness. 
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Obligation-based moral theories have been rejected as incomplete, flawed and 
hence inadequate for use as a nursing ethics. 
In this Chapter I shall focus on one of the merits of the virtues and virtue ethics and 
apply it to nursing. This is the crucial role played by judgment and moral wisdom in 
the moral lives of persons. I shall demonstrate how nurses can use judgment, moral 
wisdom and the virtues to make morally good decisions. Examples utilize the virtue 
of compassion, but I also briefly note the value of courage and respectfulness. The 
exercise of the virtues and the use of judgment and moral wisdom can be referred to 
as the virtue-based approach to moral decision-making. I examine other merits of the 
virtue-based approach to nursing practice. Then, problems of the virtue-based 
approach are discussed, in particular the conflict of the virtues problem highlighted in 
Chapters 3 and 5. I end the Chapter by arguing that the virtue-based approach in 
nursing practice and a strong virtue ethics is a viable and plausible rival to the 
traditional obligation-based moral theories such as utilitarianism and deontology. 
Judgment and moral wisdom 
Judgment 
In Chapter 4, Hursthouse2 examined the 'Strong Codifiability Thesis' (SCT). There 
were two distinct parts to this thesis: (a) moral obligations, rules, and prinCiples 
amount to a decision procedure to determine the right action in any particular case 
and (b) this decision procedure needs to be stated in terms so that a non-virtuous 
person could understand and apply this correctly. Obligation-based moral theories, 
for example, act-utilitarianism, state that it is adequate and sufficient to apply its 
Single rule 'maximize best consequences'. However, as noted in Chapters 4 and 5 
one of the criticisms of obligation-based theories is that their portrayal of human life, 
including the moral life and moral experiences, is much simpler and straightforward 
than it really is. If one looks again at the SCT above, the italicized words are there to 
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emphasise that the focus is on telling people what the 'right action' is and the belief 
that it is always possible to determine what the right action will be irrespective of the 
circumstances. 
I am not going to repeat all of the objections levelled at obligation-based moral 
theories as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. But if I focus for a moment on the phrase 
'morally relevant features' that often appears in the literature, I believe that these 
features include the following concepts or qualities: (1) the consequences or 
outcomes of acts and omissions, (2) duty-based intentions and motives, (3) the 
nature, content, and application of moral obligations, rules, and principles, (4) rights-
based reasons, (5) moral virtues, including virtue-based intentions and motives, (6) 
people's needs, interests and values (7) intuitions and (8) religious beliefs. In nursing 
practice, I believe that such issues as (9) past experiences and (10) clinical 
knowledge are also relevant. 3 One can see that obligation-based theories fail to 
discuss several important and necessary features of the moral life. These theories -
at least in their traditional forms as discussed in Chapter 4 - tend to over focus on just 
(1) - (3). Or, perhaps if the theory is deontological, there might also be room to 
accommodate (4). Obligation-based moral theories seem to claim that other morally 
important features, such as the moral character of persons are unimportant in 
providing an adequate account of morality, moral decision-making and the moral 
lives of persons. 
What is missing from this list? What do persons exercise to make decisions and 
choices? More specifically, what do nurses use? My response is simple: judgment. 
Note what I said above about act-utilitarianism and the application of its single rule. 
Take an example such as the morality of breaking a promise. It might well be that 
act-utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics agree that the right thing to do is that 
that minimizes suffering. But for virtue ethics the process of getting to this resolution 
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is not as simple as it is for the other two theories. Virtue ethics uses judgment to ask 
questions, for instance, was this the sort of promise that should never have been 
made? Should it be broken? What might some of the effects be if the promise is 
broken? One can see that questions can be framed in terms of the promise and the 
consequences of breaking it. Of course, questions should also address the people 
involved, for example, what does the breaking of this promise say about the 
character of the person who breaks it? If it was a silly extravagant promise, what 
does this say about the person who made it? Discussing consequences does not 
provide problems for virtue ethics. The notion of consequences, outcomes or results 
is important in morality. One cannot dispense with talk of consequences and one 
need not, virtue ethicists do not wish to dispense with this notion. But the 
acknowledgement that consequences are important in morality is very different from 
constructing a moral theory based on this notion. Particularly when such a theory 
excludes other equally important moral features. 
I believe that part (a) of Hursthouse's SCT is a fair representation of the aim of 
obligation-based moral theories. Turning to deontology for a moment, common moral 
rules such as 'do not lie' are undoubtedly important in morality and especially in 
educating the young to 'do the right thing'. Virtue ethics talks about the virtue of 
honesty and the vice of dishonesty; its pivotal objective is to educate the young to be 
good persons. It is clear that the moral rule 'do not lie' and the virtue of honesty are 
related. Virtue ethics need not reject deontology's rules. However, Hursthouse4 
believes that instead of merely teaching children about rules and the need to abide 
by such rules, it is crucial that children are taught to love and prize the truth by 
teaching the virtue of honesty. I agree with this claim. It seems to me that there are 
several differences between the two approaches, which have been examined in 
Chapters 3 - 6. Two are worth reiterating here. First, it comes back to moral motives: 
should someone tell the truth in a particular case because he has been taught that he 
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must abide by certain rules such as 'never lie'? Or should one tell the truth because 
one understands that it is good to be honest, that morally speaking, honesty is a 
virtue and people benefit from it and that morally speaking, dishonesty is an example 
of acting badly? Second, it should be clear by now that morality is not just about 
actions and actors. Virtue ethics is unfairly characterized as a theory about Being 
rather than Doing. But more accurately, virtue ethics emphasizes the role of moral 
character, responsiveness towards others and questions about being, for example, 
what kind of person should I be? An account of right action is just one requirement of 
an adequate moral theory. Thoughts and feelings are also morally important 
phenomena; virtue ethics recognizes and makes room for this. 
I believe that consequentialism - act and rule - are incomplete and inadequate moral 
theories. I have given my reasons in Chapters 4 and 6 and one or two have been 
briefly noted above. 
I also have serious objections against deontology. However, from a virtue ethics 
perspective, deontology's rules tend to be reasonable, they make sense and I can 
see how useful they are in moral education. I am therefore reluctant to cast all of 
deontology's rules aside without further reflection. If people are to find deontology's 
moral rules helpful and acceptable, there are at least four points that I would like 
addressed. First, rules should be clearly articulated and framed to allow 'ordinary' 
people (that is, non-philosophers) to understand them. Second, such rules need to 
be specific enough to provide relevant action-guidance, but should also be flexible 
enough to apply them with success in different circumstances. Third, justification for 
the rules should be clearly set forth, explaining the rule'S origin and why it is 
important. Situations involving conflicts between rules are unavoidable. Thus, fourth, 
explicit acknowledgement of such conflicts should be evident and a suitable 'method' 
of resolving such conflicts should be clearly explicated. 
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However, deontological theories remain incomplete and inadequate (discussed in 
Chapter 4). Moral rules, obligations and principles are not sufficient in morality. One 
major point that appears to receive minimal attention by deontologists is that moral 
rules are not somehow magically applied. Instead, it is persons who actually 
determine how the rules are applied. For example, nurses apply the rules, 
obligations, and principles of deontology (and the rule of act-consequentialism). Two 
nurses might apply a specific rule, for instance, 'do not breach confidential 
information' in different ways. One may reveal a piece of information that the other 
nurse would not. Or two nurses acting from the obligation of beneficenceS might act 
in distinct ways. This is partly because the nature of obligation-based concepts is 
evaluative. For instance, taking 2 common moral rules as examples, what might it 
mean to (a) 'promote the patients' interests' and (b) 'do no harm to the patient'? 
Besides the evaluative nature of moral rules, obligations and principles, one further 
necessary consideration regarding the different ways that a nurse can act is the 
moral character of the nurse applying the rule. This is why an examination of the 
virtues and vices and a corresponding virtue ethics is so important. The need for a 
nurse to exercise judgment is important because (as noted above) moral rules are 
evaluative and thus can be conceived and interpreted in different ways. Furthermore, 
the range of morally relevant features is broad. In a particular interaction with a 
patient, a nurse might consider some of the 10 aforementioned features. The NMC 
code of conduct also provides a degree of action-guidance; it is clearly deontological 
in content, although because it talks about 'interests' and 'outcomes' it also espouses 
a crude form of consequentialism. I say 'crude' because there is minimal 
philosophical analysis and argumentation in the code. Judgment is utilized in 
deliberating about all of the possible morally relevant features. For example, one 
needs to ask questions about their importance in a given situation, evaluate their 
meaning and utility and reflect about possible difficulties and limitations with each 
224 
one. 
Moral wisdom 
Virtue ethics states that persons should use the virtues and judgment to make 
morally good decisions. Hursthouse, for one, goes further and recognizes the notion 
known as 'moral wisdom'. For her, this complex phenomenon contains three 
components: moral perception, moral sensitivity and moral imagination. I am 
reluctant to claim that these components are sufficient for moral wisdom, but they are 
clearly involved and worthy of further examination. 
Moral perception 
Several thinkers have drawn attention to the role of emotion in moral thinking, 
including moral perception and sensitivity.6 Oakley, for example, believes that 
emotion is a necessary feature for moral perception and that without emotion this 
faculty is diminished. According to Aristotle (Chapter 5), it was perception, not reason 
that allows persons to see and understand specific facts, circumstances, and details 
of situations, which enables one to exercise a virtue to the right degree. 
Lutzen and Nordin? conducted a grounded theory study involving 14 psychiatric 
nurses, each with a minimum of 5 years post registration experience in mental health 
nursing. The broad aim of the study was to reveal additional dimensions of moral 
decision-making. Interviews were carried out with each nurse, one question was 
asked: 
Can you tell me about a situation in which you had to make a 
decision concerning patient care but were unsure what was 
right or wrong. 8 
The method of constant comparative analysis revealed the core concept: structuring 
moral meaning. There were 3 interrelated properties to the core concept: perceiving, 
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knowing, and judging. According to the authors, 'perceiving' 
in relationship to moral conflicts is the capacity in which the 
nurse discerns meaning in her observations in order to 
comprehend the reality of the situation. 9 
Perception will be understood according to Lutzen and Nordin's conception above. 
Simply put, it is one's capacity to see and provide meaning in observations and 
experiences. The range of observations and experiences that nurses can perceive is 
vast. I see no point in even attempting to provide a list of such observations and 
experiences. Some examples of these are given in this thesis. If I presented such a 
list, it would be a form of crude reductionism: richly textured, complex and 
multilayered personal experiences described in a few short sentences. One of the 
key points is that nursing is saturated with morally and emotionally tense situations. 
So much happens at an intrapersonal and interpersonal level that it is difficult for 
nurses to perceive well. There will be times when certain information is not 
perceived. Several factors can affect one's ability to perceive. One's knowledge base 
is clearly important including clinical knowledge of illness. If a nurse understands 
aspects of an illness such as arthritis, then thoughts will be triggered that will enable 
her to search for specific signs. Or questions will be asked that seek to identify 
certain possible symptoms. For instance, a patient is taking anti-inflammatory 
steroids. The nurse is aware that this type of medication can affect skin quality; 
sometimes the skin can be so fragile that haemorrhage easily occurs. Two other 
factors that might affect the quality of perception are time and the emotional well 
being of the nurse. In brief, if there is insufficient time for a nurse to deliver all 
interventions, then less time might be spent in direct contact with patients; a nurse 
might need to work at a faster pace so that she can manage to meet patients' needs. 
This situation can be intensified if a nurse is emotionally and physically tired. 
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Moral perception concerns one's ability to see, discern meaning and understand the 
wide range of morally relevant features that might be involved in particular 
interactions. Previous experiences need to be examined. This examination includes 
self-reflection and reflection about the patient's illness. This in part promotes one's 
ability to perceive and evaluate situations. From the examination of consequentialist 
and deontological moral theories in Chapters 4 and 6, it seems to me that neither of 
these theories emphasizes moral perception; indeed the phenomenon of moral 
wisdom tends to be ignored by obligation-based theories. Having said this, 
obligation-based moral theories are not precluded from examining moral wisdom 
including moral perception. However, obligation-based theories, particularly act-
consequentialism with its one rule 'maximize best consequences' but also the moral 
rules espoused by deontology holds that judgment is unnecessary to evaluating right 
action. 
Is it possible to shed more light on the meaning of 'judging'? When I judge a song, for 
example, I listen to it. I think about its composition, I consider how the music and 
lyrics work together and I think about the song's emotional effect on me. Am I moved 
by it? What does it make me think of? How do I feel when I listen to it? I might 
compare one song with another written by the same artist and I will think about 
similarities and differences. If a friend asks me for a judgment on a particular song, 
then I will give him my opinion. In this way, my judgment is a conscious decision 
based on a process of reasoning and reflection. When I make judgments, I am 
making choices. If the object of a judgment is aesthetic, for example music, then 
such a judgment is based on certain personal values and beliefs. For instance, while 
listening to a song, I tend to prefer the music to the lyrics, but another person might 
focus on the lyrics. This is an example of a value judgment. There is a sense in which 
all judgments are based on values; thus judgments, conceived as decisions and 
chOices, are subjective and personal. In the Lutzen and Nordin 10 study noted, the 
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process of judging was found to involve 2 aspects: valuing and idealizing. According 
to the authors, these aspects "refer to the dialectical components, personal values 
and professional ideals, in judging alternatives" .11 This claim relates to the conflicts 
experienced by nurses between, on the one hand, the rules laid down by institutions 
such as hospitals and rules proposed in professional codes of conduct and, on the 
other hand, one's own value and belief systems. 
Several empirical studies suggest that nurses use intuition and instincts in making 
moral decisions in nursing practice. For example, Lutzen and Nordin 12 found that 
nurses relied heavily upon intuition and 'feelings' for moral perception rather than 
moral theories such as principle-based ethics. 13 One conclusion drawn from this 
study "indicates that moral decision making within the nurse-patient relationship is 
not always deduced from rational thinking or principles".14 Moreover, rather than 
moral principles or codes of conduct nurses focus on responses towards patients and 
take different contexts into account regarding the nurse-patient relationship in 
defining their own choices and decisions.15 Furthermore, in terms of moral 
perception, nurses see, understand and communicate morally tense situations using 
the language of the virtues and vices, for example, 'fair', 'care', 'well', and 'honest' .16 
Experiential evidence derived from 15 years of clinical experience working in adult 
medical nursing environments and 18 months in nurse education leads me to concur 
with these empirical studies. For some nurses, formal moral theory does not appear 
to be useful. Indeed my personal experience is that even with substantial knowledge 
of moral theory and health care ethics, on reflection my moral decision-making 
appears to have been grounded in intuition and emotions/feelings towards the 
patient. According to some nurses whom I have taught, one of the difficulties in trying 
to understand the meaning of moral obligations such as 'respect for autonomy' and 
'beneficence' and moral concepts such as 'informed consent' is their evaluative 
nature. For some nurses, perhaps this difficulty - comprehending the evaluative 
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nature of moral language - is one reason why they instead rely on personal qualities, 
intuition and instinct in moral decision-making. 
Moral sensitivity 
To be sensitive to a person's needs suggests that one is able to identify one's needs, 
perhaps more easily than another person is able to. The phrase 'morally sensitive' 
connotes a positive and admirable quality; one that in a nurse suggests that care will 
be morally good. In contrast, if I am insensitive to my friend's feelings, then I might 
fail to perceive his feelings and as a result, I might act as though his feelings do not 
matter to me. To be a morally sensitive nurse, it is insufficient to merely perceive 
patients' needs. One's perceptions ought to produce a morally appropriate response; 
perceptions also help to form one's moral motives. According to the virtue-based 
approach to morality, one should respond to another person's needs and interests in 
morally good ways. Nurses should act, think and feel from the virtues, for example, 
honesty, kindness, trustworthiness, respectfulness and courage. Take kindness as 
an example. Acting kindly towards a patient is an example of acting well. But as 
noted earlier the virtues are concerned with thoughts and feelings too, because these 
affect how one responds to someone else. Kind thoughts and feelings are morally 
good. Kind responses towards patients tend to have positive effects on a patient's 
ability to survive illness and then recover and fare well. 
Sensitivity towards patients' needs and interests including reflection about morally 
relevant features can be seen as moral sensitivity. The opposite - lack of moral 
sensitivity or moral insensitivity - can manifest itself in various ways. These include: 
(a) the lack of insight that some nurses demonstrate towards patients, for instance, in 
relation to allowing a patient some privacy; (b) nurses who are unaware of a patient's 
embarrassment when the patient is attempting to micturate while precariously 
balanced on a bedpan; (c) nurses who are apparently oblivious to the need for a 
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patient to have time alone with his or her spouse to discuss private and intimate 
matters; and (d) nurses who stand behind the curtains talking quite loudly, therefore 
allowing other patients to hear private and confidential information. During my career 
as a clinical nurse, I strived hard not to make assumptions about peoples' values and 
beliefs. With regard to nurses, it is a false assumption that they will be morally 
sensitive to a patient's needs including their distress. 
One of the major aims of current nurse education is to develop morally sensitive 
practitioners. 17 Being morally sensitive might include the notion of being empathetic 18 
or having fellow feeling for another person's needs. It seems to me that one 
component of displaying moral sensitivity is one's ability to assimilate information -
clinical and moral - and interpret it to provide help for a patient and respond in 
morally good ways; the latter meaning 'acting from the virtues'. The context and 
particulars of each situation, observation or interaction need to be taken into account 
and given considerable thought. The ability of nurses to think about a wide range of 
notions including patients' characters, needs, interests and desires is important to 
being sensitive. However, it is not enough to merely ask relevant questions in an 
attempt to gather important information (although even this is not straightforward for 
contemporary nurses).19 To develop moral sensitivity, it is crucial that nurses aim to 
make sense of such information, including information revealed in conversations with 
patients. 
I mentioned earlier that several authors have drawn attention to the important role 
played by emotion in moral thinking and the moral life generally. Occasionally 
'emotion' (the plural is not used), for example, sympathy, compassion and empathy 
are held to be synonymous with the virtues. On my conception of a virtue (Chapter 3) 
compassion counts as a virtue, but I reject the claim that sympathy and empathiC 
are virtues. Oaklel1 states that emotions are felt experiences composed of desires 
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and cognitions, which are manifested towards others. Clearly the helping relationship 
between nurse and patient involves emotion. One of the aims of the virtue-based 
approach to morality is to promote the nurse's ability to identify the patient's needs 
and interests and respond to these by acting, thinking and feeling in morally virtuous 
ways. One could replace the language of needs and interests and instead say that 
nurses ought to respond to patients' emotions in morally virtuous ways. This is one 
reason why in Chapter 2, I examined some common emotions experienced by ill 
patients. 
Moral imagination 
Scotf2 has examined the idea of 'imaginative identification'. In her words, 
For example, I may become angry with my mother due to certain 
comments she makes and directs, unfairly in my view, at my 
husband (who is present during the scenario). However I 
suggest that the anger is a direct response to my perception of 
the hurt/embarrassment I might feel if I were my husband 
listening to the comments.23 
The faculty of empathy appears to be related to the activity of imagination. Or at least 
imagination involves being empathetic. Perhaps empathy is a necessary, but not 
sufficient component of imagination. It seems to me that the activity of imagination 
requires one to put oneself in another person's position (as Scott did above). 
Questions might include 'how would I feel if that cruel comment was said about me?' 
and 'how would I feel if the nurse spoke to me in such a callous way?' 
Part of thinking about the virtues and emotions involves the activity of imagination. In 
relation to moral imagination and the moral life, Murdoch24 believes that one sees 
that which confronts one by attending properly, by looking selflessly and completely. 
The objects of such attention should be things of value such as virtuous people and 
the notion of goodness itself. Nurses can think hard about the virtues and vices and 
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imagine how such traits as compassion and patience can lead to morally good 
interpersonal responses. 
The virtue-based helping relationship 
I view the helping relationship between nurse and patient as one grounded in moral 
virtues (I shall refer to this as a virtue-based helping relationship). Nurses will need to 
inculcate several moral virtues if they wish to respond to patients in a wide range of 
morally good ways. Examples of virtues that are important in the development and 
sustenance of morally good helping relationships are compassion (including 
benevolence or kindness), courage, respectfulness, patience, tolerance, justice, 
trustworthiness, and honesty. For example, regarding the first three virtues, I suggest 
that the virtue of compassion is the moral foundation of the helping relationship 
between nurse and patient. Courage is a moral virtue that is needed by a nurse if she 
wishes to be an advocate for a patient. And the virtue of respectfulness is one of the 
virtues necessary to empower patients. 
The above list is not exhaustive; different virtues will be implicated depending on the 
role and aims of the nurse, the patient's needs and interests and the range of morally 
relevant features that are considered important to the interactions. The fact that the 
focus might be on one individual virtue, for example, compassion, does not mean 
that others, for example, justice will be neglected. Indeed, the virtue-based approach 
to morality holds that the virtues per se are crucial to leading morally good lives. It is 
difficult to imagine a nurse developing a virtue-based helping relationship based on 
just one virtue, therefore ignoring other crucial virtues. 
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In the next section, I examine the virtue of compassion. 
The virtue of compassion 
What does compassion consist of? What does it mean to call someone 
compassionate? Suppose a nurse says of a colleague, 'she has loads of 
compassion'. What is it that she is describing? These sorts of questions can be 
applied to all moral virtues. If responses to these kinds of questions are inadequate, 
then critics might object to the virtue-based approach to morality because it is 
insufficient. It seems to me unsatisfactory and indeed futile to say something like, 
'John, a staff nurse, needs to show compassion to his patients' if in reality (a) John 
does not know what it means to show compassion and/or (b) John's colleague, 
Sandra, understands compassion in a different way to him, hence John and Sandra 
respond to patients in distinctly different ways, meaning their actions, thoughts, and 
feelings differ. 
Compassion is a common notion in nursing. I use 'notion' because compassion is 
often referred to as a dimension or faculty needed by nurses. Kinion, Jonke and 
Paradise simply state that nurses "must show compassion,,25; however, this 
command suggests an underlying deontic reason for showing compassion. 
Furthermore, Kinion et a/ provide no conception of compassion; indeed the term 
'compassion' is merely noted once at the end of the article. Therefore, one does not 
get far in understanding this complex virtue. 
In what ways should one with compassion act? According to Blum, compassion 
"requires the disposition to perform beneficent actions".26 The actions of a 
compassionate nurse will benefit the patient. Such beneficent actions can be 
physical/medical or non-physical such as alleviating emotional distress. It is plausible 
to believe, as the nurses in a recent modest Delphi27 study did, that a component of 
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compassion is another virtue, namely benevolence28 or kindness. Kind acts, thoughts 
and feelings are part of being a compassionate nurse. 
What about motives? A compassionate nurse's motive for action is internal. The 
virtue of compassion forms part of one's identity. It is one character trait that shows 
other people the kind of nurse one is. Because of these internal dispositions and 
motives, being compassionate comes naturally to one; having compassionate 
thoughts and feelings and acting from these is a natural response for the 
compassionate nurse. Furthermore, if the nurse understands the virtue-based 
approach to morality, then she will want to help patients survive illness, recover and 
help their lives to fare well, according to the patient's needs and interests. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma claim that besides a moral dimension, compassion 
includes an intellectual dimension, 
it consists in the disposition habitually to comprehend, assess, and 
weigh the uniqueness of this patient's predicament of illness.29 
This point relates well to the discussion in Chapter 2 about patients' lived experience 
of illness and nurses being inclined and motivated towards listening to patients' 
narrative accounts of illness. 
With regard to doctors, Pellegrino and Thomasma believe that objectivity is lost if 
practitioners become too involved or co-suffer too much with patients. An element of 
this is plausible; one can see problems, such as emotional burn out, if all nurses 
were to excessively co-suffer with patients. It is likely that some nurses would 
respond to this by saying something like 'I couldn't carry out my role effectively if I 
became too immersed in a patient's problems'. Moreover, from a virtue-based 
perspective, nurses would not fare well if they co-suffered too much. By extension, if 
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all nurses co-suffered to an excessive degree and were emotionally distressed as a 
result, then this would adversely affect the quality of the helping relationship, which 
could result in patients faring less well than they might otherwise. 
The virtues, especially compassion, but also benevolence and honesty, developed as 
an important pattern of interest throughout the Delphi study30 noted above. This 3 
round questionnaire study aimed to examine how mental health nurses make moral 
decisions. Compassion was given 16 diverse meanings. This is unsurprising given its 
phenomenological complexity; certainty about issues and concepts such as 
compassion would trouble and concern me. This is because nurses are individual 
moral persons, with particular moral views and different experiences. A sense of 
ambiguity, uncertainty and divergence is therefore to be expected. In the study, 
compassion was understood to include components of benevolence, kindness, 
caring and empathy. 
Some of the 16 meanings of compassion were: "show understanding about how they 
[the patients] are feeling/behaving", "compassion is caring and showing it" and "give 
time and listen". A subsequent question asked, "Is behaving and acting 
compassionately important to the goal of being an ethical psychiatric nurse?" More 
than 70% of the sample responded in the affirmative to this question. Responses 
included, 
I think behaving and acting compassionately is a goal of being 
a human but particularly for nurses, caring for 
vulnerable people. 
Some nurses were uncertain about this question, for example, 
for the most part, behaving and acting compassionately 
is a major part of a psychiatric nurse's role, but in 
some instances this may not be appropriate. 
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And another nurse answered in the negative to this question, saying 
on occasions, because of my professional attitudes 
and position, despite not always feeling 
compassionate, I can fulfil this goal. 
In Chapter 2, I examined the feeling of vulnerability that patients often experience. 
For the nurse in the first quote, being compassionate is necessary because of such 
vulnerability. Two points need noting regarding the second and third quotes above. In 
relation to the second quote, there is the question of the appropriateness of one's 
feelings and emotions. This is a difficult issue. It partly concerns whether nurses 
believe they should be 'patient-focused' or 'task-focused'. Some nurses worry that 
being patient-focused involves the need to form close relationships with patients. 
Such nurses might fear that excessively close relationships go beyond the 
boundaries of a 'professional' nurse-patient relationship. Nurses who hold this view 
might believe that overly close relationships jeopardize the 'professional' or 'ethical' 
status of the nurse. In this Delphi study, several nurses mentioned this latter point; 
nurses described colleagues as 'unethical' if such 'overly close' relationships 
developed. It might be fruitful to ask nurses to describe the sorts of situations hinted 
at above where 'in some instances' it is inappropriate to be compassionate. My 
second point is in relation to the third quote above. It is not clear what this nurse 
means by 'professional attitudes and position'. On a positive note, this nurse is 
honest in admitting that sometimes she lacks compassion for a particular patient. But 
despite this, she believes that she can still be an 'ethical' nurse. This response helps 
to bring out the distinction between actions and feelings. On the one hand, this nurse, 
acting perhaps from the obligation of beneficence, does benefit the patient. For 
example, she may provide him with analgesia for a headache or administer a 
Psychotropic injection to reduce symptoms of mania. These examples are beneficent 
actions. But, on the other hand, these actions are according to this nurse, carried out 
without the feeling of compassion or without this nurse being compassionate. The 
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motive is one of duty rather than virtue. Actions might appear beneficent and the 
effects of these actions might benefit the patient. But in terms of motive, character 
traits and the quality of the interpersonal response, this is different from acting, 
thinking and feeling from the virtue of compassion. 
A compassionate nurse will have compassionate thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, 
compassion demands action from its possessor. Thus the compassionate thoughts 
and feelings will motivate the nurse to respond in ways that show compassion. 
Possessing the virtue of compassion gives content and meaning to nurses' actions 
and thoughts. According to Lutzen and Barbosa da Silva31 , compassion is an active 
virtue; others include courage and trust. Active virtues, including compassion, 
"motivate the agent to the appropriate action in order to help the dependent 
patient".32 Being a compassionate nurse will involve the desire to understand what is 
troubling a patient, the desire to spend time with a patient, listen to the patient's lived 
experience of the illness and the desire to ask questions so that the nurse can begin 
to make sense of the patient's lived experience. Showing compassion helps develop 
a bond with the patient. If nurses act, think and feel in compassionate ways, then the 
helping relationship is promoted. Other virtues such as trustworthiness between the 
patient and nurse can also be promoted. Furthermore, because compassion serves 
the good of others, it links to another virtue, namely, justice.33 
This description of compassion has established a picture of what a compassionate 
nurse is like, what she feels and does. Character traits that I view as moral virtues 
might be seen as emotions by other thinkers. It might be concluded that compassion 
is an emotion. However, Von Dietze and Orb claim that compassion is a moral virtue 
with an emotional element. According to these thinkers, compassion also includes a 
rational dimension: "at its core is the notion of deliberate altruistic participation in 
another person's suffering". 34 
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I realize, however, that it is not easy to identify, cultivate and habitually exercise the 
virtues, let alone do so for morally good reasons. Compassion is no exception, as 
Nouwen, McNeill and Morrison suggest 
Compassion asks us to go where it hurts, to enter into places of 
pain, to share in brokenness, fear, confusion and anguish ..... 
compassion means full immersion in the condition of being 
human.35 
In Chapter 3, I conceived a virtue as an admirable character trait, deserving praise 
and admiration from others, which is habitually exercised and helps its possessor 
and others to fare well in life. Based on this conception, I view compassion as a 
moral virtue. 36 Compassion is an example of an other-regarding or altruistic37 virtue 
because the exercise of compassion helps others to a greater degree than its 
possessor. Compassion is a moral virtue needed by nurses to develop and sustain a 
helping relationship between themselves and patients. Compassionate care is an 
example of morally virtuous, that is, morally excellent care. 
Compassion and caring 
Compassion is for some an important aspect of 'successful,38 care. What is the 
relationship between caring and compassion? The terms 'caring' and 'care' have 
been used several times in this thesis. The notion of 'caring' appears of fundamental 
importance in nursing and is necessary to describe the work of nurses. However, 
like other concepts such as 'best interests' caring is poorly conceptualized. It is 
difficult to move past a basic understanding, for example, 'its what we, as nurses, do'. 
A distinction has been made between 'caring for' and 'caring about'. 39 The former 
suggests a deontic foundation, a more distanced type of caring where the care is 
perhaps not 'patient-focused'. 'Caring about' sounds more inclusive, a more 
developed and wide ranging form of care where the carer focuses on a greater 
number of, or a more diverse set of, concerns. And, as noted in Chapter 3, Barker 
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talks about 'caring with', which suggests a more patient-centred collaborative sense 
of caring. 
I believe that 'caring' represents an attitude about someone or something in the 
world. For example, 'I care for Carol' or 'I care about music'. The meaning attributed 
to the term 'care' is usually a positive one. For instance, if I overheard someone on a 
bus saying 'John cares a lot for Sally', without knowing anything about John I might 
think that John was a nice or a good person. In other words, the term 'care' results in 
a positive response in others. But I suggest because care is an attitudinal term, it 
needs qualification to bring out its real meaning. For example, according to the nurse 
who participated in the aforementioned Delphi studlO, it is possible to care without 
compassion. Reflecting on my clinical experience, I can recall nurses who went about 
their work efficiently. However I do not remember observing much compassionate 
care from these nurses. I suggest that the use of 'care' and 'caring' needs to be 
supplemented by another term; indeed I think in many cases the addition of a virtue 
term clarifies its meaning. For example, 'I care justly about Sam' or 'I am caring 
patiently for Jake'. Perhaps if a virtue term does not make sense, then an adjective or 
adverb might suffice. For instance, returning to the man on the bus 'John cares 
passionately for Sally'. 
From the above, it should be clear that I reject the claim that caring is a virtue.41 I 
believe that caring is not a morally admirable character trait that helps its possessor 
and others to fare well. Rather it is an attitude about someone or something in the 
world. Furthermore, I reject the idea that 'care' is sufficient for leading morally good 
lives, as it is possible to care in ways that are not morally good. 
I shall now briefly describe the important role played by two more moral virtues, 
namely courage and respectfulness. 
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Courage and advocacy 
The literature on advocacy and the role of the nurse as patient advocate is plentiful 
42. According to the obligation-based view, nurses ought to act in accordance with the 
obligations of beneficence and respect for patients' autonomy. This includes 
promoting and protecting patients' needs, interests and wishes. In reality, being an 
advocate for a patient can entail putting the interests of the patient ahead of one's 
own. An example is defending and promoting the wishes of a patient with cancer 
when these oppose the views put forward by the consultant.43 Nurses who act as 
advocates can, depending upon the precise circumstances, leave themselves 
vulnerable to professional dispute and emotional distress. Therefore, one of the 
character traits needed to be a successful advocate is courage. One can call this 
moral courage, bravery or plain 'guts'. Irrespective of the nomenclature, people need 
courage to get through life. Ignoring military courage, courage helps one to endure 
the hostilities that daily life can provide. Women require courage to go through 
pregnancy. In general, people need to exercise courage for self-protection.44 
Possessing courage does not come naturally to everyone. I have noted that 
inculcating the virtues is sometimes far from simple. Cultivating and exercising 
courage requires nurses to want to help patients in distress. Without such desires, 
nurses would be less inclined to put themselves in the potentially vulnerable and 
dangerous position that being an advocate can demand. 
I shall not discuss the arguments for and against nurses acting as advocates for 
patients. Suffice it to say that there are good reasons why nurses are not suitably 
placed to make effective advocates.45 Despite these arguments, it remains clear that 
a nurse will at least on some occasions wish to act as an advocate for a patient. If 
this is so, then the nurse will require the virtue of courage in order to be an effective 
advocate and help promote the patient's needs and interests. Typically, obligation-
based moral theories fail to discuss the character traits needed to be an effective 
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advocate. This is a major oversight and one that can be thoroughly addressed by the 
virtue-based approach to morality. 
Respectfulness and empowerment 
As noted in Chapter 2, the notion of empowerment is heavily debated in the 
literature. However, generally such debate fails to centre on an examination of the 
sorts of character traits that nurses require if they are to empower patients. Nurses 
will not be able to empower patients if they lack certain traits of character, for 
example, respectfulness; I suggest that other important virtues needed to help a 
nurse empower a patient include patience, tolerance and courage. The obligation-
based view states that nurses ought to act in accordance with the principle of respect 
for a patient's autonomous wishes. While this instruction might provide some degree 
of action guidance, especially for a novice nurse, it seems to me that it remains 
crucial to debate and examine the moral character of the nurse. After all, nurses are 
not robots. How obligations are perceived, interpreted and applied concerns the kind 
of person one is. The latter is a core feature of the virtue-based approach to morality. 
The virtue of respectfulness can be examined and a nurse can understand the kinds 
of actions, thoughts and feelings fostered by this virtue. For example, a nurse asks a 
patient with asthma certain specific questions about his medications because she 
sees that his hands are shaking more than usual. She listens attentively to his 
responses and relays such information to a doctor. The result is that the patient is 
prescribed a reduced dosage of vasodilator, which is causing the shakes. As a result, 
this patient feels more in control of his treatment and a little more empowered. 
In the next section I describe the three features of the virtue-based approach to , 
moral decision making in nursing practice. The first feature is the exercise of moral 
virtues. The conception of compassion outlined is utilized to facilitate understanding. 
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The second feature is the use of judgment and the use of moral wisdom is the third 
feature of the virtue-based approach. 
Virtue-based moral deciSion-making 
The virtue of compassion 
Imagine a nurse who is caring for a male patient with Parkinson's disease (PO). 
Because this disease affects neuromuscular transmission, problems of living result, 
for example, one needs help with activities of living such as washing, dressing, eating 
and walking. Jack has PO and lives alone at home. A community nurse visits him 
each day. Jack's favourite nurse is Carol. Jack likes Carol because he believes that 
she understands him better than some of the other nurses. If pressed, Jack thinks 
that Carol is a kind nurse who shows him compassion. 
Carol is disposed to carry out beneficent actions that help Jack. She tries hard to 
meet all of Jack's needs, including his emotional needs. Although Carol has a busy 
daily schedule, she enjoys spending time with Jack. She asks him if the new sinemet 
medication is working, she asks him about his son who lives in Australia and she 
asks him if the care staff have done his shopping. Jack replies that the new tablets 
are beginning to work, his son is doing well and his shopping was done yesterday. 
Conversing with Jack can take a considerable time, especially if Jack is having a bad 
day and his speech is slurred. It seems to Jack that Carol is also a very patient 
nurse. From Carol's perspective, she wants to get to know Jack so that, in part, she 
can understand his illness and its effects on his life. Carol hopes that she can help 
Jack to better adapt to the PO, especially managing his muscle tremors46 more 
effectively. 
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Carol is motivated from deep inside to show kindness to her patients. Carol's parents 
and her friends describe her as a genuinely kind person. Kindness is, for Carol, one 
of the core values of being a good caring nurse. Carol aims to understand Jack's 
predicament. She thinks about his situation when she visits him. Moreover, when 
Carol leaves his house she imagines what it might be like to be unable to walk more 
than 30 metres without tumbling to the floor, what it might be like dribbling when 
trying to eat and what it might be like to be unable to get dressed nearly every 
morning of one's life. Carol believes that being compassionate includes a desire to 
understand Jack's individual needs and his distress. She is kind and aims to be 
compassionate not because other people tell her to be or because the NMC code of 
conduct47 demands this from her. Instead she is habitually kind, because it is part of 
whom she is as a person. Carol believes that patients, like Jack, do better when she 
demonstrates kindness in her work. 
The above scenario is not meant to read as a caricature of a caring patient-focused 
nurse, although it is possible to read it in this way. It seems to me that one of the 
points about so-called holistic and patient-centred nursing care is that if these notions 
are to be any more than mere buzzwords or slogans, then nurses need to 
demonstrate the virtues. One aim of the above scenario is to show how it is possible 
for a nurse to think about the meaning of compassion and apply it to patient care. 
Moreover, the thoughts and feelings of patients and nurses involved are taken into 
account as well as actions. Carol demonstrates compassion towards Jack. But she is 
also patient towards him; she understands the effects that PO can have on Jack. For 
instance, the fact that it sometimes takes him a long time before he can speak. It is 
important to clarify that a nurse who advocates the virtue-based approach to morality 
is highly unlikely to exercise just one virtue. This example helps to show that altruistic 
virtues such as compassion and patience are interrelated. 
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The use of judgment and moral wisdom in nursing practice 
Virtue-based moral decision-making acknowledges and encourages the use of 
judgment and moral wisdom - moral perception, moral sensitivity and moral 
imagination. 
Suppose Carol visits Jack one morning as usual. However, this morning Jack does 
not wish to get out of bed. Carol observes signs of pain and discomfort in Jack's face. 
She asks him whether he slept well, but muscle tremors and spasms kept him awake 
most of the night. Jack wants to lie in bed for an hour or two longer. Carol is however 
concerned that Jack may develop a sacral pressure sore, as his skin is already very 
red. Having perceived Jack's distress and established his lack of sleep, Carol thinks 
carefully about how she should respond to Jack's needs. On the one hand, he wants 
to sleep for an hour or two, which is important given the bad night he has had. One 
the other hand, Carol does not wish Jack to develop a pressure sore that will cause 
further physical and emotional distress. Carol thinks about how she might feel given 
the circumstances. She also takes into account the wide range of morally relevant 
features listed earlier. This wide range of information and the knowledge she has of 
Jack's condition and character enables Carol to make a judgment. She decides that 
on this occasion she will ask Jack if she can move his position in the bed. She 
explains to Jack the risk of pressure sore development. He understands this and they 
mutually agree that Jack will lie on his left side. Carol offers to return in an hour or so 
after seeing another patient. Before she leaves, Carol gives Jack an extra dose of 
Sinemet48 to relieve muscle tremors. Just over an hour later, Carol returns to visit 
Jack. He is much happier because his spasms have abated and he has slept well for 
the past hour. 
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It has been noted how the virtue-based approach does not over focus on actions. 
Instead it also acknowledges and examines the thoughts and feelings of patients and 
nurses. It aims to help patients survive and recover from illness. In an attempt to find 
a wide range of ways to help patients through and beyond illness, the virtue-based 
approach encourages the use of reflection and critical thinking skills. For example, 
being kind and compassionate enables a nurse to think about a wide range of 
treatments including pharmacological ones. The obligation-based moral approach 
does not necessarily preclude this aspect of practice. But the virtue-based approach 
promotes and encourages the development of a helping relationship and this in turn 
fosters reflection about the needs and interests of patients. If the approach taken by 
a nurse is limited to acting according to moral obligations, rules and principles then 
the thoughts and feelings of both nurses and patients will not take centre stage. If a 
nurse allows only actions and obligations to guide her practice, then it seems to me 
that she is potentially limiting the range of practices and activities that might in some 
way help a patient. 
An example might help. Suppose a patient has chronic back pain that is secondary to 
cancer. The virtue-based approach encourages the nurse to use moral wisdom -
moral perception, sensitivity and imagination - to reveal information about the patient 
that might otherwise remain unknown. In this case, the nurse spends considerable 
time49 with the patient in order to evaluate his pain and the effectiveness of the 
prescribed morphine. Through conversation, asking open ended questions, the 
willingness and ability to listen to the patient's responses and the desire to 
understand the patient's lived experience of cancer and bone pain, it becomes clear 
that the patient's pain is not well controlled. He is also suffering from severe 
constipation, which is recognized as an adverse side effect of morphine. 50 The nurse 
is intent on helping the patient to fare as well as possible through the nightmare of 
cancer, both the disease itself and its treatment. She therefore conveys to a medic 
245 
that the patient's pain is poorly controlled and that he is suffering from constipation. 
The nurse makes it clear to the medic how much distress the patient is in. The 
morphine is soon replaced with Fentanyl 51, which proves more effective in controlling 
the patient's pain, plus regular bowel movements are soon re-established. It is 
sometimes not possible - perhaps due to the intensity of the work and an insufficient 
number of nurses - to spend a lot of time getting to know a patient's needs. At other 
times, spending time with patients might be possible, but literature has already 
shown that nurses spend minimal time in direct contact with patients. Hence, it is 
morally admirable that a nurse should act, think and feel from the virtues of patience 
and kindness as in this scenario. But the impact of the virtues is clear to see: this 
nurse was able to promote the patient's quality of life and I would suggest that these 
kinds of interventions are often the ones that patients tend to remember. 
Merits of the virtue-based approach 
In Chapters 3 and 5, I identified and examined some of the merits of the virtue-based 
approach to morality and virtue ethics from the perspective of general ethics. In this 
chapter, I have considered other merits of this approach, for example, how it 
promotes the use of judgment and moral wisdom and how these morally important 
features can help nurses make morally good judgments. I shall now summarize and 
perhaps clarify some of these important merits. 
The language of the virtues 
Nurses utilize the language of the virtues and vices on a daily basis. For example, 
words such as 'care', 'fair', 'well', 'just' and 'good' are all aretaic (virtue and vice) 
terms. 52 It therefore seems sensible to claim that the language used by nurses 
should be utilized in the moral theory that they adopt to guide their practice. This 
claim provides a reason why nurses should consider utilizing the virtue-based 
approach and virtue ethics instead of obligation-based ethics. 
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Adequate action-guidance 
The above is more important than it might at first appear. Supported in part by 
Hursthouse's53 v-rules thesis (Chapter 5), such aretaic terms do provide a good 
degree - breadth and depth - of action guidance. In other words, by thinking hard 
about words such as 'kind' nurses can get a sense of what these words mean. For 
instance, Tom is 15 years old. He is bored, having been a patient on an orthopaedic 
ward for 6 weeks. He is in traction because he has a serious complicated lower limb 
fracture. If I think about the meaning of 'kindness', then I imagine some of the things 
that I could do that are kind deeds. From conversing with Tom, I know that he enjoys 
reading music magazines. Within a couple of hours, I have obtained some music 
magazines from the hospital library. When I visit Tom he appears genuinely surprised 
and grateful. He thanks me for my kindness and thoughtfulness. 
Thus, through reflection of previous and current experiences the sorts of actions, 
thoughts and feelings that aretaic words can conjure up in one's imagination can 
become quite clear. As noted, thinking about the meaning and content of aretaic 
terms and exercising the virtues provides the moral motive for action. It has been 
noted in Chapter 5 that virtue ethics is charged with not being able to provide 
adequate action guidance. This is held to be a serious flaw of virtue ethics and it is 
one reason why a strong virtue ethics is often held to be non-viable (Chapter 5). I 
reject this claim and assert that a strong virtue ethics - one that provides adequate 
action-guidance for nurses - is both possible and plausible. As such, it demands 
increased scholarly attention and an acknowledgement that it provides a serious 
moral alternative to the traditional obligation-based moral theories of 
consequentialism and deontology. 
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The virtue-based approach, consequences and other morally relevant features 
The virtue-based approach does not ignore or even minimize the crucial notion of 
consequences in the moral life of patients and nurses. As noted in Chapter 4, the 
idea of consequences/outcomes/results is fundamentally important in everyday life. 
Thus, consequences are taken into account by the virtue-based approach. However, 
virtue ethics does not over focus on the importance of consequences at the expense 
of other morally important features. Virtue ethics accommodates and debates several 
features of morality ignored by obligation-based theories. These have been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Two of these are: an examination of the moral 
character of people (both nurses and patients) and the need to develop and sustain a 
virtue-based helping relationship to enable patients to survive, recover and fare well. 
The virtue-based approach and the role of emotions in morality 
Another morally relevant feature that is taken into account by the virtue-based 
approach is the important role played by emotions such as distress, fear, anxiety, 
vulnerability, guilt and remorse in the moral life of nurses and patients. One of the 
main points is that it is morally appropriate for nurses to feel different emotions in 
their daily work. These emotions are often distressing and unpleasant. First, suppose 
a nurse has withheld information from a patient with terminal illness because the 
patient's relatives believe she could not cope. Second, suppose a nurse tells a 
patient that information will be kept secret and the patient who trusts the nurse tells 
her that upon discharge he will self-harm. The nurse thinks that it will be best for the 
patient if she passes this information on to the consultant. Or, third, perhaps a nurse 
lies to a paralysed patient when asked if he will ever walk again. The nurse cannot 
bear to tell the patient whom she is close to that he will never walk again. In each 
example, it is morally appropriate that the nurse should feel certain emotions as a 
result of being involved. I suggest that in all three examples, the nurse would feel 
emotionally upset, guilty and worried concerning the patient's response upon finding 
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out the truth. Because the virtue-based approach focuses upon the kind of nurse one 
is, it examines the traits that in part make a morally good nurse. This examination _ 
of good and bad character traits - necessitates and promotes self-reflection. 
Because the emphasis is not solely on actions, the virtue-based approach and virtue 
ethics takes emotions and feelings into account and recognizes their value in terms 
of their contribution to the moral lives of patients and nurses. 
The virtue-based approach and resolving moral dilemmas 
The virtue-based approach does not over focus on actions. It examines the thoughts, 
feelings and emotions experienced by nurses and ill patients. In part because of the 
distinction noted by Hursthouse54 (Chapter 4) between two possible ways of using 
'right moral decision/morally right action' compared with the obligation-based 
approach there is less emphasis placed upon finding solutions to moral problems and 
dilemmas. An assumption is not made that all moral dilemmas are resolvable. Unlike 
the obligation-based view, the aim is not to do the right thing. The aim is to act well, 
that is, from the virtues; actions, thoughts and feelings motivated from the virtues will 
be morally good. Nurses ought to strive towards achieving morally good interactions 
and responses with patients. When a nurse is involved in morally complex, tense 
situations, for example, when a patient is coerced into having ECT for depression 
against his wishes, the morally appropriate response from a virtuous nurse is to feel 
moral remainder. This is because involvement in such horrible situations should 
produce certain responses in a nurse, for example, a nurse might feel regret and 
remorse for her involvement including the things she said and did. As was noted in 
Chapter 4, in even more terrible situations, which Hursthouse refers to as irresolvable 
and tragic dilemmas, the lives of those involved including nurses and patients will 
end up being marred in some way. This claim provides a reason why a plausible and 
adequate nursing ethics needs to take the role of emotions/moral remainder into 
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account. Obligation-based moral theories in nursing are incomplete and hence 
inadequate because they neglect this morally important feature. 
The virtue-based approach and moral education 
The question of how to educate the young to be good persons is clearly an important 
one. In nursing, it is necessary to consider how student nurses can develop to be 
morally good nurses. Rather strangely, the obligation-based approach fails to 
sufficiently debate these questions. It is though people of any age - the immature 
and mature - just will be able to act in accordance with moral obligations. In contrast, 
virtue ethics asks questions concerning the moral education of the young. In 
examining such issues as learning from role models and habituation of moral and 
clinical excellences, the virtue-based approach and virtue ethics provides a good 
starting point for further exploration of issues concerning the moral education of 
nurses (I discuss the topic of moral education further in the 'Conclusions'). 
The virtue-based approach, narrative accounts of illness and patient-centred care 
The virtue-based approach to morality including the idea of a virtue-based helping 
relationship promotes a narrative and relational account of a patient's lived 
experience of illness. As noted, patients feel a range of emotions including fear, 
anxiety, powerlessness and vulnerability and the virtue-based approach recognizes 
the presence of such emotions. Illness can create these emotions and the process of 
hospitalization can intensify these feelings. In part, because intrapersonal and 
interpersonal responses are examined and developed, it seems to me that the virtue-
based approach recognizes the value and promotes the ideal of patient-centred and 
holistic care. In Chapter 2, literature was examined that indicates that (at least) some 
patients and some patients' relatives define 'high' quality care in terms that I would 
call virtue-based care. For example, high or good quality care involves nurses being 
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gentle, patient, honest and kind towards patients. I believe that good nursing care 
and the exercise of the moral virtues is synonymous. 
The virtue-based approach and the use of judgment and moral wisdom in moral 
decision-making 
In my view one of the most notable merits of the virtue-based approach to morality is 
its acceptance and promotion of the use of judgment and moral wisdom in moral 
decision-making. Earlier in this Chapter, I examined both judgment and the 
associated notion of moral wisdom and applied it to nursing practice. In short, 
judgment is a complex process with the end result that a decision/choice is made. A 
wide range of morally relevant features is taken into account. While deontological 
moral rules are useful, conflicts frequently occur. Nurses should perceive and 
assimilate precise pieces of information and examine some of the complexities of 
specific morally dense situations. Judgment is required to work through this 
assemblage of information. Moral wisdom - moral perception, moral sensitivity and 
moral imagination - is utilized in tandem with judgment in an attempt to make morally 
good decisions. While this is problematic (to be discussed later in the 'Problems' 
section), the virtue-based approach, unlike obligation-based moral theories, 
construes moral decision making as difficult. In this respect, the virtue-based 
approach describes and reflects more accurately the work of clinical nurses including 
the innumerable morally tense and complicated moral tensions and conflicts that 
arise in contemporary nursing practice. 
The virtue-based approach and reasons for action 
Another advantageous aspect of the virtue-based approach requires some 
discussion, namely, reasons for action. 
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'Reasons for action' is a richly documented philosophical topic.55 From a virtue-based 
perspective, Hursthouse has examined reasons for action and moral motivation in 
relation to a woman's reasons for wanting an abortion. 56 Moral rights are usually 
given as the framework for discussing the morality of abortion. But as Hursthouse 
claims "in exercising a moral right, I can do something cruel, or callous, or selfish, 
... .inconsiderate, .. , .dishonest".57 In other words, people can act viciously (I noted 
that people can exercise rights virtuously or viciously in Chapter 4). Pregnancy and 
childbirth are very important states of being for many, though not all, women. It is 
important to recognize and contextualize pregnancy and childbirth within the whole 
narrative of a woman's life. The woman's needs, interests, values and life plans need 
to be identified and taken into account in decision making. It might be a morally kind 
act for a woman who never wanted children to abort, if after prolonged deliberation 
she feels strongly that she could not give a child a caring and happy environment in 
which to live well. Acting from kindness is an example of acting morally well. 
Conversely, one's reason for wanting an abortion might turn on, for example, 
selfishness. For example, a woman says 'I want an abortion because I want to go out 
shopping and having a child to care for would spoil my enjoyment of life'. Or perhaps 
the reason for action might be dishonesty as in 'I want an abortion because the father 
of the child is not my husband, and I don't want my husband to find out'. 
The above reasoning can be applied to nursing. Two examples from mental health 
practice are: (A) Elizabeth refuses her psychotropic medications and (B) John wants 
to be released from the mental health unit. These two examples serve as illustrations 
that facilitate an explication of the topic of reasons for action. But, it seems to me that 
one of the many strengths of the virtue-based approach is that it promotes an 
examination of the particulars of each situation. In nursing practice, complex and 
subtle issues will need to be identified. 
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In (A), Elizabeth might refuse to take her psychotropic medications because they 
make her feel nauseous and very tired. She is really keen to write a letter thanking a 
friend for a recent present. It is several days since the present arrived, but Elizabeth's 
depression prevented her from responding to her friend. Now, she is in a rush to get 
the letter written and posted. Her medications make her feel unwell, which means in 
turn she does not feel able to concentrate on writing the letter. This is why she does 
not want to take her medications. Elizabeth's motive is that she wants to demonstrate 
gratitude to one of her closest friends, someone she has known for over 30 years. 
She wishes to maintain a close friendship and she values loyalty. Her reasons for 
action (refusal of medications) are grounded in the virtues of respectfulness and 
loyalty (perhaps others too). 
However, in (8) above, John wants to be released from the mental health unit, 
because he has 'a score to settle' with someone whom he feels has let him down. 
One day John is heard to mutter 'I'm going to show him who's boss' and 'I'll teach 
him a lesson he'll never forget'. It is plausible to think that his reason for wanting to 
leave the unit concerns vices such as physical/verbal aggression and cruelty. 
Problems of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice 
In this section, I highlight some of the major problems with the virtue-based 
approach. These have been noted in Chapters 3 and 5, but here I explore these 
problems in more detail and in the context of contemporary nursing practice. 
Assumptions about virtues and goodness 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that an assumption is made regarding moral virtues being 
morally good traits of character. For example, that it is morally good to be honest. Or 
that by being honest one can lead a good life. However, the claim that a certain 
character trait, for example honesty, is a virtue is made because it meets with a 
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specific conception of a virtue. The authorities for such conceptions include some of 
Western philosophy's most respected thinkers including Aristotle58 and in 
contemporary virtue ethics SIote59 and Hursthouse.6o I am not saying that such 
conceptions are necessarily well argued. Rather, one needs to consider whether the 
character trait under the spotlight satisfies the criteria given in the conception of a 
virtue that is utilized. My conception was given in Chapter 3, but to repeat: a virtue is 
a character trait that is habitually performed, which disposes the possessor to act, 
think and feel in morally good ways. A virtue is a morally excellent trait that deserves 
praise and admiration from others. 
Nurses who display the virtues, especially the other-regarding virtues such as 
kindness and generosity, will have a positive impact on the lives of patients. It has 
been noted (Chapter 2) how some empirical research indicates that patients feel 
virtuous care, for instance, the kindness of a nurse. It has also been noted how some 
patient's perceptions of 'high' and 'good' quality care concern nurses exercising 
moral virtues. Besides kindness and generosity, moral virtues important in nursing 
include fairness, patience, and courage. 
Assumptions about the meaning of 'virtuous' 
It is possible that a number of people, including nurses, view the language of the 
virtues as old fashioned. For example, if one is described as 'virtuous' then it can be 
understood to mean 'prissy' or 'prudish'. This possibility might deter a nurse from 
learning more about the virtue-based approach. Clearly, there is a need to teach the 
virtue-based approach and virtue ethics in nurse education. Evidence suggests that 
this does not always happen. 61 
Part of the reason why the virtues can be seen in the above negative way is because 
of the history of nursing, especially the influence of Nightingale. She wanted nurses 
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to be good, with high moral character. The virtues in Nightingale's era of nursing 
were obedience and subservience, because the nurse's role consisted in following 
the physician's orders. This shows how the meanings of virtues change over time 
and differ between gender and cultures. Perhaps some thinkers and clinical nurses 
still think of the virtues - if indeed they think of them at all - as submissive traits of 
character. If so, then it seems to me that this provides even more reason to educate 
nurses about the virtues. 
Identifying the virtues 
The charge of moral relativism can be levelled at the virtue-based approach to 
morality. It is alleged that since virtues are human character traits it follows that 
disagreement will arise in identifying which traits are virtues. I accept that people will 
produce lists of different virtues. This will happen in part because human needs, 
interests and values are distinct. Because of the complexity of human lives, I find it 
difficult to believe that an advocate of the virtue-based approach would lead his life 
according to just one virtue. Irrespective of whether a virtue such as justice is 
considered to be fundamentally important to the moral life, it seems to me that one 
would also realize the importance of other moral virtues, such as courage, 
respectfulness and kindness. This is a positive aspect of the virtue-based approach; 
human lives are complex, multifaceted and multidimensional, thus many different 
virtues are necessary to lead morally good lives. 
I also accept that people might prioritize virtues differently, for instance, one person 
thinks that kindness is much more important than patience. Some people prioritize 
the moral importance of obligations; it was noted in Chapter 4 how 'respect for 
autonomy' appears to be the predominant moral obligation (especially in the current 
climate of empowering patients). Likewise, perhaps, some people might believe in a 
'fundamental' virtue, such as justice. The point is that some virtues will be more 
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appropriate and applicable than others depending on particular situations and roles. 
For example, there are 10 nurses on a medical ward. It might be thought that all of 
the nurses would agree that compassion and honesty are key virtues, which need to 
be exercised in patient care. But I believe that this is overly optimistic. Why should 10 
different people, each with their own unique values about nursing practice, not to 
mention distinct needs and interests, agree on something as complicated as this? 
Instead, I would expect some disagreement. The nurses hold a team meeting. 
Perhaps 5 nurses agree that compassion and honesty are really important virtues. 
Another 3 nurses point out that respectfulness, especially given the current emphasis 
on patient-centred care, is a crucial virtue to inculcate. The remaining 2 nurses bicker 
among themselves and fail to reach any firm conclusions. Furthermore, 4 weeks later 
at the next team meeting, it transpires that most of the nurses have changed their 
minds! The 10 nurses now feel that all of the virtues mentioned 4 weeks earlier are 
equally important. Therefore all of these virtues should be demonstrated in the 
delivery of patient care. The nurses agree that depending on issues such as the 
nature of the nursing activity, the needs and interests of the patient and the kind of 
nurse one wishes to be in a given interaction, some virtues will be more important 
than others. 
In Chapter 2, it was noted how individual nurses view their roles and the nature and 
ends of nursing in different ways, even though some general agreement is reached. 
However I reject the claim that disagreement would cause insurmountable problems. 
Acting from the virtue-based approach entails certain phenomenon. For example, 
moral wisdom and judgment would be utilized, the virtue-based helping relationship 
would be developed, patient-centred care would be promoted, and the virtues would 
serve as the nurse's motives. Given this, it seems to me that identifying and 
prioritizing different virtues is not especially problematic for nurses. 
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Why should nurses be virtuous when nursing patients who have committed deplorable 
acts? 
This question is very important and raises serious issues about reasons for acting 
from the virtues; especially the idea that nurses should be just and impartial. 
Examples of deplorable acts include rape and child abuse. Rapists and child abusers 
often come into contact with forensic psychiatry services. The deontic approach 
instructs nurses to abide by certain obligations, for example, the four principles 
approach examined in Chapter 4. These moral demands apply irrespective of what 
the patient has done. The obligation of beneficence means that nurses are obliged to 
benefit patients. Again, this applies whether one likes and admires the patient or 
whether one dislikes and is repulsed by the patient. On the surface, this appears to 
be reasonable. However, on an emotional level it is far from simple to always apply 
such moral demands. One of the problems is that obligations are external concepts. 
As such, it might be difficult for a nurse who is angry with and repulsed by a patient to 
act from beneficence when this is not how she feels towards the patient. 
It is true to say that humans compare and evaluate each other's acts and thoughts. If 
these are judged to be deplorable then it fails to make sense - it is not part of the 
human condition - to like and admire the perpetrators of such acts. Because rape 
and child abuse are horrendous, vicious crimes that violate human rights, I believe it 
is fair to claim that most people think rape and child abuse are deplorable acts. As 
such, the perpetrators might well be despised for their actions. 
In response to the question 'why should nurses be virtuous when nursing patients 
who have committed deplorable acts?', I shall make 4 claims. 
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First, it is the virtue-based approach that people utilize when they describe acts such 
as rape and child abuse as deplorable and the perpetrator as despicable. These 
terms are aretaic, that is, they describe behaviours and thoughts motivated from the 
virtues or in this case the vices. These kinds of terms can be used to describe and 
evaluate a person's moral character. Instead of admiring or praising one for 
displaying the virtues, a natural conclusion to draw is that someone who rapes 
another person or abuses children is to be despised. Such aretaic terms are, as 
Hursthouse62 and Benn63 claim, common and very useful. The deontic approach fails 
to provide words that possess such descriptive power. Using such aretaic terms can 
be therapeutic and cathartic. The use of these kinds of terms and subsequent 
discussion can facilitate the relief of raw emotions such as anger and hatred in 
nurses who treat and care for rapists and child abusers. 
My second response is that nurses and other practitioners who treat and care for 
rapists and child abusers should aim to be just and compassionate. This will not be 
an easy thing to do. Raw emotions will probably make this difficult to do, at least on a 
habitual basis. However, the virtue-based approach recognizes the importance of the 
emotions in the moral life. The deontic approach fails to sufficiently take the emotions 
of nurses into account. Nurses might feel a range of strong emotions such as anger, 
hatred, rage, and perhaps vengeance. The virtue-based approach recognizes these 
emotions as real. These emotions are not conveniently brushed aside as 'unethical' 
or 'wrong', because they might motivate unfair actions for example. The virtue-based 
approach acknowledges and accommodates such negative emotions in nurses who 
treat and care for perpetrators of deplorable deeds. 
My third response is to claim that in nursing people who have carried out despicable 
and evil deeds, one is reminded of the dark side of humanity. One is presented with a 
vivid picture of just how vicious people can be and what terrible deeds people are 
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capable of doing. It seems to me that this fact about human nature provides further 
reason for people to focus on inculcating the virtues. 
My final response regarding this serious question is not at all intended to defend the 
despicable and deplorable acts committed by perpetrators of rape and child abuse. 
However, it is a response that I believe the virtue-based approach would make 
because it promotes reflection concerning reasons for action. This is that nurses 
should try to understand why some people perform deplorable deeds. Perhaps an 
abuser was abused as a child. Perhaps there is evidence of diminished 
responsibility. The virtue-based approach holds that people can cultivate the virtues, 
although this requires consistent hard work and determination. One claim that comes 
out of this is that it is possible for people to change their character if they want to 
badly enough. It might be possible then for some people who have carried out 
despicable deeds to change especially with virtuous care and effective treatment. I 
remain uncertain however about the empirical evidence that might support or deny 
this possibility. I can hear forensic nurses saying 'only someone who has never met 
or worked with perpetrators of rape and child abuse would say something like that'. 
Nevertheless, it is a view that I think the virtue-based approach would advocate. 
Where would the boundaries be drawn if nurses (and other practitioners) could treat 
patients as they like? For example, is it morally justifiable for a homophobic nurse to 
refuse to care for a homosexual? Is it morally justifiable for a racist Caucasian to 
refuse to care for an African-American? Justice both as a moral principle and a moral 
virtue would be shattered if one's values and emotions went unchecked. 
The problem of exercising a virtue to an excessive degree 
Aristotle's 'doctrine of the mean' is sometimes taken to mean that persons need to 
moderate their feelings, for example, no one should ever feel extreme anger or love. I 
concur with Norman64 who takes the mean to concern the relationship between 
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reason and emotions/feelings. As noted, experiencing emotions is an important part 
of the reality of contemporary nursing practice. Moreover, it is not always simple for 
nurses to work through one's emotions and hit the mean when it comes to exercising 
the virtues. For example, although a nurse wants to be kind, she also realizes that 
some patients can be manipulative; showing too much kindness can then prove 
counter-productive. Another example concerns the virtue of honesty. If a nurse on a 
mental health ward was always completely honest this might lead to difficult 
situations for the other nurses on the ward. Suppose a patient asks about the side 
effects of a medication and the honest nurse describes a long list of such side 
effects. But, on another occasion a different nurse responds to the same question, 
only he decides not to reveal some of the side effects. He does so because he does 
not wish to deter the patient from taking the medication, as it is having beneficent 
effects.65 Also, imagine if a nurse was to tell the truth (or more accurately, the 'truth' 
as far as she was concerned) to a patient prior to a surgical procedure. The patient 
asks about 'possible complications' and discovers that there are several, including a 
particularly high likelihood of haemorrhage and post-operative infection. Might this 
worrying information deter the patient from undergoing surgery? 
Finding the mean involves the use of judgment and moral wisdom, especially moral 
perception. Moral perception helps a nurse to see and discern meaning in a wide 
range of morally relevant features. Clinical information will also be taken into account, 
plus other relevant pieces of information that apply to the situation at hand. Moral 
perception helps to identify and clarify the morally relevant features of complex, 
morally tense situations. 
The virtue-based approach focuses on developing morally good responses and 
interactions and developing and sustaining a helping relationship based on several 
moral virtues, for example, kindness, patience, trustworthiness and courage. If a 
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nurse practices (acts, thinks and feels) according to the virtue-based approach, then 
the importance of moral wisdom and judgment should be clearly understood. It 
seems to me that the virtue-based approach actually facilitates and heightens moral 
perception and moral sensitivity. Furthermore, the virtue-based nurse does not over 
focus on the nature and consequences of actions; neither does she assume that 
moral dilemmas are resolvable. The emphasis is not on discovering right and correct 
solutions to moral problems and dilemmas. Instead, the virtue-based nurse seeks to 
identify and reflect on the morally relevant features of specific interactions. Her 
general aim is to act, think and feel in morally excellent ways to help the patient 
survive illness, recover and fare well. 
One might accuse the virtue-based approach of setting extremely high standards of 
behaviour for nurses. I accept that it is not always easy to be virtuous, for instance, 
kind, generous and patient especially on every occasion. However, it does not follow 
that the virtue-based nurse should always be, for example, (a) honest or (b) 
courageous. There will be many times when such behaviours should and do happen. 
It is, however, also clear that by using moral wisdom and judgment, a nurse will make 
a decision based on the morally (and clinically) relevant features of each situation or 
interaction. For example (a) a nurse decides to withhold some information about the 
side effects of a medication and (b) a nurse does not act as an advocate for a 
patient. In (a) the nurse thinks that the medication is helping the patient to recover 
from illness and fare well. Thus, she judges that, on this occasion, it will help the 
patient to recover if she continues to take the medication. Therefore a judgment is 
made that withholding a piece of information is a morally right action. Note, however, 
that in this situation the virtue-based nurse will feel moral remainder. This is because 
while this action might be morally right, it does not count as a morally good deed. 
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In (b) the patient is demanding cardiac surgery that is so risky the surgeon is 
unwilling to attempt it. Rather than being courageous, the nurse decides that it would 
be an example of acting badly, perhaps foolishly or naively, if she acted as an 
advocate for the patient on this occasion. The nurse judges that the surgeon is acting 
well. She decides that going ahead with this operation would be reckless. She also 
believes that the patient is being selfish because he is not thinking of his spouse's 
feelings. Therefore, to promote the patient's wishes on this occasion would be acting 
badly. 
Conflicts between virtues 
The above discussion regarding the use of judgment and moral wisdom is implicated 
in providing a response to another common criticism of the virtue-based approach to 
morality. This is that virtues conflict and a person has no way of knowing which virtue 
to exercise. This claim is intended as a serious objection of the virtue-based 
approach and virtue ethics. 
First, I hold that conflicts between virtues are to be expected given the moral 
complexity of human lives. But critics66 suggest that the conflict problem is a serious 
disadvantage of the virtue-based approach. The fact that there is no single rule or a 
decision procedure to follow is seen as a major flaw of the virtue-based approach. 
However, in my view, an adequate normative ethics should acknowledge that 
conflicts, whether between obligations or virtues, will arise especially given the 
subjective and value-laden moral complexities of human lives. This is particularly true 
within nursing practice, saturated as it is with innumerable dense, complex moral 
tensions. 
Second, I have already discussed two points that relate to the claim 'when virtues 
conflict, a nurse has no way of knowing which virtue to exercise'. The first is that the 
262 
action-guidance available from thinking about the meaning and application of the 
virtues, for instance kindness, means that a nurse will have an idea of what to do. 
One can eliminate actions, thoughts and 'feelings that are unkind, cruel and callous 
(these are examples of acting from the vices). Then, reflection and use of moral 
imagination regarding the v-rule 'be kind' can help to conjure up examples of kind 
actions, thoughts and feelings that can be habitually exercised. The second related 
point is that a nurse might prioritize one virtue over another. For example, she 
believes that justice is more important than patience in delivering morally good 
patient care. If the conflict involves justice, then irrespective of the second virtue in 
question the nurse will have an idea of what to do and how to be. She will act in just 
ways and think and feel justly. 
Third, what is a nurse to do given a situation in which she could either act from the 
virtues of respectfulness or justice? Return for a moment to the earlier example of 
Carol, the community nurse and Jack, the patient with PD. Although it was not made 
explicit, the two virtues of respectfulness and justice are in conflict in this scenario. 
The options were: should Carol get Jack out of bed or let him have another hour in 
bed? Carol acted from the virtue of respectfulness. She made this decision after 
conversing with Jack. She discovered that he had not slept well overnight and she 
respected his request to have another hour in bed. Carol utilized moral wisdom and 
judgment in her decision-making. On this occasion, with this set of morally (and 
clinically) relevant features, Carol believed that being respectful and leaving Jack in 
bed a little longer would help him to fare well. Carol reflected about justice and Jack's 
needs. She concluded that it would be unfair to insist that Jack should get out of bed. 
This is because on previous occasions Carol has respected other patient's views, 
some of whom also had PO and a sore sacrum. According to Carol, their needs 
appeared remarkably similar too. Therefore, if she had allowed these other patients 
to lie in bed longer, why ought she insist that Jack should get out of bed? 
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I noted earlier that situations in clinical practice often require more than one virtue to 
be exercised. The above is an example of this claim. This is because I believe that 
Carol understood that having a good sleep is a benevolent action. It is clear that 
Carol acted kindly. Another community nurse, perhaps one acting from the obligation 
of non-maleficence, might well have persuaded Jack that getting out of bed was 
better for him than remaining in bed. This second nurse might have told Jack that his 
sacrum was very red and sore. Therefore to prevent the development of a sacral 
pressure sore, it was more important to get Jack out of bed and relieve the pressure 
than allow him to have another hour in bed. 
I need to make it clear, however, that I am not suggesting that a nurse who acts in 
accordance with an obligation, such as non-maleficence, is unable to act kindly. 
Instead, I think the point is that sometimes it can seem so important for a nurse to act 
from obligations (both moral and legal) that other morally important features are 
neglected. These include inculcating moral virtues, using moral wisdom, using 
judgment and realizing the important role played by the emotions in the moral lives of 
patients and nurses. 
Finally, the virtues are excellences of character, admirable and praiseworthy traits 
that help their possessor and others to lead morally good lives. I understand that 
choosing between virtues can be problematic, these sorts of situations require a 
nurse to utilize judgment and moral wisdom. However, as long as the choice is 
between 2 (or more) virtues, then by definition subsequent actions, thoughts and 
feelings should be morally good and thus have a positive impact on the patient's life. 
For example, take justice and kindness. Both of these virtues aim to help the patient 
to fare well, but in different ways. Kind actions, thoughts and feelings will have a 
positive impact on the patient's well being. The same can be said of just actions, 
thoughts and feelings. The actual actions might be different, but both virtues will 
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contribute to a patient surviving and recovering from illness. 
I end this section by suggesting another option in response to a conflict between two 
or more virtues. Depending on the particulars of the situation including the patient's 
physical and emotional needs, acting from the virtue of respectfulness means that 
the nurse could ask the patient for his views. The range of options could be outlined 
and the patient would be given the choice. Given certain caveats - for example, the 
patient is an adult with decision making capacity - it seems to me that in the current 
climate of promoting empowerment and collaborative and patient-centred care, this 
option is not as preposterous as it might at first appear. 
Conclusions 
I have examined the crucial role played by judgment and moral wisdom in nurses' 
moral decision making. Obligation-based moral theories neglect these phenomena. 
Indeed, act-consequentialism with its single rule - maximize best consequences -
holds that the use of judgment is not only unnecessary, it is a sign of a defective 
moral person. 67 
I have explained why the virtues should be inculcated. I have demonstrated how a 
nurse can exercise the moral virtues in patient care, for example, compassion. The 
general aim of the virtue-based approach is to help the patient to survive and recover 
from illness and fare well thereafter. At the core of this aim is the need to develop 
and sustain a virtue-based helping relationship. Besides compassion, nurses ought 
to inculcate other virtues such as courage, respectfulness, patience, justice, honesty 
and tolerance. 
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I characterized the three features of the virtue-based approach to moral decision-
making in nursing practice. These are: (1) the exercise of moral virtues; (2) the use of 
judgment; and (3) the use of moral wisdom. The obligation-based view might pay 
homage to (1), but it seems to me that it ignores and derides the use of (2) and (3). 
I have identified several problems associated with virtue ethics and the virtue-based 
approach to morality. These problems are well known in general ethics. I have 
discussed these problems in the context of contemporary nursing practice. My 
responses to these problems, especially the conflicts problem, have been explicated. 
I believe that these responses provide an adequate defence of the virtue-based 
approach. It needs to be noted that philosophers have been debating obligation-
based theories since the 18th century and yet several problems still remain. I hope 
that with further scholarly work from moral philosophers and health care ethicists in 
virtue ethics and the virtue-based approach, some of the problems of the virtue-
based approach will be further resolved. However, it seems to me that disagreement 
is a permanent and positive feature of philosophical enquiry and as such should be 
accepted and applauded. 
Virtue ethics and the virtue-based approach have several merits that were described 
in Chapters 3 and 5. In this Chapter, I applied these merits to contemporary nursing 
practice. These merits include: nurses utilize the language of the virtues in clinical 
practice; adequate action guidance is provided from thinking hard about the v-rules 
and the virtue and vice terms; the role played by emotions in the moral lives of 
patients and nurses is taken seriously; empowerment and patient-centred care are 
effectively promoted; and the use of judgment and moral wisdom is recognized as 
being very important for nurses. 
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Such a virtue-based approach has distinct advantages for contemporary nurses 
compared to the traditional obligation-based theories of consequentialism and 
deontology. I conclude that the virtue-based approach and virtue ethics are plausible 
moral approaches to the moral complexities that abound in contemporary nursing 
practice. Moreover, a strong version of virtue ethics that provides adequate action 
guidance for nurses is a viable possibility. 
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CHAPTER 8 - MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE VIRTUES1 
Introduction 
Summary of the argument so far 
I have argued that the virtue-based approach and a strong virtue ethics are plausible 
and attractive moral approaches for use in contemporary nursing practice. The need 
for such an approach stems from the vulnerability, powerlessness and fear 
experienced by patients with illness. In order to help patients survive and recover from 
illness, nurses ought to develop and sustain a virtue-based helping relationship. 
Important virtues include compassion, courage, respectfulness, justice and patience. 
Moreover, the emphasis is not purely on actions and their consequences. Rather the 
emotions of both patients and nurses are realized and accounted for. In part because 
of the innumerable complex moral tensions in nursing practice, it is important to the 
ends of the virtue-based approach that nurses utilize judgment and moral wisdom in 
their moral decision-making. Moral decision-making in accordance with the virtue-
based approach is context-dependent, relational and particularist. 
I believe that the above account is plausible and well grounded. However, in the work 
of Macintyre, there is a contemporary moral philosopher whose ideas about the virtues 
provide further philosophical foundation for the virtue-based approach to contemporary 
nursing. Therefore, in this Chapter I examine Macintyre's work and in the next Chapter, 
I relate some of his themes to my account of the virtue-based approach. 
Macintyre's account of the virtues 
Macintyre is dissatisfied with and pessimistic about many of the claims inherent in 
modernism. The objects of his disapproval include some of the claims made by 
contemporary political philosophy, especially liberalism, and modern moral philosophy, 
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particularly what he calls the 'Enlightenment project'. What does Macintyre propose as 
an alternative moral theory?2 In brief, he responds by proposing a neo-Aristotelian 
ethics that is (a) teleological, (b) socially contextualized and (c) historicized. According 
to Macintyre, three features are not found in contemporary obligation-based moral 
theories. Or if these features are present, then they are neglected and given low 
priority. 
I shall examine Macintyre's concerns with contemporary ethics in more detail, as this 
provides the philosophical background and motivation for his theory. Next, I shall 
present the three major theses, presented and defended in After Virtue, that constitute 
his account of the virtues. I end this Chapter by considering some of the objections and 
merits of his theory. 
Macintyre on modern moral philosophy 
Macintyre's dismissive claims about modern moral philosophy are similar in some 
respects to the rejection of Kantianism and utilitarianism - the moral theories that 
dominate contemporary moral philosophy - that Anscombe3 made in 1958. While 
Anscombe's thesis was grounded in the lack in contemporary society of a theistic deity, 
one can still see in her writings the seeds of at least the core of Macintyre's ideas. 
(Indeed Anscombe has influenced many philosophers who might be labelled as anti-
theorists, besides Macintyre, another example is Williams. 4) 
Prior to After Virtue, Macintyre began to demonstrate his disagreement and dislike of 
much of the substance of modern moral philosophy.5 In short he criticized these moral 
theories and the theorists who proposed the theories, because they failed to socially 
and historically contextualize these theories; they tended to ignore the role and 
importance of history and social theory in moral philosophy. The result was that the 
development of moral theories and moral persons over time, place and culture is 
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ignored. Furthermore, the historical context of the philosophers advancing such 
theories and ideas is also neglected. 
In After Virtue, Macintyre continues to develop the above claims. Additionally, 
Macintyre is disgruntled with modern moral philosophy, because it is predominantly 
concerned with trying to settle what appear to be intractable moral disagreements, 
concerned with what are frequently irresolvable dilemmas. One reason that such 
dilemmas are irresolvable is that conflicting moral positions invoke incommensurable 
premises, for example, the ethics of abortion invokes moral (and legal) rights and the 
Kantian idea of universalizability. The meanings now given to these (and other) moral 
notions are hidden, disjointed or empty of substance, that is, meaningless. This is 
prinCipally because the meaning of these moral notions originally derives from 
historical contexts much different from contemporary modernism. 
One of Macintyre's main claims is that some of the social and political arrangements 
typical of modernity prove hostile to the cultivation and exercise of the virtues. 
Macintyre argues that the virtues can only flourish if one has an adequate, shared idea 
of what the good life for man is. For Macintyre, modernism ignores this Aristotelian 
concept. 
Macintyre argues that in contemporary western cultures, virtue terms such as 'justice' 
and 'desert' are used out of context. These terms have been redefined to refer to one's 
obligation to obey the moral rules or principles of justice. Macintyre argues that this 
flawed view of the virtues is adopted by modernism, especially contemporary 
liberalism. Consequently liberalism fails to develop a shared view of the virtues. 
Moreover, because liberalism is wrought up in the idea of the capitalist market, the 
vices, such as individualism and acquisitiveness, are instead cultivated. Finally, 
liberalism, more specifically liberal theory, is also committed to an impartial and neutral 
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view of the good. It maintains an unbiased view between competing conceptions of the 
good. One result of this is that the virtues, especially justice, honesty, and courage are 
not cultivated. 
Since 1981 Macintyre has published four major works in moral and political philosophy: 
After Virtue in 1981 (2nd edition published in 1985); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
in 1988; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry in 1990; and most recently in 1998, 
Dependent Rational Animals - Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. Taken together, 
plus other published papers, Macintyre develops an original set of theses, which he 
argues provides a convincing account of the moral and political life. 
Macintyre's Argument 
In this section, I describe Macintyre's argument, although I limit this discussion to the 
Macintyre found in After Virtue. In his later writings, he revised some of his earlier 
claims. If appropriate I cite from the relevant literature. Where the argument is 
important and dense, I quote Macintyre at some length. 
I limit this discussion to the 3 major theses presented in chapters 14 and 15 in After 
Virtue, where Macintyre develops his account of the virtues. I shall present the 3 
theses (T1-T3) under the following headings (Macintyre does not adopt these 
headings). I then describe and where necessary explain each one: 
• T1 - The role and importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of the self in 
morality; 
• T2 - Macintyre on practices, goods and the virtues; 
• T3 - The role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in morality. 
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T1 - The role and importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of the self in morality 
Macintyre objects to the conception of the 'self' advanced by contemporary liberalism, 
which views individuals as essentially deciding and choosing beings. He rejects the 
liberal view that choosing and deciding largely determine the moral worth and value 
ascribed to an act or person. The liberal self understands the good only as one part of 
making choices and decisions; and this self is the sole arbiter of the latter processes. 
This conception of the self can say, for example, 'I am what I decide to be' or 'I shall 
choose x over y'; it can, if it so desires, include or ignore any or all of the contingent 
social features of one's existence. 
Against this conception of the self, Macintyre proposes a narrative conception. In After 
Virtue Macintyre writes, 
man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a 
story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his 
history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for 
men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question 
'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'of what story or 
stories do I find myself a part?' We enter human society, that is, with 
one or more imputed characters - roles into which we have been 
drafted - and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to 
understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them 
are apt to be construed. 6 
It is clear that Macintyre rejects the liberal idea that an individual is principally a decider 
and chooser. According to Macintyre, a person has an identity, which is partly 
conceived before he or she makes any decisions or choices. Therefore, the central 
question in persons' moral lives is not concerned, as liberals and obligation-based 
theorists claim, with decisions and choices, which we ought to make, "but rather [it is] a 
question about how we are to understand who we are".? 
To summarize these 2 different conceptions of the self: liberalism places the emphasis 
on the idea that humans are primarily choosing and deciding beings. In contrast, 
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Macintyre's narrative conception focuses on the moral context, history and background 
circumstances, which are unchosen, but which help to inform and make ones choices 
meaningful and comprehensible. 
Why does Macintyre refer to his view as 'narrative'? Clearly, this relates to his claims 
about man as a story-telling creature. Furthermore, Horton and Mendus think that 
Macintyre's conception of the self is called narrative because, 
it implies that answers to questions about what we ought to do involve not 
merely (or primarily) choosing what to do as individuals, but also, and 
essentially, discovering who we are in relation to others. 8 
It can be seen that an important theme is developing: it is crucial that one reflects on 
and comprehends how one responds to others and how others respond to us. 
This thesis about the narrative conception of the self in Macintyre's moral theory 
contains both epistemological and normative dimensions. Broadly, for individuals to be 
properly understood - for one to fully understand oneself - reference to the wider 
community, to other beings, needs to take place. There is a requirement to understand 
that through social relations and interpersonal responses, one's being is partly 
constituted. The normative dimension follows from these epistemological claims, for 
these claims have implications for how humans ought to live. This relationship -
between the epistemological and normative - is philosophically interesting and 
stimulating. It is, however, problematic as some critics argue that the normative 
dimension does not necessarily follow from the epistemological (I discuss this point 
further in the 'Objections' section). 
What ought I to do? This question, one of the pivotal questions in moral philosophy, 
lies at the core of obligation-based ethics. Macintyre argues that one must 
acknowledge the importance of the narrative structure to one's life; the story of my life 
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has a certain narrative structure "in which what I am now is continuous with what I was 
in the past".9 Rather than one's life being merely or principally a set of choices and 
decisions, it is a search, a search for one's own identity; for who or what I am and for 
what I ought to do. Macintyre calls this search a quest and it is essential to what he 
calls 'the unity of a person's life'. On this, he says 
In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that 
its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask, 
'What is the good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out that unity 
and bring it to completion. To ask, 'What is the good for man?' is to ask 
what all answers to the former question must have in common. But now 
it is important to emphasize that it is the systematic asking of these two 
questions and the attempt to answer them in deed as well as in word 
which provides the moral life with its unity. The unity of a human life is 
the unity of a narrative quest. 10 
The most important part of discovering the unity of one's life is asking the questions 
'what is the good for me?' and 'what is the good for man?' The unity of one's life is, in 
part, achieved by aiming to provide responses to these two questions, in both one's 
actions and dialogue. It should be noted, however, that this unity to which Macintyre 
refers must be understood from within a social context. Without this perspective, there 
can be no substance to a person's life (however, remember that according to 
Macintyre, one cannot choose one's social context). 
T2 - Macintyre on practices, goods and the virtues 
Macintyre objects to the lack of teleology within contemporary liberalism, indeed the 
latter denies the possibility of a telos for man. One result of this is liberalism's inability 
to evaluate what and who we are and compare and contrast this with what and who we 
ought to be. In short, Macintyre proposes a moral theory that has the virtues at its core. 
Macintyre accords social context a prominent role in morality. Further, he thinks it is 
crucial for humans to consider how their present identity has been formed from the 
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past; Macintyre refers to this as the 'given' in our lives. These ideas are also present in 
his concept of a practice. Macintyre writes, 
Bya 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. 11 
Examples of practices given by Macl ntyre include chess, football, farming, architecture, 
music, painting and the enquiries of physics, chemistry, biology and history. One of the 
most important points about practices, for moral philosophy at least, is that there are 
standards of excellence internal to each practice. On this, Horton and Mendus write 
For example, in order to play chess well, a player must heed the standards 
which define the playing of chess. Not just anything counts as playing 
chess well, and the features which do count are ones which are defined 
by the practice. They are not matters for individual preference or decision-
making. 12 
For Macintyre, morality in general and the virtues in particular should be viewed as 
practice-based. Indeed, he claims that the concept of a practice is crucial to an 
adequate and satisfactory account of the virtues. Individuals cannot simply decide and 
choose what acting morally well means to them. Instead acting well is to be determined 
according to the type of practice(s) one is engaged in. One can see that instead of rigid 
moral rules and obligations, it is the virtues that have a central position in Macintyre's 
conception of morality. He argues that morality should be conceived as a life that 
embodies the virtues. One's understanding of why particular character traits count as 
virtues, and indeed on the question of what virtues are, depend upon our ability to (a) 
recognise the role that virtues play in practices and to (b) reflect critically on the central 
role played by the virtues in the narrative unity of the self. 
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In chapter 14 in After Virtue entitled "The Nature of the Virtues", Macintyre provides a 
tentative definition of a virtue. He writes 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices 
and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. 13 
Macintyre holds that only social and political arrangements that sustain the practices 
and ensure the supply of the internal goods exclusive to each practice, are justifiable. 
Before I provide Macintyre's later revised formulation of a virtue, the idea of internal 
goods requires some clarification. An obvious question perhaps, but are there external 
goods? The response to this is affirmative. Macintyre uses the game of chess to 
explain the distinction between these two types of goods (however, other practices 
could also be used to illustrate this distinction). It is possible to gain both internal and 
external goods by playing chess. Examples of external goods include money, status 
and prestige. These goods can be achieved in other ways besides playing chess; they 
are only externally and contingently attached to the playing of chess. Macintyre asserts 
that the achievement of external goods "is never to be had only by engaging in some 
particular kind of practice".14 
Conversely, the goods internal to playing chess - the practice of chess - cannot be 
achieved by any other means but by playing chess, or as Macintyre adds, another 
game of that kind. What might the internal goods of chess be? It is difficult to state 
categorically what these might be. However, internal goods could include the sorts of 
feelings and attitudes developed and sustained in those who play chess and take pride 
in aiming to be excellent at playing chess. These goods are achieved through striving 
for excellence, meaning that individuals aim to improve on previous practitioners 
whose participation in the practice has formed the history and standards of the 
practice. Why does Macintyre call these goods internal? Two reasons are given: 
281 
first, as I have already suggested, because we can only specify them in terms 
of chess or some other game of that specific kind and by means of examples 
from such games ... and secondly because they can only be identified and 
recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question.15 
In reply to the question, 'what are the internal goods of chess?' it is impossible for one 
who does not play the game of chess to answer. For Macintyre, individuals ought to 
relate their lives to the numerous different types of practices that make up their lives 
and the virtues are crucial to this process. His reformulated definition of a virtue, which 
takes this into account, suggests virtues are to be understood as dispositions 
which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods 
internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of 
quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, 
temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish 
us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. 16 
It is useful to repeat the 4 claims made in the above quote. The virtues: 
I. sustain practices; 
II. enable humans to achieve the internal goods of practices; 
III. ensure that we continue on our search or quest for the good life; 
IV. help to provide us with greater self-knowledge and knowledge of the good life 
for man. 
Thus, the virtues help us to proceed with our search for the good life. They help us to 
prevent or deal with harmful and negative aspects of life, which might lead us away 
from the quest for the good. Furthermore, the virtues develop one's knowledge of 
oneself and knowledge of what the good for one consists in. 
Before I consider Macintyre's concept of a tradition, I shall comment further on what 
Macintyre means by a good life. As noted in Chapter 3, many virtues are necessary to 
meet the ends of practices that humans participate in. For example, the virtues 
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required to achieve the ends of law will differ from those needed in farming. 
Furthermore, virtues are needed to sustain different types of communities, for instance, 
political and social communities; respective examples here are different political 
ideologies and families. Men and women can search for the good in their moral lives, 
while philosophers too can enquire about the nature of the good. Macintyre concludes, 
albeit provisionally, that the good life for man is, 
the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues 
necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to 
understand what more and less the good life for man is.17 
However, the view that the good life is the life spent seeking the good life is open to 
criticism (this is discussed in the 'Objections' section). For Macintyre, the practices and 
the exercise of the virtues that sustain the practices must knit together in such a way 
that individuals come to understand that the life of virtue is indeed a good way of living 
one's Iife. 18 After all, it should not be assumed that individuals will know that the 
virtuous life is worthwhile, more so than sayan egoistical life. But the question of how 
one can know that the life of virtue is a good life and how different practices knit 
together are complex. 
T3 - The role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in morality 
To recap thus far: First, Macintyre has provided a narrative conception of the self, 
which has advantages over liberalism's conception, such as it takes seriously the 
moral context, history and background circumstances of individuals' lives. Second, 
Macintyre defined the virtues in relation to practices and then linked this to the good 
life for man. 
The third (and final) stage concerns the concept of a tradition of enquiry. According to 
Macintyre, it is important to remember that contemporary liberalism ignores the role 
283 
and importance played by social context and history in morality. One result of this is 
that the given in one's moral life is not acknowledged by liberalism. 
Macintyre argues that individuals cannot search for the good for man or exercise the 
virtues qua individuals. He provides two reasons for this claim. First, individuals live in 
different social circumstances, living the good life changes according to these 
circumstances. For instance, the good life for a sixth-century Athenian general will be 
quite different to the good life for a seventeenth-century farmer. Or the good life for a 
homeless person will be markedly different to that of a millionaire businessperson. 
Second, all individuals have a particular social identity, with which one approaches 
one's specific circumstances. For example, I am someone's son, my sister is 
someone's daughter, I am a member of the nursing profession and a citizen of 
England. Macl ntyre believes that what is good for me must be the good for others who 
take on these roles. Furthermore, Macintyre writes 
I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of 
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute 
the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my 
life its own moral particularity.19 
This reference to debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations helps to 
shed some light on one's understanding of Macintyre's phrase, the 'given in our lives'. 
These features of the moral life are inherited - consciously or not - from the past. 
Macintyre seems to be suggesting that these features will ensure particular moral 
starting points. While this implies (at least on the surface) individualism at odds with his 
previous claims (especially those in T1), it is balanced by his view that part of one's 
identity consists in social and historical roles. These roles consist in ends that apply to 
each person who takes on that role. It seems to me that Macintyre is no liberal when, 
regarding the narrative conception of the self, he says "the story of my life is always 
embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity".20 In other 
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words: 'I cannot map my identity, I am unable to keep track of who and what I am 
, 
without reference to other beings, who form the community I live in'. 
On Macintyre's view, much of what I am is inherited. Parts of the past impinge on my 
present. I am part of a history, although I may not realise or accept this. As such, I am 
a bearer of a tradition of enquiry. In After Virtue Macintyre defines a living tradition as, 
An historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.21 
Greater clarification on this definition is given by Mulhall and Swift who write 
A tradition is constituted by a set of practices and is a mode of under-
standing their importance and worth; it is the medium by which such 
practices are shaped and transmitted across generations.22 
Mulhall and Swift state that there are many types of traditions. Three examples are 
moral, for instance, humanism, religious, for instance, Catholicism, and economic, for 
instance, a profession. It is important to note that traditions are not static, but dynamic. 
Possibilities exist not only for an individual to embark on a quest and to acknowledge 
the given in one's life, but also to reflect in a critical manner about the nature and 
content of the traditions and practices which one finds oneself a part. This dynamism is 
described by Horton and Mendus, who remark, 
Traditions change and develop over time; some decay and fall into 
terminal disrepair and some emerge in response to changed 
circumstances. 23 
Because of this dynamism, Macintyre believes that the concept of a tradition is not in 
the least conservative (however, it is clear later on that others disagree on this). 
Macintyre's moral theory can now be understood to encompass a narrative conception 
of the self, a conception of practices and the crucial role of the virtues in the 
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sustenance of the practices and latterly, an understanding of a tradition of enquiry, 
which situates the aforementioned in a wider context. 
As noted earlier, the diverse sets of practices that exist within society define the 
virtues. These practices are situated within and help to sustain a tradition of enquiry, 
"which provides the resources with which the individual may pursue his or her quest for 
the good".24 Included, as a vital component of this quest is moral deliberation and 
action. These rely heavily on standards of rationality, which form part of the overall 
tradition of enquiry in question. Since After Virtue, Macintyre has increasingly focused 
on the notion of rationality and the concept of a tradition. 
Further discussion of and objections to Macintyre's thesis 
In this section I discuss further some of the detail in Macintyre's moral argument as 
outlined in After Virtue. I present several objections levelled against his theory. These 
points of discussion and objections are crudely categorised according to the thesis that 
the objection targets. But these theses merge together and overlap. It is therefore 
necessary and fruitful to remember that each one forms part of a larger moral 
argument and each needs to be comprehended and contextualised as such. Below is 
T1-T3 again: 
• T1 - The role and importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of the self in 
morality; 
• T2 - Macintyre on practices, goods and the virtues; 
• T3 - The role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in morality. 
T1 - The role and importance of Macintyre's narrative conception of the self in morality 
On the epistemological and normative dimensions of the self 
Macintyre alludes to the fact that his narrative conception of the self contains both 
epistemological and normative dimensions. As noted, Horton and Mendus pick up on 
286 
this. Consider the following example. John is a 40-year-old farmer, married to Jean. 
They have 2 children, one son, Daniel aged 10 and a daughter, Julie aged 5. John has 
farmed all his life, inheriting his North Yorkshire farm from his parents 10 years ago. He 
employs two aides, Brian and Todd. There are other farms in the surrounding area, the 
most prominent one is owned by John's friend Jack. For John to get to know himself 
well, for him to strive to understand who and what he is, he needs to be aware and 
understand that his being is partly constituted through his relations with and responses 
to others. These others include John's relationships with Jean, Daniel and julie. 
Additionally, there are his relationships with Brian and Todd to consider and how he 
gets on and responds to Jack, other local farmers and the local community. These 
claims are epistemological in nature, because they deal with beliefs about one's 
identify (in this sense then, these claims also have a metaphysical component). Horton 
and Mendus claim that the normative dimension -how one should live one's life -
follows from these epistemological claims. In other words, knowing who one is and 
what kind of person one is and relating this knowledge to getting on with others, has 
implications for how one ought to live. 
The above epistemological and normative claims appear plausible. It is clear that these 
claims apply to general ethics as a whole and not just to virtue ethics. An individual 
who fails to understand or does not attempt to understand herself, one who takes little 
or no interest in how she responds to others (or how others respond to her) could be 
called egoistic, self-interested or even, in an extreme case, amoral. If everyone acted 
in self-interested ways, then social relations would crumble or fail to develop in the first 
place. Because of their lack of concern for others, individuals would show no interest in 
inculcating the virtues; so that for example, trust, honesty and loyalty would be 
marginalized. The lack of such virtues would not merely be responsible for the failure 
of human relationships; business and economics would also suffer badly. As someone 
who wants to be virtuous, it is important that when I reflect on my thoughts and plan my 
287 
actions (at least those I am capable of planning), I take others' interests into account. I 
would add that I ought to care about others' interests. Suppose that Ethel has just 
started work as a typist in my small company. I know that one of my positive traits is 
showing patience with others. This trait did not come naturally; I had to work hard to 
inculcate it. But I saw how being patient helped other people and so I aim to be patient 
with others. Nancy, the senior typist, complains to me that Ethel is 'just too slow'. 
Nancy believes that Ethel should have a typing speed in excess of 35 w.p.m. I talk with 
Ethel and during the conversation it emerges that Ethel, though experienced, is a very 
nervous person who needs a few weeks to settle into a new post. I tell Ethel that we 
can wait for her to settle in. I ask Ethel if I can discuss this with Nancy. After gaining 
her permission, I explain the situation to Nancy and ask that she is more patient with 
Ethel. Two weeks later, Ethel has settled into her new job and has made a few friends. 
She now types at 60 w.p.m. This example illustrates the moral value and worth of 
knowing one's traits (positive and negative), caring about others and whenever 
possible helping others. It seems to me that epistemological and normative claims and 
the necessary link between them, forms the basis of morality; at least if one wishes to 
be moral and values forming good relationships with others. 
On choosing and deciding 
If one accepts Macintyre's primary claim, that contemporary liberalism views 
individuals as essentially choosing and deciding beings, then tile secondary claim, that 
the process of deciding and choosing determines the moral worth of a person or a 
person's acts, remains open to criticism. There is more to this than merely choosing 
and deciding. Many liberals are deontologists who focus on obeying moral obligations, 
for example, beneficence, justice and respect for one's autonomy. Other liberals are 
consequentialists, concerned with maximizing or optimizing good consequences. As 
noted in Chapter 4, deontologists and consequentialists focus on actions especially the 
question 'what should I do?' Their response is to invoke moral obligations, rules and 
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principles. Deontologists also invoke the notion of moral rights. The latter theorists are 
convinced that the moral value of an act concerns not only the aforementioned moral 
notions, but also moral concepts such as intention. I accept that one needs to choose 
which of the aforementioned moral notions will guide one's actions. But I have noted 
that morality is also concerned with other relevant features. And although exercising 
judgment involves a series of choices and decisions, this moral concept and moral 
wisdom too require extensive examination. 
Macintyre is caustic and sceptical at the prime role liberals assign to choosing and 
deciding. An example showing that Macintyre is anti-liberal is his claim that one is 
'drafted' into human roles, which provides one with one's character. His use of 'drafted' 
implies one has no choice. This supports the idea that in wanting a moral theory that 
takes into account the role of history and society in moral philosophy, Macintyre has 
unfortunately gone overboard in his criticism of the idea of 'choosing and deciding'. His 
theory has undoubted merits (see 'Merits' section). However, it is severely anti-liberal 
and it does not need to be, at least not in such a sustained manner. 
On the good life 
According to Macintyre, men and women can search for the good in their moral lives. 
For him, it is searching for the good life that actually constitutes a good life. Two points 
here are worth making. First, there is no mention of a shared conception of the good. 
But, if each person can search and discover a good then this is a liberal, not a 
Maclntyrian, idea. Second, and more importantly, how would Macintyre respond to the 
following: 'during one's search for the good life, one displays, on several occasions, 
certain vices, for instance impatience and intolerance. Is this still an example of a good 
life?' It is hard to see what Macintyre's strategy could be here. I doubt he would 
conclude that this sort of life is a life of vice, because acting from the vices 'on several 
occasions' does not constitute a life of vice. Indeed, it suggests that there were many 
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times when one did not act out of the vices. Macintyre claims that the virtues 
necessary to search for the good life are those that help shed light on what the good 
life is and is not. These virtues are intellectual virtues (noted by Aristotle in Chapter 3). 
Wisdom, both theoretical and practical, is an example of an intellectual virtue (moral 
wisdom has been examined in detail in the previous Chapter). The role of the 
intellectual virtues such as wisdom is clear to see when one is searching for 
something. It will be beneficial to the searcher if one possess wisdom rather than say 
the moral virtue of compassion (however, I suggest that patience is also implicated). 
Denying a telos for man? 
Another example of Macintyre's characterization of liberalism is his implication that it 
denies a tel os for man. Is a telos for man the only way in which one can formulate who 
one ought to be and what one ought to do? If these two claims are correct, then it is 
true to suggest that liberalism is unable to contrast who one is and what one does with 
who one ought to be and what one ought to do. A simple, yet accurate, 
characterization of liberalism holds that each person is a choosing and deciding being. 
If correct, this then explains why a telos for man (an overall purpose for mankind) is 
denied by it. 
In his defence, Macintyre does suggest that human choices are important to our 
'selves'. However, on his view one is required to take other features into account. For 
example, moral context, history and background circumstances, because these help us 
to understand our choices and decisions. I concur with Macintyre on this; without these 
features our choices and decisions would effectively be meaningless. On Macintyre's 
view, one could conclude that liberals regard choosing and deciding as sufficient in 
morality. Macintyre believes however that these processes are only necessary and as 
such, are only of use when contextualized. However, some liberals would agree with 
Macintyre on this. Therefore, Macintyre has done contemporary liberalism a disservice 
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by making such a broad and perhaps inaccurate representation of it, particularly the 
liberal conception of the self. 
Man as a story telling animal 
Macintyre says that man is essentially a story-telling animal. Is this an accurate 
representation? Especially during childhood, stories and story telling are undeniably an 
important part of one's moral education. As exemplified by so-called fairy tales, often 
these stories do not aim at the truth. But they serve a vital role in entertaining and 
amusing children; moreover they teach children about good and bad people, the world 
and one's place in it. In adulthood too, stories do not always aim at the truth. For 
example, some types of stories aim to stretch one's imagination (riddles) or make one 
laugh Uokes). Others, of course, aim at telling people what and why events occurred in 
the past (historical stories). The latter is an example of narratives that aim at the truth 
or at least the historian's version of the truth. Aristotle argued that man is a rational 
animal: stories play an important role in determining standards of rationality. Of course, 
much of Macintyre's claim depends upon what is meant by 'truth'. The philosophical 
literature describes several theories of truth, for example, coherence25 and pragmatic26 
theories of truth. It will, in part, depend upon which theory is adopted as to whether the 
telling of stories is a/ways a means of relaying truthful information. 
MaCintyre's narrative conception of the self is relevant to moral philosophy. If by 
'stories' Macintyre means, not just fairy tales that adults tell to children, but rather 
relaying information about one's life to other people, then I would agree that man is 
essentially a story-telling animal. 
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T2 - Macintyre on practices, goods and the virtues 
The flourishing of the virtues in modernity 
Macintyre argues that the virtues cannot flourish within modernity, because radical 
disagreement exists on the notion of the good life for man. There is therefore no single 
shared conception. His conclusion is that the virtues will thus be marginalized. On this 
claim, Mason asks 
Why does it follow that the virtues must suffer when there is no 
agreement on a substantive conception of the good.27 
To illustrate Macintyre's argument, Mason focuses on distributive justice. To 
summarize Macintyre here: justice as a virtue was originally conceived in terms of 
desert. What one deserved was judged according to one's contribution to the 
community, which held a shared conception of the good. However, as noted earlier, 
the virtue of justice has become redefined in terms of a disposition to obey the rules 
and principles of justice. In part, this has happened because of the lack of any 
consensus regarding what forms the community's good. But because there are 
different rules and principles of justice, there is radical disagreement on the nature and 
content of justice as a virtue (if it is viewed as a virtue at all). 
Mason is uncertain about what Macintyre's precise point is. He believes that Macintyre 
might be making one of three points: 
1. The virtue of justice will be marginalized because it is understood as 
supplementary to the rules and principles of justice. However, even in this 
context, Mason claims that justice as a virtue could still thrive. He argues that 
no necessary reason arises why the status of justice within our culture must 
diminish; despite the fact that various conceptions of justice as a virtue exist. 
He concludes that virtue terms - desert, for instance - could remain widely 
292 
used in everyday discourse and humans could continue to highly value the 
virtues; 
2. The virtue of justice - understood, according to Macintyre, as a trait that is 
needed to sustain a particular practice - will be marginalized. Mason thinks that 
justice, as a virtue on this conception will include one's ability to impartially 
judge one's contribution to the community's good. Therefore, if the virtue of 
justice was understood as a disposition to obey the rules and principles of 
justice, it might be conceived as a disposition to obey the rule: "people should 
be rewarded in accordance with their contribution to the community's good".28 
For Mason, this rule is plausible and could attract supporters. Mason is aware 
that Macintyre's response might be to argue that this rule would still be 
insufficient. This is because there would remain no shared conception of the 
good. Mason believes that this reply would lead Macintyre into a tautology. 
Mason writes 
justice, conceived (at least in part) as a disposition to reward people 
according to what they deserve on the basis of their contribution to 
the good of the community will not flourish where there is radical 
disagreement, since part of what it is for it to flourish is for people 
to share a conception of the community's good and to believe that 
contributions to it should be rewarded. 29 
3. Finally, MaCintyre might instead be saying that justice, as a virtue needed to 
sustain practices, cannot flourish unless this conception is widely accepted. 
This is because if there is no practice-based conception of the virtues, then the 
shared practices that ground and define the virtues will not survive. This idea 
links to Macintyre's claim that individuals are unable to seek the good life or 
exercise the virtues only qua individuals. The point here is that some form of 
shared understanding about the practices and their internal goods is required to 
sustain the practice in question. And the follow up claim is that if consensus is 
present, then a measure of co-operation will be too. This co-operation, 
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including the forming and maintenance of good relationships between 
individuals, assisted by the exercise of the virtues, will help people in their 
search for the internal goods. 
However, Mason counters this argument by suggesting that while it avoids the 
aforementioned tautology, for the virtues to flourish he believes that there need not be 
a shared conception of the good and the virtues need not be the same across 
communities. On the flourishing of the virtues, Mason writes 
the virtues might also flourish in a society made up of a number of 
different practices, each practice involving a group of individuals 
who shared a conception of the good, and hence who could co-
operate with each other in pursuit of it.3o 
I accept this claim. Justice as a virtue is distinct ·from justice as a disposition to obey 
the principle of justice. In part the difference is a matter of moral motivation. That is, the 
virtue of justice is a character trait that individuals inculcate and exercise on a habitual 
basis. They do so because they think it is valuable for its own sake and because they 
understand that being just will help to benefit others. Acting from the obligation of 
justice is different because one can act in accordance with moral obligations without 
accepting and understanding what it means to think and feel just. The obligation or 
principle of justice focuses on just actions and the motive is one of moral and legal 
duties. However, as long as individuals value the content of justice as a virtue (and 
other virtues too) and there is a real sense of moral admiration for those who are just, 
plus a dedicated and consistent attempt to foster the virtues, especially in children, 
then it seems to me that the virtues can flourish. 
Moreover, I agree with Mason on: (a) there need not be a shared conception of the 
good; (b) the virtues need not be the same across communities; and (c) the virtues can 
flourish given different types of practices, where within each practice a shared 
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conception of the good exists. However, Macintyre suggests several times in After 
Virtue that he might also agree with (c), insofar as he readily accepts that different 
types of practices exist in society. I doubt whether Macintyre would insist that there 
ought to be just one shared conception of the good within all of these practices. Even 
in (c) above, I would expect some individuals within a specific practice not to agree 
entirely on the conception of the good. There would probably be some shared items on 
each person's list. Discussion and debate could centre on which of these items are 
most plausible and why. Moreover, there need not be any utilitarian calculus 
performed. Furthermore, complete consensus on the good among many individuals is 
something that is unrealistic, unwelcome and not worthy of admiration. As Rawls31 
remarks, disagreement over different conceptions of the good is to be expected in a 
modern democratic society. 
Macintyre responds to these comments by arguing that such disagreements are 
resolvable, but only by appealing to a form of Thomism, a tradition of moral thought 
based upon the work of Thomas Aquinas. Crudely, he thinks that his version of 
Thomism has rationally compelling reasons that will convince others to jettison their 
own theories and adopt Thomism instead. Macintyre's version of Thomism explored in 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?32 unsurprisingly adopts a fixed conception of the 
good for man. Consequently this ensures there are no radical disagreements in 
morality and politics. Macintyre aims to show in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
why other theorists should abandon their traditions of moral thought. He insists that 
once they understand his version of Thomism, they will indeed do so. 
On practices 
The virtues are not merely required to engage in the practices. Nor are they just 
required to meet the ends of each practice in a morally (and technically) excellent 
manner. Instead, the practices define what the virtues are. In other words, the 
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practices tell us which traits are to be counted as virtues and why and provides their 
content. 
Miller on Macintyre's notion of a practice 
Miller33 makes an important distinction between what he calls self-contained and 
purposive practices. He accuses Macintyre of missing this important distinction. Miller 
believes that this distinction has implications for how the virtues - most notably, 
courage and justice - are understood and how they relate to the internal goods. 
Miller claims that Macintyre's list of practices is so diverse that the notion of a practice 
is made more complicated than it should be. According to Miller, self-contained 
practices - for instance, chess and cricket - are entirely concerned with "the internal 
goods achieved by partiCipants and the contemplation of these achievements by 
others".34 Conversely, Miller believes that purposive practices serve other (usually) 
social ends. Miller thinks that Macintyre's distinction between internal and external 
goods is well made. However, this is because Macintyre focuses on games, such as 
chess, where the distinction is quite obvious. Miller explains that the internal goods 
gained through playing a fine innings of cricket would be "incomprehensible in the 
absence of the game itself'. He then claims that "the standard of excellence 
involved .... can only be identified by reference to the history of the game".35 In other 
words, the sorts of things - particular skills, strokes, positioning of the bat and so on -
that make an innings 'fine' have been developed through the history of the game by 
previous cricketers. One important point is that self-contained practices can only be 
judged by those who partiCipate in them. In arguing that non-participants probably have 
insufficient knowledge to identify the internal goods, Macintyre's claim seems to be 
excessively exclusive. 
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Miller continues by claiming that in the purposive practices of farming or the activities 
of physicists or historians, there is an external social purpose that helps to provide the 
point or raison d'etre of the particular practice. For instance, the social purpose of 
farming could be 'producing food for the community', while for physiCists it might be 
'discovering and finding evidence to support the truths of physics'. Judgement on the 
standards of excellence within these practices can legitimately be made from people 
who do not participate in the practice. 
Miller's distinction makes MacIntyre's claims about the differences between the internal 
and external goods less convincing. In farming, for example, there is still the distinction 
between being an excellent farmer and the various extrinsic goods, such as, 
developing a good local reputation and money that could accompany success as a 
farmer. But on Miller's view, because farming has an important social purpose being an 
excellent farmer also concerns things that are external to that practice. 
Miller illustrates his concern by referring to the example of medicine (which Macintyre 
mentioned in After Virtue, but failed to develop). Actually stating what the internal 
goods of medicine are is not particularly straightforward. Perhaps it is 'being an 
excellent doctor'. However, Miller points out that this might mean different things. For 
instance, it could refer to 'someone who is excellent at healing the sick' or to 'someone 
who carries out the standards of the medical community in an excellent manner'. 
These two meanings might indeed diverge to a degree. If so, Miller argues that the 
practice will have fallen victim to professional deformation, he writes "A good practice 
here is one whose standards of excellence are related directly to its wider purpose".36 
In self-contained practices such as chess or cricket, the rules and standards can only 
be assessed internally by practitioners taking part. Whereas with purposive practices, 
for example, farming, architecture or physics, the practice as a whole can be reviewed 
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by comparing it against the end it is meant to serve. Take medicine as an example. It is 
possible to compare different forms of medicine, for instance Chinese versus Western. 
Or it is possible to compare different forms of surgical techniques for say hip 
replacement operations. Standards of excellence relating to these forms of medicine or 
techniques may change and these changes may be made following a review of such 
comparisons. Adopting Miller's distinction between self-contained and purposive 
practices means that in purposive practices, the standards of excellence and internal 
goods will be related to the particular ends of the practice. 
Miller believes that Macintyre makes a mistake in assuming that all practices are the 
self-contained type (even farming, which seems to have a clear social worth). Miller 
believes that this assumption is supported by Macintyre's examples and by Macintyre's 
claim that the standards of excellence are only developed through internal debate with 
specific practices. It is this assumption that helps ground and make possible 
Macintyre's account of the virtues. 
For Macintyre the virtues are personal qualities, dispositions or traits of character 
required to sustain the practices and achieve the goods internal to each practice. 
These goods may alter as practices develop. But newly suggested traits cannot simply 
qualify as virtues on the basis of some social goal or purpose. 
However, Miller argues that the virtues should be understood as dispositions that 
sustain purposive practices. Thus any 'list' of the virtues must be formulated according 
to the social goals, ends and purposes that each practice is meant to serve. It follows 
from this that the virtues themselves are no longer independent or self-sufficient 
dispositions. Instead, they are dependent upon an understanding of a particular 
society's dominant purposes and needs. According to Miller, the main arena for the 
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manifestation of the virtues will be related to purposive practices - for instance, farming 
and medicine - and not towards self-contained practices. 
Miller looks at two specific virtues, namely courage and justice. He asks, 'When do we 
think of people displaying courage? First, during wartime or on the battlefield. Second, 
when acting humanely in dangerous situations. Finally, when putting up with intense 
pain with equanimity. He believes these are central cases. One could also speak of 
courage as that quality displayed by, for instance, parachutists. But here he believes 
one might use the term 'daring' instead. This is because this activity - and others like it 
- is optional; people participate through choice. For Miller, a distinctly 'moral' term like 
courage does not appear to be warranted in these lesser cases. On this point, he 
writes 
Unlike courage displayed in the service of a valued end such as the 
saving of life or the defence of one's homeland, courage displayed 
merely for its own sake is hardly the genuine thing. 37 
Miller's conclusion is that plausible accounts of courage, justice and perhaps other 
virtues need to relate to purposive, not self-contained practices. 
How does Macintyre respond to Miller's criticisms? In short, Macintyre rejects these. 
He believes that if practices are valued for their external purposes, then these activities 
are hostile or opposed to practices. According to Macintyre, these types of activities 
are linked to modern economic systems, which are organised in ways that exclude the 
necessary features of practices. 
Macintyre also charges Miller with missing a crucial distinction, "that between a 
practice and the way in which it is institutionalized" .38 This distinction helps one to 
comprehend (a) how external and internal goods are related and (b) how the virtues 
relate to internal goods. Macintyre admits that if, in After Virtue, he had focused in 
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greater detail on productive crafts, for example, fishing and farming, then this 
distinction and the above two points might have been better realized. He explains this 
point when he writes, 
The aim internal to such productive crafts, when they are in good order, 
is never only to catch fish ... lt is to do so in a manner consonant with 
the excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a good product, 
but the craft person is perfected through and in her or his activity. 39 
T3 - The role and importance of a tradition of enquiry in morality 
The threat of moral relativism 
One of the reoccurring criticisms levelled at Macintyre's moral theory, as outlined in 
After Virtue, concerns the concept of a tradition. Briefly, the objection is that because 
his moral theory focuses to such an extent on the idea of a tradition, it collapses into a 
form of moral relativism. More precisely, the claim is that individuals find themselves 
trapped within a particular tradition. Because they lack the necessary intellectual and 
practical resources, they are unable to enter into dialogue and adjudicate between 
other traditions. The result is that individuals cannot free themselves from the tradition 
they find themselves in. 
Macintyre fails to deal with this possible objection in After Virtue. However, he picks up 
on it later in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry. It is pertinent to note that Macintyre rejects this objection. Despite morality 
being essentially tradition-dependent and although the given in persons' lives derives 
from traditions, Macintyre believes individuals are able to enter into debate and rational 
argument between contrasting traditions. Thus, in his view, moral relativism is avoided. 
On liberalism ignoring social and historical contexts in moral philosophy 
There may be some truth in Macintyre's assertion that contemporary liberalism ignores 
the role of social and historical contexts in moral philosophy. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that because of this liberalism completely fails to acknowledge the 
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given - what is already present in one's life, through one's past, community and nation 
- in one's moral life. Macintyre's provides a crude characterization of contemporary 
liberalism. 
Perhaps I misunderstand Macintyre, but he appears to confuse two points in his 
discussion of social roles and identities. First, he believes that all individuals have 
particular social identities. This is correct, I have no dispute with this claim. This means 
persons all have individual identities, in several respects persons are quite different. 
Second, Macintyre claims that the good for one person must be the good for others 
who take on that role. The use of 'must' here is misplaced. Even if this claim was true, 
it should not be conceived as an obligation, although it appears that this is Macintyre's 
conception. 
More notable, however, is the fact that Macintyre appears to confuse social roles with 
one's particular character. There are grounds for believing these are distinct. For 
example, it does not necessarily follow that Jack (the son of John) will share the same 
conception of the good as Brian (the son of Norman). Or that Bruce, a farmer, will 
share the same conception of the good as Frank, another farmer. These individuals 
might hold conceptions of the good containing certain items that appear on each of 
their lists. This phenomenon, however, might arise out of coincidence, experience (for 
example, knowledge of what is needed to be a successful farmer) or sheer luck. 
Examples of shared items include good health, sufficient money to live well, good, long 
lasting relationships with friends and enjoyable and stimulating jobs. Many people 
would include some (or all) of these items on their list of goods. But the many different 
particulars that make ones' lives unique - one's hopes, attitudes, fears and beliefs, not 
to mention the various pragmatic circumstances that shape human lives - ensure that 
many of us would will conceive of the good life in different ways. (Later in After Virtue, 
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Macintyre says that the given in each of our lives gives us a different moral identity or 
particularity. Here, he seems to be acknowledging the uniqueness of individuals' lives.) 
Conclusions 
Macintyre's account of the virtues has been described and examined. I have 
interpreted his account presented in After Virtue to consist of 3 theses: the role and 
importance of a narrative conception of the self in morality; the meaning and nature of 
practices, goods and the virtues; and the role and importance of a tradition of enquiry 
in morality. 
Macintyre believes that moral philosophers have failed to socially and historically 
contextualize modern obligation-based moral theories. Such theorists have tended to 
ignore the role and importance of history and social theory in moral philosophy. 
Instead of a liberal conception of the self, which contemporary liberal theory proposes, 
Macintyre advances a narrative conception of the self. The latter conception focuses 
on the moral context, history and background circumstances of peoples' lives, which 
are unchosen, but which help to inform and make one's choices meaningful and 
comprehensible. According to Macintyre, man is essentially a story telling animal. 
I have provided Macintyre's conception of a practice. A 'practice' is the name given to 
a complex series of human activities that strive towards standards of excellence and 
realize entities called internal goods. Macintyre's examples of practices include chess 
and farming. For Macintyre, a virtue is a disposition that: sustains practices; enables 
humans to achieve the internal goods of practices; ensures that humans continue on 
their search or quest for the good life; and help to provide humans with greater self-
knowledge and knowledge of the good life for man. It is sometimes difficult to identify 
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the internal goods of a practice; Macintyre believes that only those people who 
participate in the practice will be able to do this. The internal goods of chess could 
include the sorts of feelings and attitudes developed and sustained in those who play 
chess and take pride in aiming to be excellent at playing chess. Conversely, external 
goods include things such as wealth, power and prestige that can all be obtained by 
participating in other activities. 
A tradition of enquiry contextualizes and situates the narrative conception of the self 
and the practices and virtues. A tradition can be seen as an intellectual argument that 
provides a way of understanding the value of practices. Traditions are dynamic and 
change over time; they shape practices and help them to live on through future 
generations. Practices are situated within and help to sustain a tradition of enquiry. 
I have examined several objections levelled against Macintyre's account. Perhaps the 
most notable is Miller's distinction between self-contained and purposive practices. 
Miller believes that purposive practices such as medicine serve social ends. Whereas, 
self-contained practices such as chess and cricket are entirely concerned with the 
internal goods of that practice and how participants can achieve the internal goods. 
It should be clear by now that I share many of Macintyre's concerns with modern moral 
philosophy. It seems to me that Macintyre provides a rigorous and thought provoking 
account of the virtues. I believe that some of his ideas have value and application 
within nursing practice and nursing ethics. Thus, in the next Chapter, I apply some of 
his ideas to my conception of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice, which I 
proposed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 9 - MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE VIRTUES AND 
THE VIRTUE-BASED APPROACH TO MORAL DECISION-
MAKING IN NURSING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
The conception of the virtues and the virtue-based approach to moral decision making in 
nursing that I explicated in Chapter 7 is a defensible and well-argued account. Having 
examined Macintyre's account of the virtues in general ethics, it is quite clear that some 
of his ideas, for example, those concerning a narrative account of the self and the 
conception of a practice, could be applied to nursing practice. Therefore this is what I 
aim to do in this Chapter. I intend to provide further theoretical and philosophical 
foundations for the plausibility and viability of a strong virtue-based approach to nursing 
practice. 
Nursing practice, narratives and morality 
In Chapter 2, I described and examined some of the emotions that persons can feel 
during periods of illness. The process of hospitalization can intensify such emotions. I 
focused on the following emotions: anxiety, fear, powerlessness, vulnerability and 
dependence on others for help. Patients can describe and express their feelings about 
iI/ness in the form of a narrative. The virtue-based approach encourages a nurse to listen 
to patient's narratives, because the emphasis is not solely upon the nature and 
consequences of actions. Rather the focus is also on patient's character traits and this 
approach recognizes the value and worth of emotions in one's moral life. Central to the 
virtue-based approach is the need for nurses to inculcate the virtues, which aims to 
develop and maintain morally good interpersonal responses. Macintyre's narrative 
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conception of the self recognizes the importance of interpersonal responses. Nurses and 
patients can better understand who they are through an examination and reflection of 
interpersonal responses. 
For Macintyre, the central question in one's moral life is 'how am I to understand who I 
am?' Thus, questions and reflections concerning personal identity and self-awareness 
regarding both intra personal and interpersonal responses become crucial features of the 
moral life. Who and what I am concerns context and one's role as a nurse. 
In Chapter 2, I mentioned the empowering effects that listening to patients' narrative 
accounts of illness can have. The virtue-based nurse desires to know about and 
understand the patient's lived experience of illness. Take a patient with chronic 
rheumatoid arthritis (eRA) as an example. The nurse wants to discover how the eRA 
affects the quality of the patient's life. How do inflamed joints affect her activities of 
living? What sorts of problems of living are caused by the eRA? Note that the nurse will 
gather and assimilate information about physical and emotional needs. Nurses who wish 
to learn about such stories from patients will require patience because one needs to 
spend time building up such a profile. But such nurses will be motivated to spend time 
with the patient, ask relevant questions, listen to the patient's responses that tell a 
personal and emotive story and aim to understand the patient's needs. This process is 
not simple. It requires a certain degree of enthusiasm for nursing, dedication to the role 
of being a nurse and the exercise of virtues such as patience, tolerance and 
industriousness. The nurse wishes to understand such a narrative account of the 
patient's illness to help situate the patient at the centre of care. The current in vogue 
ideal of patient-centred care surely needs to take seriously the idea that nurses should 
be listening to patients' narrative accounts of illness. The virtue-based approach through 
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self-reflection and reflection of the patient's needs and interests promotes and facilitates 
answers to the questions 'how in this situation can I help my patient' and 'how in this 
situation should I respond to my patient's needs?' 
Part of the effect of listening to a patient's narrative account of illness should be that it 
becomes easier to view a patient's time on the ward as only one moment out of the 
person's whole life. The narrative conception of the self helps one to think of patients' 
pasts, presents and futures. For instance, a nurse is caring for a patient named John. 
The present is John's time spent on the ward as a patient with eRA undergoing 
investigations with the aim to alleviate swelling and pain. But John is 65 years old, he 
has a past. The nurse knows little about his past, some factual information is written in 
the medical and nursing documentation. But there is no sense of John as a person, his l values, beliefs and life plans. Nor can anyone know what will happen to John in the 
future; once he has been discharged, no one knows what might happen regarding his 
life and illness. 
Macintyre's account of morality is context dependent, it is a particularist approach rather 
than the universal approach adopted by obligation-based moral theories especially 
Kantianism. Macintyre's account focuses on the moral context, history and background 
circumstances of one's life that provide meaning and facilitate understanding of possible 
decisions, choices, actions and ways of responding to others. The vast range of morally 
relevant features help to illuminate the context and specific circumstances of individual, 
unique situations and interactions. Of course, being there does not guarantee that a 
nurse will see these features; this will depend in part on moral perception, which the 
virtue-based approach heightens. 
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In response to the question 'what ought I to do?' a nurse can search for her identity by 
asking questions such as 'who am I?' According to Macintyre, one goes on a quest for 
the unity of one's life. Such a quest requires a social context. Questions such as 'what is 
the good for me as an individual nurse? and 'what is the good for this team of nurses?' 
need to be posed. 
According to Horton and Mendus 1, although answers to 'what ought we to do?' involve 
asking what one should do as an individual, they concern more importantly discovering 
who one is in relation to other people. Who am I in relation to other nurses? Who am I in 
relation to a patient? Clearly, the patient knows me as a nurse. But am I a distant 
professional, a friend or a carer who exercises the virtue of friendliness? In response to 
these sorts of questions, at least two things are required: reflection (including self-
reflection) and self-awareness. According to the virtue-based approach, nurses should 
engage in reflection of other people, oneself and the world one inhabits. Might self-
reflection promote self-awareness? I believe it helps. Developing self-awareness is 
crucial to the virtue-based approach; an awareness of one's good and bad traits of 
character, of motives and desires for being a nurse, of ideas regarding the role of a 
nurse and of the ends of nursing are all important topics for reflection. 
Nursing as a practice, its internal goods and the virtues 
Macintyre's conception of a practice is complex. Could nursing be a practice in the 
Maclntyrian sense? Is nursing a complex and coherent form of socially established co-
operative human activity? How complex is nursing? It would be easy for me -a nurse - to 
assert that nursing is complex. But how is 'complexity' to be evaluated? Nursing practice 
involves many activities and practices, which nurses perform. There are innumerable 
moral tensions and conflicts, which require decisions and choices to be made. 
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Complexity is one requirement of a practice on Macintyre's view. Nursing abounds with 
complex moral and clinical decisions. It is reasonable to suggest that nursing is a form of 
complex, human activity. I also suggest that nursing is socially established. It is 
organized at a social and community level and nurses' activities are regulated at State 
level. In a sense then, nursing is co-operative as well. 
Macintyre was uncertain whether medicine was a practice; it would have been 
interesting and fruitful if he had debated this further. Mille~ also thought medicine 
problematic, because of the difficulty in identifying internal goods. Although on Miller's 
view, medicine, since it has a definite social goal - to help, heal and care for ill persons -
can be seen as a purposive practice. 
Especially in the light of Miller's distinction between purposive and self-contained 
practices, it seems to me that medicine should qualify as a practice. For instance, it is 
co-operative human activity and coherent in that everyone should be working towards 
set ends. It is complex in the sense that it is grounded in the sciences, but also 
necessitates many other skills and abilities. If medicine is a practice, then perhaps 
nursing is too. 
Sellman3 thinks that there is a strong case for considering that nursing is a practice on 
MaCintyre's view. Sellman claims that the internal goods of nursing could derive from, for 
example, helping others, which is something those entering the profession often refer to. 
For example, a recent study using discourse analysis4 investigated reasons why people 
want to be mental health nurses as opposed to, for example, general nurses. Six final 
year undergraduates constructed their own stories. One example is: 
I've enjoyed it so much better than general when I've been going 
310 
through my training and I really do feel its my type of person is 
to sit and talk to patients, and you've got time in psyche ... 5 
Other reasons referred to finding out that one had 'something to give'. The suggestion 
here could be that one wants to help others in some way deal or cope better with mental 
distress. 
Furthermore, Sellman claims that other internal goods could be important 
for those who can be identified as good nurses and that these 
internal rewards become apparent as the student of nursing 
moves from mere performance of tasks to a position of 
immersion in the wider role of nursing. 6 
It would have been useful if Sellman had managed to explicitly identify another internal 
good, because although I have an idea of the sorts of things he has in mind, one is not 
sure. Perhaps Sellman was referring to the sorts of values and positive emotions that 
develop and find expression in more experienced nurses who find an affinity within 
nursing. If so, these feelings are hard to put into words. 
Further support for identifying the internal goods of nursing could be obtained by asking 
nurses. For example, the 3 empirical studies? presented in Chapter 2 that examined the 
role of the nurse. The themes that were identified in these studies were: the need for 
nurses to respond to patients as individuals; nurses to demonstrate respect towards 
patients; nurses should make themselves available to patients; nurses should voluntarily 
decide to spend time with patients, ask questions and listen to patients' responses; and 
nurses should demonstrate certain 'qualities' (on my view, moral virtues) such as 
kindness, patience and honesty. According to empirical studies that examine the views 
of patients and patients' relatives8 , these remarks in large part define a 'good' nurse. The 
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virtue-based approach helps to promote a helping nurse-patient relationship, indeed if 
the virtues are exercised in this relationship, for example, kindness, courage, justice, and 
respectfulness then I refer to this relationship as virtue-based. 
Practices seek to achieve standards of excellence. It has been noted that nursing from a 
virtue-based viewpoint strives for moral (and clinical) excellence. Virtues on Macintyre's 
view are those acquired traits of character that sustain the practices and help persons 
acquire the internal goods. 
I need to return to the question of nursing and its internal goods. What might form the 
internal goods of nursing? What counts as doing nursing well? In the literature in 
Chapter 2 regarding being a good nurse, the virtues were at the core of these 
descriptions. I believe that the internal goods of nursing relate to certain positive 
emotions felt by nurses. For example, the emotional responses and feelings in a nurse 
when she acts, thinks and feels in morally virtuous - for instance, kind, just and 
courageous - ways; when she recognizes and believes that her nursing care is morally 
(and clinically) excellent because of the virtues. When through kindness and patience 
(and perhaps courage) a nurse battles hard to alleviate a patient's pain, when through 
patience, industriousness and kindness a nurse succeeds in helping a patient to sleep 
and when through kindness, patience and gentleness a nurse succeeds in healing a 
patient's pressure sore. Nurses ought to feel proud of themselves when they manifest 
the virtues on a habitual basis. It is also immensely satisfying on an emotional level for a 
nurse to receive sincere gratitude from a patient or a patient's relative for the excellent 
nursing care that one has given. When the virtues are exercised, these feelings - the 
internal goods of nursing - are achieved and the practice of nursing is sustained. 
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In short, I suggest that the development and sustenance of a virtue-based helping 
relationship, the pursuit and implementation of virtue-based moral decision-making and 
the positive feelings of value, worth and gratitude experienced by nurses can be seen as 
examples of the internal goods of nursing. 
Macintyre claims that individuals cannot simply decide what acting well means to them, 
acting well is to be conceived in terms of the particular practices. Macintyre would reject 
the idea that an individual nurse can and should work out her own conception of acting 
well and the good. These aims need to be achieved with reference to the practice of 
nursing and the team of nurses working in the environment. According to Macintyre, 
there needs to be a shared conception of the good and agreement on what the ends of 
nursing should be and what the internal goods of nursing are. 
How can a nurse know what a virtue is or which traits of character are virtues? I 
discussed this question in detail in Chapter 7. Now, in tandem with the use of judgment 
and moral wisdom, one can add that a nurse needs to understand how a particular trait 
of character relates to and promotes the practice of nursing or the specific activity that 
forms part of the practice of nursing. 
On Macintyre's view, the virtues, for example, kindness and justice will sustain the 
practice of nursing. Exercising the virtues will help nurses to achieve the internal goods 
of nursing. Self-reflection and reflection about nursing, the role of the nurse and the 
internal goods of nursing will help nurses to identify which traits are virtues. The virtues 
will help nurses to search - go on a quest - for the good life, for example, they can ask 
questions about the nature of being a good nurse, the meaning and nature of good 
nursing care and how good interpersonal responses can be formed and sustained. Self-
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reflection and reflection are fostered by the virtues. Moral wisdom, in particular moral 
perception, is promoted and heightened by self-reflection and reflection of everything 
that surrounds a nurse. Nurses can learn that exercising the virtues have positive effects 
on the lives of patients, virtuous nurses can achieve the internal goods of nursing and 
such nurses can see that exercising the virtues is a good way of being a nurse. 
Macintyre believes that unless there is a single shared conception of the good life, the 
virtues will be marginalized. He believes that if the virtues are neglected, if for example, 
justice is only understood as an ethical principle or obligation, then the virtues will be 
marginalized and wither away. However, Mason9 disagrees with Macintyre. According to 
Mason, the virtues can still flourish in different practices as long as the individuals within 
each practice share a conception of the good and cooperate to pursue the good. For 
example, a team of 10 nurses on a medical ward cooperate to exercise the virtues of 
compassion, courage, kindness, justice and respectfulness. All of the nurses agree that 
these virtues are crucial to promoting the good including the survival, recovery and faring 
well of the patients. The nurses realize that other virtues might be important given the 
particular circumstances of each situation. But they cooperate to exercise the 
aforementioned virtues so that they can achieve the internal goods and the practice of 
nursing is sustained. On Miller's view, a nurse can review the practice of nursing by 
comparing actions and behaviours with the end it is meant to serve. The standards of 
excellence relate to the particular ends of nursing. 
The virtue-based approach and its focus on exercising the virtues can help a nurse to 
achieve moral excellence. However, adopting the obligation-based view does not mean 
that a nurse will be unable to achieve moral excellence. But the obligation-based 
approach does not focus on this aim· instead it seems to me that it strives towards moral , 
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competence. Note that the exercise of the moral virtues and the virtue-based approach 
can also facilitate the delivery of clinical excellence (Chapter 7). And if there is a focus 
on the intellectual virtues then clinical excellence will be promoted. 
The virtue-based approach as a tradition of enquiry 
Regarding the Maclntyrian idea of a tradition of enquiry, each individual nurse is part of a 
history; one inherits much of who one is from others. Each person is a bearer of a 
tradition of enquiry, an intellectual set of ideas - an argument - that situates the practice 
of nursing (see Figure 1). The history of nursing as a profession, the history of nurse 
education and the histories of each person entering the nursing profession all operate 
within a tradition of enquiry. Traditions are dynamic; they change to meet the needs of 
generations. The philosophical argument that is the virtue-based approach is an 
example of a moral tradition of enquiry; the biomedical model is a scientific or biomedical 
tradition of enquiry. The current emphasis on patient-centred and collaborative care and 
the need for morally excellent care in response to patients' needs and interests provide 
reasons to change the intellectual landscape or perhaps a mini paradigm shift is 
required. 
Conclusions 
I examined Macintyre's work on the virtues so that I could further ground my account of 
the virtue-based approach to nursing practice. This approach includes the development 
and sustenance of a virtue-based helping relationship and the notion of virtue-based 
moral decision-making. The latter is characterized in 3 parts: (1) the exercise of the 
virtues; (2) the use of moral judgment; and (3) the use of moral wisdom - moral 
perception, moral sensitivity and moral imagination. 
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There are notable problems to be addressed with regard to the virtue-based approach. 
These include the conflicts problem and the threat of moral relativism. I have provided a 
defence of these problems in Chapter 7. 
At the end of Chapter 7, I summarized the merits of the virtue-based approach to nursing 
practice. I shall repeat these here: (1) in clinical practice, nurses utilize the language of 
the virtues, thus it is sensible that a nursing ethics utilizes the same vocabulary; (2) 
strong virtue ethics is viable because adequate action-guidance is provided from the 
virtue and vice terms, plus virtue ethics comes up with rules, the v-rules such as 'be 
honest' and 'act kindly' that can help a nurse decide how to act and be towards a patient; 
(3) unlike obligation-based moral theories such as deontology and consequentialism the 
virtue-based approach while accepting the importance of consequences, outcomes and 
results does not over focus on these morally relevant features; (4) the virtue-based 
approach acknowledges the important role played by emotions in the moral lives of 
patients and nurses; (5) no assumptions are made concerning the resolvability of moral 
dilemmas and the phrase 'morally right action' is not conflated to mean 'morally good 
deed'; (6) the virtue-based approach recognizes that the young including novice nurses 
need to learn and be taught how to be moral; (7) the virtue-based approach as a 
tradition of enquiry moves away from the still dominant biomedical model, the former 
accommodates the contemporary agenda of patient-centred, collaborative and holistic 
nursing care far more than the disease and diagnosis focused biomedical model; and (8) 
the virtue-based approach realizes the need for and importance of nurses utilizing 
jUdgment and moral wisdom in nursing practice. 
I now add that I conceive nursing as a practice on Macintyre's view, although following 
Miller I view nursing as a purposive practice, because it has clear social goals. The 
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internal goods of nursing might be obscure and difficult to articulate. However, it is 
fundamentally about nurses wanting to be morally good and wanting to carry out one's 
role to a high moral and clinical standard. The sorts of positive emotions one feels, the 
praise and admiration from others and the memorable sense of achievement that one 
gains from acting well and helping patients survive, recover and fare well through and 
beyond illness are, in my view, plausible candidates for the internal goods of nursing. 
These feelings and responses cannot be achieved by other means. In short, the internal 
goods of nursing can be found in the development and sustenance of a virtue-based 
helping relationship and the practice of virtue-based moral decision-making. 
The virtue-based approach to nursing practice is a tradition of enquiry. As shown in 
Figure 1, the practice of nursing is contextualized and situated within the virtue-based 
approach. Nurses can identify the virtues in a number of ways. For example, by thinking 
hard about the conception of a virtue given in Chapter 3, by reflecting about the role of a 
nurse and by developing a shared conception of the good life and thinking about the 
ends of nursing. Exercising the virtues of, for example, justice, kindness, patience and 
courage can help a nurse to achieve the internal goods of nursing. Furthermore, 
exercising these (and other) virtues will contribute to the sustenance of the practice of 
nursing and the internal goods and prevent the marginalization of the virtues. 
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Figure 1: A representation of the virtue-based approach, the practice of nursing and the 
virtues of justice, kindness, courage and patience. 
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CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
In this final Chapter, I summarize the argument. I reiterate some of the problems of the 
virtue-based approach in nursing including conflicts between virtues. I then consider some 
points for further enquiry and research. Finally, I highlight some of the merits of the virtue-
based approach including its position on moral dilemmas/moral remainder, I examine 
Hursthouse on 'morally right decision/right moral decision' and I examine the topic of 
moral education. 
The argument summarized 
Life threatening, serious and minor illness can affect people throughout the lifespan. 
Illness forms part of a person's life; it is a personal phenomena. A person can feel one or 
more negative emotions caused by illness. These include anxiety, fear, helplessness, 
powerlessness and vulnerability. Admission to hospital or being cared for at home by 
people who are effectively strangers can intensify these feelings. Illness enforces 
dependence on others for help. One needs help to survive illness, recover from it and fare 
well during and beyond illness. 
One of the recognized roles of a nurse is to help and care for patients and promote 
independence in patients. To this end, the development and sustenance of a therapeutic 
nurse-patient relationship is of crucial importance. To facilitate such a helping relationship, 
the literature suggests that nurses require several skills, attributes and qualities. These 
include well-developed verbal and non-verbal communication skills, honesty, kindness, 
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patience and trustworthiness. These qualities are particularly important in the light of the 
current trend towards collaborative and patient centred-care. 
Instead of these traits of character being conceived in terms of skills or qualities and left at 
that, these traits are examples of moral virtues. It is therefore necessary to turn to moral 
philosophy and examine the nature of the virtues. The virtues were at the core of ancient 
Greek ethics most notably in Aristotle's 1 ethics. In this thesis, a moral virtue is conceived 
as a morally good character trait to acquire and exercise. Traits such as kindness dispose 
the possessor to habitually act, think and feel in certain ways, in this case kind ways. 
Moral virtues are examples of moral excellences and as such people who inculcate the 
virtues deserve praise and admiration from other people. The virtues differ depending on 
roles and between societies and cultures. However, exercising the moral virtues IS 
valuable because the possessor and benefactors tend to do well from virtuous activity. 
Since the Enlightenment, obligation-based moral theories have developed and within 
contemporary general ethics these theories are popular and receive widespread attention 
in the literature. Whilst it is clear that obligations, rules and principles, the nature of the act 
and the consequences of actions are morally important features obligation-based theories 
have several well-established flaws. Regarding consequentialism, these include difficulties 
in predicting the actual consequences of actions and omissions and an over focus on the 
notion of the 'Right' including an extreme focus on 'right action'. Furthermore, act, rule and 
indirect forms of consequentialism omit to discuss and take seriously several other morally 
important features. For example, they fail to provide a rich account of moral character, 
tend to gloss over the question of moral education, that is, how the young learn to be 
morally good adults and fail to acknowledge the important role played by emotions in the 
moral life of people. Deontology does not provide adequate action-guidance until its 
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second premise, it uses complex evaluative language such as 'harms' and 'interests' and 
it fails to tell one how to settle conflicts between moral duties. Because of these flaws and 
omissions, obligation-based moral theories in general ethics are incomplete and hence 
inadequate. 
The question is, 'where should one turn in order to discover a more complete account of 
the moral life?' My response is to virtue ethics, the moral theory that has the virtues at its 
core. The aims of virtue ethics include providing a detailed account of moral character, 
resisting making the assumption that all moral dilemmas are resolvable and providing a 
satisfactory account of moral education. Supplementary and strong versions of virtue 
ethics have been developed. Strong versions of virtue ethics have not been proposed in 
medical/health care ethics. This deficit is connected to one of the common criticisms 
levelled against virtue ethics, that it is unable to provide adequate action-guidance; in 
other words it is unable to tell people (nurses) what to do. But thinking about the nature 
and meaning of the virtue and vice terms and the v-rules set forth by Hursthouse2 means 
that virtue ethics does indeed provide adequate action-guidance; at least it is as adequate 
as the action-guidance prescribed by consequentialism and deontology. A strong version 
of virtue ethics is therefore viable and more plausible than some critics acknowledge. 
However, several other problems afflict virtue ethics including the charge of moral 
relativism, how it accounts for excessive virtue and how conflicts between virtues can be 
resolved. 
Despite the recognition that nurses should display the moral virtues and the plausibility of 
a strong virtue ethics (at least in general ethics), in nursing practice and nurse education 
obligation-based moral theories remain extremely popular and widespread. Possible 
reasons for their popularity include the compatibility between the empirical epistemological 
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paradigm of medicine and the outcome-centred perspective of consequentialism and the 
compatibility between rule-based deontological ethics and the rules laid down by 
institutions such as hospitals. 
An examination of moral character is neglected in the literature on nursing ethics. The 
'four principles' approach is popular in the teaching of ethics to students of nursing and in 
the literature. The latest edition of Beauchamp and Childress' Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics3 has responded to criticism of earlier editions by including a chapter on the role of 
the virtues in biomedical practice. 
Disadvantages of obligation-based moral theories in nursing practice include an over 
focus on the nature and consequences of actions/omissions, assumptions about and an 
emphasis on moral dilemmas and their resolution, ignorance of the role emotions play in 
the moral lives of patients and nurses, lack of guidance regarding conflicts between 
obligations, for example, respect for autonomy and beneficence, the apparent 
incompatibility between the nature and aims of obligation-based ethics and the current 
health agenda towards patient centred and collaborative care and the ignorance and 
unrealistic attitude demonstrated towards the role of judgment and moral wisdom in the 
moral lives of nurses. 
The relationship between illness and patients' emotions particularly vulnerability and 
dependence on others for help, the importance of moral character, the value of the moral 
virtues and the use of judgment and moral wisdom can be taken further and 
contextualized within contemporary nursing practice. There is some evidence to suggest 
that nurses do not utilize obligation-based ethics, for example principle-based ethics, in 
moral decision-making. Instead, judgement, intuition and instincts are relied upon. The 
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virtue-based approach suggests that nurses ought to utilize judgement and moral wisdom 
- characterized as moral perception, moral sensitivity and moral imagination - so that 
morally good decisions can be made. 
Morally relevant features of situations, experiences, interactions and observations include 
the outcomes of actions, intuitions, moral rights, moral virtues, intentions and motives, 
religious beliefs, past experiences and clinical information. Morally perceptive nurses are 
able to see such features and discern meaning in them. Morally sensitive nurses 
assimilate this understanding, act upon it and respond to patients' needs and interests in 
morally good ways. Moral imagination can be utilized by nurses to reflect on what it might 
be like to be a patient in a specific set of circumstances; these thoughts can help a nurse 
to find a broad and diverse range of practices, interventions and activities that can help 
patients. 
Three features characterize the virtue-based approach to moral decision-making: (1) 
exercising the moral virtues, for example, compassion (2) utilizing judgment and (3) 
utilizing moral wisdom. The emphasis is on helping a patient to survive illness, recover 
and fare well from illness. The virtues are concerned not with right action but with acting 
morally well, for example, kindly, justly, and patiently. The virtue-based approach does 
take into account the nature and consequences of actions/omissions. Other positive 
features of this approach include a focus on intrapersonal and interpersonal responses, 
the role played by emotion including moral remainder in the moral lives of patients and 
nurses and the use of judgment and moral wisdom in helping nurses to make morally 
good choices and decisions in particular situations with different circumstances. The 
virtue-based approach can be described in short as context-dependent, relational and 
particularist for the reasons stated. 
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Problems of the virtue-based approach in nursing include assumptions about the nature of 
virtues and goodness, ambiguity and disagreement in identifying the virtues, uncertainty 
regarding how to account for excessive virtue, for example, being too honest with a patient 
and being unable to settle conflicts between virtues such as respectfulness and justice. 
However, there are also many merits. These include the compatibility of this approach with 
the language of the virtues and vices used by nurses in practice, adequate action-
guidance provided by the v-rules and the content of the virtues, the wider range of morally 
relevant features that this approach takes into account, its acknowledgment that some 
moral dilemmas are irresolvable or tragic and a recognition that even so-called resolvable 
dilemmas mean that virtuous nurses will feel moral remainder, its emphasis on moral 
education and its acknowledgment that 'high' quality nursing, indeed patient-centred and 
collaborative care, require a particularist and relational nursing ethics that promotes and 
encourages the use of moral judgment and moral wisdom in moral decision making. 
While the philosophical foundation for this virtue-based approach is adequate, the work of 
Macintyre provides a more secure, perhaps deeper, level of grounding. Macintyre's 
account of the virtues as set forth in After Virtue4 is interpreted in the form of 3 theses: (1) 
the role and importance of a narrative conception of the self in morality, (2) the meaning 
and nature of practices, goods and the virtues and (3) the role and importance of a 
tradition of enquiry in morality. Macintyre's account of the virtues is relevant to 
contemporary nursing practice. For example, his account recognizes the importance of 
allowing patients to tell their narratives, it acknowledges the importance of interpersonal 
responses and it realizes that questions about personal identify are fundamentally 
important, for instance, 'who am I?' and 'how do I relate to my colleague?' Macintyre's 
account is particularist, relational and context dependant, most suitable for the virtue-
based approach to moral decision making in nursing practice. 
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Nursing is conceived as a purposive practice; it is a complex and coherent form of socially 
established human activity that aims at providing social goods and demonstrating human 
excellences. While it is far from simple to articUlate the internal goods of nursing, it is 
plausible to suggest that these relate to nurses feeling certain positive emotions. These 
emotions occur when one acts, thinks and feels in morally excellent ways in an attempt to 
help a patient survive illness and then recover and fare well from illness. The development 
and sustenance of a virtue-based helping relationship, the pursuit and implementation of 
virtue-based moral decision-making and feeling valued, for example, receiving gratitude 
from a patient or relative, are examples of the internal goods of contemporary nursing 
practice. Self-reflection about the role of a nurse, one's desires as a nurse and the ends of 
nursing shed light on which traits of character are virtues. Nurses who exercise the virtues 
help to sustain the practice of nursing. The virtue-based approach is conceived as a 
tradition of moral enquiry, the practice of nursing is contextualized and situated within this 
tradition of enquiry. Exercising the virtues, for example justice, will prevent the 
marginalization of the virtues. 
Problems with the virtue-based approach 
Some of the problems of the obligation-based approach that were examined in Chapter 6 
have been repeated in the above summary. In summarizing the argument, I have also 
repeated some of the problems of the virtue-based approach to moral decision-making in 
nursing practice that I examined in Chapter 7. 
The problems of the virtue-based approach will be listed in the same sequence as that 
given in Chapter 7. These are: (a) assumptions made about virtues, moral goodness and 
the meaning of 'virtuous'; (b) the difficulty inherent in identifying the virtues and the charge 
of moral relativism; (c) how one can account for persons exercising a virtue, for example 
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honesty, to an excessive degree; (d) the criticism that virtue ethics and the virtue-based 
approach fails to provide adequate action-guidance; and (e) how to settle conflicts 
between virtues. 
I shall now discuss (d) and (e) in more detail, but note that I also responded to these 
problems in Chapter 7. 
Inadequate action-guidance from virtue ethics and the virtue-based approach 
Supplementary virtue ethics is plausible because it combines the two different 
approaches, deontic (obligation-based) and aretaic (virtue and vice-based). But I believe 
that supplementary virtue theory is merely an obligation-based moral theory with a slogan 
attached saying something like 'oh, don't forget to take moral character into account'. I 
reject the view that people can derive adequate action guidance from evaluative and 
inflexible moral obligations, rules and principles. It seems to me untrue to suggest that 
obligation-based ethics provides adequate action-guidance, while claiming that virtue 
ethics and the virtue-based approach cannot. Responses from a recent Delphi study 
support Hursthouse's5 claim that adequate action guidance can be obtained from thinking 
about the meaning of virtue and vice terms. In this study, the language used by nurses on 
a daily basis included virtue and vice terms such as 'honest', 'fair', 'well', 'good' and 'care,.6 
The use of such terms helps nurses to know how to be and also what to do. From my 
nursing experience, it is true to say that (at least some) nurses use language such as 'that 
nurse acted badly', 'as a nurse, I need to provide good nursing care' and 'it is important to 
be fair when delivering nursing care'. It has been noted how patients associate 'high' and 
'good' quality nursing care with the exercise of moral virtues such as kindness and 
honesty. It is inaccurate to suggest that the language of the virtues and vices is strange or 
rare in nursing practice. It is actually very commonplace. 
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Furthermore, Hursthouse's v-rules thesis is simple, yet also inspiring. She is correct to 
suggest that the virtues and vices prescribe action guidance. For example, 'do what is 
just', 'be kind to patients', 'do not be unfair to patients' and 'be respectful towards patients'. 
To be critical for a moment, perhaps one could claim that Hursthouse is making an 
unnecessary concession to obligation-based ethicists who demand action-guidance in the 
form of moral obligations, rules and principles. Hursthouse developed the v-rules thesis as 
a response to the specific objection that virtue ethics, because it does not produce any 
rules, fails to provide adequate action guidance. However, she demonstrates that virtue 
ethics does produce rules for action. Moreover, the v-rules provide action-guidance that is 
on a par with the action-guidance prescribed by the one rule of act-consequentialism or 
the plurality of rules produced by the various forms of deontology. 
What about clinical skills? 
In relation to the charge of inadequate action-guidance, does discussion of the moral 
virtues ignore the need for nurses to possess good clinical skills? 
Cultivating and exercising the moral virtues will ensure that nursing care is morally 
excellent. However, nursing is also a practical activity because the actual 
interventions/treatments/activities that constitute the work of nurses need to be physically 
carried out by nurses. How can the moral virtues help achieve clinical competence? I 
noted in Chapter 7 that virtue-based moral decision-making, especially the use of moral 
wisdom, can help a nurse to think of a broad and diverse range of activities that can help a 
patient. These activities include effective clinical interventions and pharmacological 
treatments. The motive is to find as many ways as possible to help a patient survive illness 
and recover and fare well beyond illness. Clinical nursing is not ignored even if the focus is 
just on the moral virtues. 
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A second response is to refer to Aristotle's distinction between moral and intellectual 
virtues (as noted in Chapter 3). Aristotle held that theoretical knowledge (episteme) and 
practical wisdom (phronesis) were intellectual virtues. Practical wisdom can be broadly 
understood to mean the practical skills and abilities that are needed to plan and lead a 
successful human life. In the context of nursing, skills and abilities that help a nurse to 
organize, plan and deliver care are important to being a 'good' nurse. In tandem with the 
moral virtues, these can help a patient to survive illness and recover and fare well beyond 
illness. 
Theoretical virtue could also be conceived in a similar way. This refers to the wide range 
of theoretical knowledge needed by nurses to be successful in carrying out their roles. 
This knowledge base is drawn from several disciplines. For instance, anatomy, 
physiology, law, ethics, psychology, sociology, politics, evidence-based care and 
philosophical skills such as critical thinking and the ability to evaluate arguments. 
Furthermore, clinical skills such as taking and recording vital signs, applying a bandage 
and administering medications could be seen as practical virtues needed to be a good, 
successful nurse. The point about viewing the aforementioned as virtues is two-fold. First, 
their relevance to whether patients are able to fare well or not is clearly understood. And 
second, the virtues - moral and intellectual - all aim at human excellence. In short, the 
virtuous nurse is concerned with developing and maintaining morally and clinically 
excellent care. 
Conflicts between virtues 
Conflicts between virtues should be expected given the moral complexity of human lives. 
An adequate normative ethics will realize that conflicts between obligations, rules, 
principles and/or virtues will arise in part because of the personal and subjective nature of 
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human lives. Nursing practice is value-laden and abounds with morally dense, complex 
dilemmas and tensions. 
The action-guidance available from thinking about the meaning and nature of the moral 
virtues, for instance courage, justice and kindness, will mean that nurses do have an idea 
of what to do in difficult situations. The v-rules also provide action-guidance. Furthermore, 
nurses will value different virtues. According to the virtue-based approach to moral 
decision-making, nurses will utilize judgement and moral wisdom to ascertain and 
comprehend the range of morally relevant features within a specific situation or interaction. 
Depending on a nurse's evaluation of the aforementioned, she might decide to be just 
rather than kind, because she values justice as a virtue more than kindness in this 
particular situation. 
The virtues are excellences of character, admirable and praiseworthy traits that help their 
possessor and others to lead morally good lives. Choosing between virtues can be 
problematic; this is one reason why the use of judgment and moral wisdom is so important 
in the moral lives of nurses and patients. A decision may have to be made between acting 
justly or kindly. Both these sorts of actions are examples of acting virtuously. The patient 
will be helped, but in different ways. It would be different if the choice was between acting 
from a virtue (say, kindness) and acting from a vice (say, cruelty). The former is morally 
preferable to the latter. To end, it would also be prudent to act from the virtue of 
respectfulness and ask the patient for his preference. This is sensible (given the caveats 
that the patient is an adult and has decision-making capacity), especially with the current 
health agenda that focuses on collaborative and patient-centred care and promoting the 
empowerment of patients. 
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Areas for further research and enquiry 
Research on identifying the virtues and conflicts between virtues 
Empirical nursing research utilizing questionnaires, grounded theory and ethnography 
could examine a series of topics including the identification and value of virtues. Moreover, 
it would be profitable for researchers to investigate the nature of conflicts between virtues 
and gather information from nurses and patients regarding their views on these complex 
phenomena. Further philosophical enquiry on all of these topics is also needed. 
Research on the intellectual virtues, judgment and moral wisdom 
In this thesis, I have neglected to sufficiently examine the role of intellectual virtues in 
nursing practice and their relationship to moral virtues. While it is clear that the moral 
virtues are crucial to the development of a virtue-based approach to nursing practice, the 
role of the intellectual virtues requires further scrutiny~ Empirical research and 
philosophical enquiry regarding how nurses utilize practical wisdom and the role of 
judgment and moral wisdom in the moral lives of nurses and patients would prove 
invaluable to the development of a rigorous virtue-based approach to nursing practice. 
Virtue ethics and blame 
Obligation-based ethics are stringent theories that demand a lot from people. Act-
utilitarianism has just one rule, but deontology has a plurality of rules. In combination, 
these theories tell people that many acts are impermissible or obligatory. There is plenty of 
scope for people to fail to meet the demands of these rules. If a person does not meet 
such demands, then, according to these theories, she has failed and is morally (and 
perhaps legally) blameworthy and culpable, depending upon her intentions and the 
outcomes of the acts/omissions. Virtue ethics would view this differently. (I say 'would' 
because I failed to identify any literature on this topic.) The virtue ethics view is pertinent to 
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nursing because contemporary nurses practise in an environment that conceives 'good' 
practice in a legalistic sense as well as in a moral sense. Of course, virtue ethics aims to 
motivate nurses to cultivate and exercise the virtues, so that the possessor (the nurse) 
and the benefactor (the patient) can fare well in life. And if a nurse is despicable (for 
example, violent, nasty or cruel) then he acts viciously and deserves blame. He should 
feel moral remainder - emotions such as remorse, guilt and regret - for being such a nurse 
and doing such deplorable and unpleasant deeds (however, he might not feel these 
emotions because he is not virtuous). It is unfair to claim that virtue ethics is lenient on 
those who do horrid deeds; it clearly does not ignore the notions of blame and 
responsibility. Virtue ethics and the virtue-based approach encourages people to be 
virtuous, because it realizes that many people are capable of being vicious. But virtue 
ethics does not aim to make people feel guilty or uncomfortable for being unable to act in 
accordance with moral obligations, rules or principles. Part of the reason for this view is 
that people who have 'failed' to act ethically - that is, have not acted according to 
obligations, rules or principles - might have had good, perhaps virtuous, moral reasons for 
so doing. On this view, in contrast to obligation-based ethics virtue ethics should be 
considered less uncompromising and more just in terms of attributing blame. 
Patients with chronic illness and the virtues 
It should be clear that the virtue-based approach focuses on the development and 
sustenance of a virtue-based helping relationship between nurse and patient. While a 
nurse can exercise the virtues in any nursing speciality, the development of such a 
relationship is facilitated over a period of time. Some of the examples in this thesis include 
patients with chronic illness such as arthritis. Patients with chronic illness such as arthritis, 
diabetes, asthma and manic depression exploit the true nature of the virtues, provide ideal 
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opportunities for the virtuous activity of nurses and facilitate the development of a virtue-
based helping relationship. 
It is sensible to suppose that different nursing environments will have an effect on the 
opportunity and possibility for such a virtuous relationship to be formed in the first place. 
This goal might not be as achievable in nursing environments where patients are admitted 
and discharged rapidly. Examples of this include day case surgical wards and outpatient 
appointments. However, it remains important for nurses to exercise the virtues irrespective 
of the environment. It is hard to imagine that acting kindly, patiently and justly could ever 
be seen as examples of acting badly. 
It would be interesting to examine the role of nurses working in A&E and identify which 
virtues are deemed important. Community nursing is an environment where the virtue-
based approach would be most profitable.? And it would be profitable to investigate the 
virtue of compassion in terminal care, the role of courage and respectfulness in being an 
advocate for a patient and the nature of justice as a virtue in issues of resource allocation. 
These topics could be examined by utilizing a two-pronged approach, namely 
philosophical enquiry and empirical nursing research. 
Merits of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice 
I examined the merits of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice in Chapter 7 and 
these were again highlighted in the 'Summary' section at the beginning of this Chapter. In 
this section I shall list the merits and then focus on the virtue-based approach and moral , 
dilemmas/moral remainder, Hursthouse on 'morally right decision/right moral decision' and 
moral education. 
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The merits of the virtue-based approach in nursing practice include: (a) nurses in their 
clinical work utilize the language of the virtues and vices, thus a plausible and adequate 
nursing ethics should acknowledge this; (b) the important role assigned to consequences 
and outcomes in the moral life is recognized, but there is also a focus upon the role played 
by emotion in the moral life of patients and nurses; (c) reasons for action are identified and 
examined in terms of the virtues and vices, for example, has someone acted well or 
badly?; (d) the patient's lived experience of illness is told in the form of a narrative to a 
nurse who wants to understand how the illness affects the patient's activities of living; (e) 
patient-centred and collaborative care is facilitated by the aims and concerns of the virtue-
based approach; (f) moral dilemmas are not assumed to be resolvable, the notion of 'right 
action' is not emphasized, but moral remainder is; and (g) the subject of moral education 
is held to be of central importance in morality. 
I shall discuss (f) and (g) in more detail. 
The virtue-based approach and Hursthouse on dilemmas and moral remainder 
Nurses who cUltivate the virtues and develop an understanding of virtue ethics and the 
virtue-based approach will be aware that moral dilemmas in nursing are either (a) 
resolvable or (b) irresolvable. But in both kinds of dilemma, nurses will feel moral 
remainder - negative emotions such as regret, anguish, guilt, hurt, loss, despair and 
remorse. Nurses should realize that it is a sign of a virtuous moral character to feel these 
emotions. It is morally appropriate to feel these emotions because the virtuous nurse is 
fully aware of the distressing nature of nursing situations that for both patient and nurses 
are saturated with moral tensions, uncertainties and perplexing issues. Moral remainder 
will be experienced during and after many different nursing interventions/interactions. 
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Irresolvable dilemmas present when two virtuous persons (nurses) do not know what to 
do. In the end, both virtuous persons do different things; these situations might involve a 
conflict between virtues. Despite each act being an example of virtuous behaviour - for 
example, one is just, another kind - each nurse feels moral remainder. This is intensified 
because each virtuous nurse evaluates his or her behaviour as less than admirable and 
far from morally good. On Hursthouse's view both nurses' lives will be marred. 8 
Hursthouse on 'morally right decision/right moral decision' 
Obligation-based ethics encourages the conflation of two different meanings that can be 
given to 'morally right decision/right moral decision'. Assume that in a moral dilemma the 
options are x (to coerce a patient to have ECT) and y (to respect the patient's wish to 
refuse ECT). X is the better option because it is believed that ECT will help to alleviate the 
patient's depression, x is more beneficial than y therefore x is carried out. 
Other examples of this sort of dilemma (though they might not be seen as such) include 
whether to sedate a patient against his will, whether to detain someone involuntarily and 
whether to respect a patient's decision to refuse life-prolonging chemotherapy. These are 
examples of 'Dynamic' ethical issues that have caught the public attention partly through 
intensive media attention. But as noted in a recent Delphi study9 other examples abound 
in nursing. For example, should a nurse allow a patient to leave the ward for an hour and 
should a patient be allowed extra pocket money? 
Returning to the case in point. Here, the decision to go ahead with the ECT is the 'right 
moral decision', because it is made on the grounds that y was more harmful. But a 
different use of this phrase refers to a person doing a morally good deed, one that is 
motivated from the virtues and deserves admiration and praise. Option x (coercing a 
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patient into having ECT), while the morally right option of the two is clearly not an 
admirable act. Coercing a patient to have a treatment that she would rather not have is not 
an example of a morally good deed and does not deserve praise or admiration from 
others. 
Teaching the virtues 
In Chapter 7, it was noted how virtue ethics views the moral education of the young to be 
crucial to a plausible account of the moral life. I shall consider this in the context of nursing 
practice. 
There appears to be a neglect of the virtues and virtue ethics in the teaching of nursing 
ethics to pre-registration nurses. This belief was supported by the findings of one small 
scale Delphi questionnaire study,10 which showed that 4 out of 11 lecturers from selected 
departments of nursing in the UK taught virtue ethics to pre-registration student nurses. 
The focus was instead on consequentialism and deontology, which were taught by 10 out 
of 11 lecturers. If these findings are supported on a wider scale, then many students will 
not come into contact with the notions of the virtues and virtue ethics and obligation-based 
ethics might be seen as the only moral approach to nursing practice. 
In my recent experience, teaching ethics to common foundation programme (CFP) and 
adult branch pre-registration nursing students, the majority of students had never heard of 
the phrase 'the virtues'. However, further discussion revealed that the students were 
familiar with traits such as 'patience', 'justice' and 'honesty' and they understood how 
exercising these traits were crucial to being a 'good' nurse. 11 Students rely on lectures and 
seminars to provide them with an essential knowledge base. But in the Delphi study just 
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noted, no specialist lecturers in ethics were employed to teach ethics to students of 
nursing. This might help to explain the lack of focus on the virtues and virtue ethics. 
Can the virtues be taught? 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that in ancient Greece virtue was understood to be a form of 
knowledge. Typically, knowledge is something that can be taught. Lutzen and Barbosa da 
Silva claim that the "virtues can be learned by anyone".12 However, one might argue that 
the virtues cannot be taught. One might believe that one is either born 'good or bad' and 
that is how people remain. For example, one who in the past has been a nasty or vicious 
person (or even someone who has just not been morally good) cannot change and 
become a morally good person. Or, perhaps while character change on a major scale is 
impossible, more 'minor' changes are possible such as improving one's self-control. 
Character change, whether major or minor, is not a process that can happen overnight. It 
will take a lot of hard work for someone to change character; indeed, changing one's 
character is probably one of the hardest things a person will ever do. 
How can the virtues be taught? 
In ethics education, it is common to deliver a series of 'key' lectures followed by smaller 
group work, for example, seminars or tutorials. The virtues, virtue ethics and the virtue-
based approach in nursing practice could be taught in the same manner. Discussion and 
debate could centre on the nature of virtues, the role of virtues in nursing practice and an 
examination of some of the merits and problems with the virtue-based approach. 
Differences between the virtue-based and the deontic approaches could be examined and 
even novice student nurses could begin to think seriously about the role of the virtues and 
vices in nursing and how interpersonal responses can help or hinder patients to survive 
illness and recover and fare well beyond illness. 
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Second, the virtues are best demonstrated in the clinical environment, where learners can 
observe experienced nurses carrying out their roles in a morally (and clinically) excellent 
manner. However, there is the question of who should judge moral excellence in nurses? 
This is more problematic than identifying nurses who are thought to be clinically excellent 
- the latter can be observed and evaluated by using quantitative methods. It is more 
difficult, though not impossible, to evaluate a nurse's moral goodness. Despite this 
obstacle, the notion of good, positive role models runs deep in contemporary culture 
generally and specifically, in nursing education.13 The emphasis on the value of 
mentorship in contemporary nursing practice is related to a feature of virtue ethics 
mentioned earlier, namely that in a quandary it can be invaluable to ask a wise person for 
moral guidance. In my nursing experience, it was common for one nurse to ask another, 
perhaps more experienced nurse, for guidance. Indeed, asking colleagues for guidance 
and advice is believed by at least some nurses to be a sign of a good team member. 
Once role models have been identified, the hard work can begin. Although difficult, 
inculcating the virtues is possible; note that Aristotle believed that virtuous behaviour 
resulted from habit. 
Conclusions 
I believe that due to the nature and effects of illness, the emphasiS in nursing practice 
should be on the ill patient and the character traits of the nurse who is caring for the 
patient. It is therefore perplexing that act-centred obligation-based moral theories remain 
so popular and widespread in nursing practice and nurse education. 
I have examined the flaws in obligation-based moral theories and concluded that these 
theories are incomplete and inadequate moral theories. I have characterized a virtue-
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based helping relationship and the virtue-based approach to moral decision-making. The 
latter focuses on several features that obligation-based ethics neglect. These are: (1) 
exercising the virtues, (2) using judgment and (3) using moral wisdom. These features 
enable morally good decisions to be made; such decisions are contextualized and 
particular. 
The cultivation and exercise of moral virtues is of fundamental importance to the end of 
being a morally good nurse. The practice of nursing can be sustained if nurses exercise 
the virtues and achieve the internal goods of nursing. If the virtues such as justice are 
seen in terms of moral principles, then I fear that the virtues will become marginalized. 
Exercising the virtues does not go unrecognized by patients. For example, a nurse who 
acts kindly, a nurse who is gentle and patient and a nurse who is courageous will be held 
in great esteem and will be praised and admired by both patients and other nurses. 
Ethicists educators and clinical nurses should take virtue ethics and the virtue-based , 
approach to nursing practice more seriously. Naturally, like other moral theories such as 
consequential ism and deontology, the virtue-based approach can be critiqued. But despite 
these objections, a strong virtue-ethics/virtue-based approach provides a philosophically 
adequate and sufficient nursing ethics. As such, it demands one's attention and further 
investigation. 
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